

THOUGHT AND REALITY

Hegelianism and Advaita

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BY

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E R R A T A

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	
19	12	read "Comorin" for "Comerin "
32	13	omit "its "
36	29 and 36	read "sūtras" for "sātras "
120	34	omit "not "
198	25	read "differences" for "difference "
239	31	ninth word read "so" for "as "
276	46	read "Sāstri" for "Satī" and "Siddhāntaleśa" for "Siddhāntaleśasamgraha."
280		read "Brahmananda" for "Brahmānada "

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TO
MY TEACHER
PROFESSOR SIR S RADHAKRISHNAN

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P R E F A C E

THE present work is a contribution to certain aspects of idealistic philosophy. It is a comparative study, yet it is not a comparison for the sake of comparison. It examines the supra-rational Absolutism of the West developed under the Hegelian influence, and in the light of the criticisms shows the peculiar character of the Advaita Vedānta of Sankara. It is therefore not a mere exposition, but a criticism and construction. The discussions are not cosmological, but epistemological and metaphysical, approached from the side of logic.

The work may also be viewed as a reorientation of Sankara's system. It places Sankara's philosophy in line with the idealistic philosophies of the West, so that we can understand the peculiarities of the former in terms of the latter. It thus discovers or brings into clearer light the guiding principle of Sankara's thought. It brings out the full significance of the principle of non-contradiction applied by Sankara as a test of truth and reality, and shows its difference from the same principle as understood by Hegel and the Hegelians. It shows the logical significance of *māyā*, demonstrates the unreality of negation and proves that the method of philosophy, which also represents the process of life, is a method which is similar to the transcendental method of Kant and the post-Kantians with certain differences. It shows that many objections to which the Hegelian Absolutism is open can be met by a consistent development of supra-rational Absolutism. The views developed in this work are therefore developed from Hegel through Bradley—these being two of the greatest philosophers of the world. Hegel is criticized from the standpoint of Bradley, and Bradley from that of Sankara. Other Hegelians are occasionally referred to, and made use of. They are introduced only as representatives of possible alternative solutions.

As the aim of the work is to attempt at laying the metaphysical foundation of the logic of supra-rational Absolutism,

the interpretation of Advaita is based mostly on polemical works. A list of books on both Indian and Western philosophy, studied and consulted, is given. Of course, other works, not mentioned in the list, have influenced my views, or helped to make them clear, especially the works of James, Dewey, Schiller, Alexander, Russell, Holt and his school, and the critical realists. As regards the Sanscrit works, the list does not contain many works on Advaita, which are non-polemical in character. But they were certainly useful to me in understanding the Advaita position. I have not included them in the list, because their help was not taken in writing the book, and because the book is mainly based on *Advaitasiddhi*, *Khandanakhandakhādyā*, and *Tatwadīpikā*, which are the chief polemical works on Advaita philosophy. For the general literature on Advaita as well as on other systems of Indian philosophy Professor Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* may be consulted.

In the study that follows I have adopted the method of dealing with problem after problem, point after point. But all the problems are interrelated. So no chapter is complete by itself, though I have tried to treat it so as far as possible. The reader may be left with a sense of dissatisfaction if he takes any chapter by itself without reading the whole.

Again, because of the method followed and the interrelation of the problems, there are some repetitions and overlappings. And some chapters in one Part, it may be felt, may as well be included in another. For example, Chapter iv of Part iv may be inserted in Part i.

There is an advantage in following this method. It is generally accepted that Hegel's philosophy is difficult to understand. But it is felt that unless the connection of Hegelian Supra-rationalism is traced to Hegel's philosophy in some points, the importance of the tenets of the former cannot be understood. Therefore I have taken the tenets concerned one after another and examined them in their different interpretations without entering into a controversy as to what Hegel actually meant. This procedure is made easier by this method.

The whole work has been written under the direct guidance

of Professor Radhakrishnan, to whom I acknowledge my indebtedness Professor J H Muirhead has taken very kind interest in my work And my grateful thanks are due to him for writing a Foreword. Besides, had it not been for his and Professor Radhakrishnan's kind suggestions and criticisms, the book would have been much more imperfect than it is even now Part of the work has already been published in different periodicals I thank their editors for permitting me to reproduce it from them The reproductions are duly acknowledged in the footnotes

P T. R.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

IN the transliteration of Sanscrit words I have used the usual diacritical marks to distinguish between the short and long vowels, as there is much possibility of committing mistakes in pronouncing them without the aid of the marks But I have not used them to distinguish between the different nasals, for naturally in pronunciation the nasal assimilates itself to the following consonant, and wherever necessary to the preceding one. It is rarely that even those who are not acquainted with Sanscrit mistake in pronouncing the nasals On the contrary, they may be puzzled by the marks if used to distinguish between the nasals, for they may think that the marks are used to indicate that the nasals have to be pronounced in some unknown way which is not the natural In the case of unfamiliar words I have stroked the palatal s at the top and dotted the lingual t and d at the bottom to differentiate them from the dental s, t, and d.

FOREWORD

I AM glad to respond to Dr. Raju's request that I should send a word of greeting to his book. The chief problem before the world at the present time is the healing of divisions between nations by a more earnest effort to understand one another. In this great mission philosophy has its part to play. The late Professor J. S. Mackenzie, who is well known in India, and who gave a great deal of attention to the means by which existing barriers to what he called a Co-operative Commonwealth of Nations might be removed, emphasized the importance of softening the antagonism between views that are apt to seem reciprocally irrational to the communities who hold them. That there are deeply rooted temperamental differences in peoples and that these are partly responsible for the different ideas of the meaning of life that prevail among them cannot of course be denied. But that the fixation of particular ideas in the literature and the formal teaching of a nation may influence profoundly its practical attitude to life is no less undeniable, and is the foundation of the hope that this may be modified by a change in what might be called the angle of educational incidence. It is a matter of common observation that in the traditional philosophies of the West in general and of England in particular, on the one hand, and of India on the other, there has from the beginning been a fundamental difference of this kind which has tended to render them intellectually opaque to each other. To the Eastern the preoccupation of the Western mind with the world of sense and the practical application of what we learn from it to the progress of material civilization has been one of the chief obstacles to the recognition of any real spiritual community with it. "How," he asks, "with any show of reason can temporal and material interests be assigned to a dominant place in a life which has significance only if it be interpreted as the hither-side of eternity?" On the other hand, to the Western the preoccupation of Eastern thought with a philosophy which preaches as the highest wisdom the contempt of sense

and matter in order to attain to a state of complete independence of them and be merged in Nirvana, has always seemed equally incomprehensible and absurd. In view of this antagonism the greatest importance attaches to recent signs of approximation to each other of leading thinkers of Great Britain and India. To Indian thinkers the shift of the emphasis, so marked in such writers as F. H. Bradley, from emphasis on temporal and spatial existence to emphasis on the values of which it is only the bearer and which give it 'reality,' is as welcome as is vice versa, the reinterpretation that Vedanta philosophy is receiving from Indian scholars so as to leave room for the ideal of a spiritual life to be attained, not by the elimination, but by the transformation of material interests, to the Western. Whether this change is interpreted in terms of the old antithesis between idealism and realism is a matter of words. The distinction has been wearing thin of late and perhaps had better be dropped now that it has served its purpose. What is of importance is the development both in East and West of a wider point of view which contains the promise of a better understanding between them as to the real meaning of human life and the ideals that should animate it in the great co-operative enterprise on which they are embarking.

Dr. Raju's wide reading in the philosophical literature of both our countries and his manifest sympathy with what is best in both, fit him in a particular degree for the task of contributing to such an understanding, and I wish his book every success.

J. H. MUIRHEAD

INTRODUCTION¹

INDIA has passed through many a political crisis. With every change in the political situation new factors have been introduced into her civilization. It has had to face, either to incorporate or oppose, new ways of thought, new standards of morality, and new forms of administration. The remarkable plasticity and elasticity of the Indian mind have expressed themselves in the various ways in which it has tried to treat the novel factors. Whenever a new religious creed appeared, it was shown to be a part of the old creed itself, and the supersession by the former of the latter was prevented. Thus Buddhism, which once spread from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, was rooted out by the absorption of most of its fundamental tenets. Moral and political discussions were divorced from the philosophical.² What Manu or Parāśara said was the settled law. None was allowed to tamper with it. It had nothing to do with a philosophical principle, even though it be the central principle on which the conception of the world was based. Similarly, political theories were in no way affected by philosophy. It was enough if our politics and morality did not conflict with

¹ The major part of this Introduction has been published in *The Aryan Path* in its June 1934 and February 1935 issues under the titles, "Need for Reorientation of Indian Philosophy" and "The Outcry Against Comparative Philosophy."

² Some may say that the institutes of our ancient lawgivers, like Manu, have a philosophical basis. But their basis is religious rather than philosophical. No particular metaphysical system seems to be implied by them. Unlike Hegel and Plato, Manu has no metaphysics of his own. Dr. Bhagavan Das's interpretation of Manu in his *Laws of Manu* does not advert to such a system. Manu's code is accepted by pluralists like the Naiyāyikas, monists like Rāmānuja, and non-dualists like Sankara alike.

Dr. Bhagavan Das has kindly suggested to me that Manu has a philosophy, though he is not a system-builder or a difference-maker. I agree with him in saying that Manu has some philosophy, because he does tell us something about God and the nature of man's life. But he does not present us a philosophy which is strictly systematic.

the ultimate aim of life, viz the realization of the Supreme Brahman.

This indifference to ethics, politics, and other social sciences is the vulnerable point in Indian philosophy. A philosophy, if it is to satisfy fully the demands of human life, should not only provide us with a principle on which we can base our conception of the world, but also attempt to develop from it the sciences that are incident to social life. True, a synoptic view of the universe, an intellectual construction of it, should not be the sole aim of philosophy. It is the ability to rise above such an attitude that most of the Western systems are lacking. Their dominant attitude is one of intellectual curiosity rather than of a serious search after the solution of life's problems. On the other hand, we should not fail to notice that life's problems include the ethical and social. They should be related to the same principle which is to explain the nature of the world. It is very often said that the outlook of Indian philosophy is practical, that philosophy, for the Indian, is not a way of thought, but a process of life. But philosophy, if it is to be a process of life, must be a process, not of blind, but of conscious life, of a life that thinks. Studies like ethics, etc., form part of our conscious life. Our life cannot avoid thinking about them. Nor can it sunder itself into discrete and unrelated parts, and treat social sciences as having nothing to do with its theory of the world. Life is a whole, a unity, and its various phases cannot be left in isolation.

"The work of philosophy," says Dewey, "is the ever new undertaking of adjusting that body of traditions which constitutes the actual mind of man to scientific tendencies and political aspirations which are novel and incompatible with the received authorities. Philosophers are parts of history, caught in its movement, creators perhaps in some measure of the future, but also assuredly creatures of the past"¹ But our philosophers of the past have nothing to say about political aspirations, and we have no new philosophies now. We are therefore obliged to import and adopt foreign views. But these necessitated and developed in

¹ *Philosophy and Civilization*, p. 4

foreign lands under dissimilar circumstances may not well suit our purpose. One element here and another there may seem adoptable. But the danger of importing such isolated elements from a system is too great to be encouraged. We have our own world-conception. And the imported views, if they do not agree with it, will work havoc on our lives by disintegrating them. It is necessary that our own individuality should react to the new problems that face it, discover its own solutions.

It is this absolute separation of our metaphysics from our social sciences by our ancient philosophers that is mostly responsible for the growing apathy towards them. *Our philosophers are now studied in the spirit of antiquarian research, and not with a view to find a solution for the problems that face present-day society. One feels as if our philosophy has nothing to do with life, it is not living but dead. One cannot help doubting whether one is not clinging to a body from which life has escaped. It may be admitted that our philosophy satisfied the needs of our ancestors centuries ago, when India was not in close contact with the rest of the world. But now the conditions have changed. That our philosophy is not able to cope with the complexity of the present situation is shown by the indifference with which it is treated.* A Tilak or a Mahatma Gandhi may give Bhagavadgita a new interpretation. But every such attempt is resented by the orthodox Indian as a misrepresentation which he would regard as something not to be taken seriously. It is not of serious concern for his life. He will take an active interest in it only if it is shown to be a necessary development of his own views. He is now faced by new problems, and any solution which the philosopher wants to offer him should be demonstrated as the logical outcome of his own theories. Only thus can our philosophy be now brought to bear on life.

It is high time that our philosophers should enter upon such a task. For a number of decades the work of translation, interpretation, and exposition, has been carried on. Besides the vast amount of work accomplished by Western scholarship, Indian scholars have been recently very active in that direction. To mention a few, Dr. Ganganath Jha

has seen that few important works on Indian philosophy remain to be translated; Dr Radhakrishnan has done much from the standpoint of comparative philosophy; throughout all his works are scattered hints for new developments, and he himself tried to give a new synthesis in his *Idealistic View of Life*, Dr Dasgupta besides the two massive volumes he has already presented to the world, promises to bring out four more such, and the attempts at an encyclopaedic survey of Indian philosophy by the Academy of Philosophy and Religion (Poona) will, we expect, leave little further to be done in the field of interpretation and exposition. Already there are signs of lagging enthusiasm for such work.

Not only the condition in the present philosophical circles, but also our social life demands new developments in thought It is as if the current of our old traditions has met the opposite current of the new ways of life and the progress of either has been checked. We have to find a new synthesis which would open the way for further progress. We should not allow the traditional and modern modes of thought and life to play into each other's hands for the downfall of our philosophy and consequently of our civilization. Hegel said that a civilization without metaphysics would be like a temple "in all other respects richly ornamented but lacking its Holy of Holies"¹ And ours would be no exception to the view. The duty of the philosopher now is "to effect a junction at some point in the new and old, of deepest sunk customs and unconscious dispositions, that are brought to the light of attention by some conflict with the newly emerging directions of activity"

"Philosophies which emerge at distinctive periods define the larger patterns of continuity which are woven in effecting the enduring junctions of a stubborn past and an incessant future"² Only by performing this function can Indian philosophy still maintain itself and our civilization. It can be performed only by attempts at new formulations. Thus the philosopher would be serving his society by supplying patterns for thought and action

Ideals to guide society in its different branches of activity

¹ *Science of Logic*, vol. 1, p. 34

² *Philosophy and Civilization*, p. 7.

cannot be framed unless the world-conception is brought to bear on the social problems. This requires reorientation of our philosophy.¹ In spite of our great ancient systems, we cannot boast of any organization of our philosophical sciences. Our systems contain discussions mostly on religion, metaphysics, logic, psychology, and certain rules of life which are rather religious than ethical. Even they are promiscuously mixed up, not distinguished and systematized. They have all to be organized. We have to import from the West the spirit of organization. Though systematization of the various branches of our experience should not be the sole aim of philosophy, it should be an essential part of it. Our metaphysics should be made the foundation of our logic, ethics, and social and political philosophies. With this aim it has to be organized. It should be made to yield logical principles which will guide our social and political thought. Then only will it be living and touch our very lives. What great efforts have not been made by Plato to adopt his metaphysical theories to his conception of state and society! Similarly, the part played by Hegel's conception of the Absolute in the organization of the states of Central Europe is not little. We need not follow any of these philosophers blindly in their methods. Yet that there is a need of relating all branches of human knowledge cannot be gainsaid. This organization is possible only if the guiding principle of our thought is made explicit. This principle is already there in our philosophy. But due to the modern ways of thinking and living it has been missed by us. In order to catch it, much stress has been laid recently on comparative philosophy, the comparison of our philosophy with those of the West. It is believed that thereby the principle can be expressed in the new way. But more often

¹ In this connection I should mention the names of two Indian thinkers who have been doing valuable work in the way of re-orientation. Dr. Bhagavan Das, though he does not present us a rigorously systematic metaphysic, has been trying to align Indian thought, chiefly in its ethical and social aspects, with Western thought. His writings are popular. Professor K. C. Bhattacharya formulates a view akin to Advaita in his small but difficult work, *The Subject as Freedom*.

than not, the comparison has been superficial, and did not touch the core of the Indian mind. And now it is feared that comparison will lead to misrepresentation and misunderstanding.

Other reasons have also led some to feel serious doubts as regards the value and reliability of comparative philosophy¹ Those doubters whisper that in comparing our systems with those of the West, we generally tend to test the importance of the former by using the latter as the standard. In doing so, we tacitly or overtly hold the latter in higher esteem. As politically conquered by a Western nation, we regard it and its culture as superior to us and our culture. In comparing our philosophy therefore with that of the West, we help to aggravate our sense of inferiority—which is certainly undesirable.

If it is true that the feeling of inferiority is engendered or intensified by comparative philosophy, then it is certainly to be discouraged. But, on the contrary, we find, even in the West, many scholars of the opinion that India has reached the greatest of speculative heights and can be proud of philosophers of the keenest analytical skill This opinion of some Indians may be dogmatic rather than considered. And the unwillingness to compare, of some ordinary enthusiasts, may be due not only to a lack of thorough and systematic grasp of the Western systems, but also to mere prejudice And this prejudice is ultimately nothing but the fear of being shown some weakness of Indian thought. The Christian is prejudiced against the Heathen; the Jew against the Gentile; so is the Hindu against the Mlechcha. In each the former is nowadays very sensitive to any criticism by the latter. But in this twentieth century when a rational and sympathetic understanding of all religions and philosophies is nearly accomplished, this sensitiveness is a tacit and unconscious admission of weakness, and the prejudice is practically the fear of its disclosure If so, it is again the outcome of the sense of inferiority, hidden in the innermost depths of mind.

¹ The word is used in the general sense of a comparative study of philosophy.

As the objectors to comparative philosophy contend, comparison may lead to some misrepresentation. Similarities may occur in very divergent systems with quite opposite standpoints. And this fact may be the source of some misinterpretation. For example, one may compare Spinoza's Substance to Sankara's Brahman. But the astonishing and the fundamental difference between the two is the difference in their methods. Spinoza's geometrical method never could have been endorsed by Sankara. Spinoza's Substance like Sankara's Brahman transcends discursive thought. But the former does not notice the inconsistency in the attempt to deduce the phenomenal world from what transcends our discursive thought. And the importance which Spinoza assigns to his deductive method becomes obvious the moment one opens his *Ethics*. But such a deduction could never have been conceived by Sankara. His method is a consuming dialectic, the principle of which, again, may be compared to the principle of coherence or non-contradiction of Bradley and Bosanquet. But this again would be a misrepresentation, for the principle has only a negative significance in the metaphysics of Sankara, whereas it is positively significant in the theories of Bradley and Bosanquet.

Yet these objections do not prove that comparison is necessarily misleading. *Comparison should be between system and system, not between concept and concept*. Even comparison between concept and concept, if it is to be thorough, should lead to the comparison of systems—which means that the concepts are taken with all the significance they derive from the peculiar contexts. Only such comparison can have metaphysical value.

This requirement makes the task very difficult. Yet such comparison is the only way by which we can arrive at significant conclusions. In performing it we may come across very valuable principles, the importance of which might have been so far unrecognized, or we may even find certain inconsistencies that might have been unnoticed. If attempts are made to remove the inconsistencies and develop on the discovered principles, new roads to progress will certainly be opened.

The view that we should not refer to any Western philosophy, lest we misinterpret, though it reveals an extremely cautious mind, is not in harmony with the spirit of our times, and is indifferent to its needs. This is the time when the peoples of the earth want to understand each other fully, and this spirit is seen not only in politics, but also in every other branch of life. To avoid misunderstanding, to bring home to others that our philosophy is as living as theirs, there could be no better way than comparison. The rationality of our systems and the presence in them of elements of universal interest, can be best exhibited by this method. This would be useful not only in making others understand us, but also in finding out what is living and what is dead in our philosophy. The scientific spirit has penetrated our country like many other parts of the globe. Its inquisitive attitude first resulted in calling in question everything ancient and accepted on authority. The first fruit of modern education was a distrust of our *dharma*, our Vedas, and our philosophies. But later, when Western scholars, like Max Muller, demonstrated their worth by a comparative study, there was a recoil from the extreme of absolute disbelief. Yet to regard Indian philosophy as beyond the reach of comparison, saying that comparison is likely to compromise its greatness, is to forget the pitiable state out of which it has been lifted, and is the opposite extreme to be avoided. It is only comparative study that has recognized its value and it only can spread its influence and win for it universal recognition. Though every system of philosophy, like poetry, is tinged with the peculiarities of its environment in which it is born, yet if it is truly rational, it does not fail to contain factors which would make it a world philosophy.

Besides, we have a hoary past, and so possess an individuality that is showing symptoms of becoming inflexible. Nations that have no past, and so no independent culture, are very susceptible to every change, because their individuality is still in the process of formation, and does not yet show signs of ossification. Once formed, it too begins to resist every modification and every incorporation of new

elements. And an individuality that is agile and full of life, and therefore progressive, does not show any recalcitrance in assimilating the new and dropping the outworn. If our individuality is to continue as a living force, it must be able not only to preserve the vital element of the past, but also to assimilate new elements from outside. To know what is necessary to incorporate from outside we must understand the nature of our individuality. Its peculiarity cannot be well grasped, unless we compare it with others. Our philosophy is its best expression. The value of its comparison, therefore, with other philosophies should not be disputed.

It has been said above that comparison between system and system would occasion new syntheses through the discovery of valuable principles or ignored inconsistencies. This progressive thought will certainly not be merely a colligation of similarities. Nor can all similarities be valuable. The atomism of Nyāya-Vaisheshika may resemble the atomism of Democritus. But neither can be of scientific value now. And the most important contribution of Nyāya-Vaisheshika to philosophy, we may say, is its logical theory. But to such an abstract level Democritus could not rise. Only in Plato and Aristotle, who lived some time after Democritus, do we find real contributions to logic. So the similarity found in these pluralists cannot enable us to say much on the nature of the minds of the philosophers, or of the environment in which they were born.

Even a grouping of valuable similarities cannot be a philosophy. For philosophy is a consistent and connected expression, and a mere aggregate of statements cannot lay claim to the title of philosophy. Properly speaking, there is no philosophy which is comparative philosophy, just as there is no religion which is comparative religion. There is only a comparative study of philosophy just like the comparative study of religion. This progressive thought would therefore be an ever renewing systematization which includes all presented facts and yet transcends them. It is claimed by Kant that he reconciled rationalism with empiricism and transcended both. He could do so only by comparing them. He did not stop with finding out and

combining what is true or false in both, but gave the combination a new shape. And in the attempt, he brought about what he called the Copernican revolution in philosophy. Every systematization adds to the facts systematized a new quality which the facts by themselves do not possess.

Until now comparative philosophy in India has not accomplished much more than pointing out similarities and dissimilarities. The result may arouse in us some pride in the greatness of our ancestors whenever we find out that they thought just as many of the great men in the West think. But, on the other hand, some of us may be misguided into thinking that dissimilarities are our weak points, and, taking catch-words for criticisms, may try to interpret our philosophy in such a way as to show it without the differences—which certainly is misrepresentation. It may be that the differences are vital and valuable points. Hence comparison should be systematic, and should help us in determining the nature of the operative principle and throwing it into relief.

It is not maintained that the thesis developed in the following pages is absolutely new. It attempts only to take the bearings of Sankara's Vedanta on Hegelianism, the most fully developed philosophy of the West, so that the guiding principle of the former may be grasped. Yet this principle can help us in constructing new syntheses in social and ethical thought.

PART I

THE ABSOLUTE AS A COHERENT
SYSTEM

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE Absolute can be said to be infinite, in its true interpretation, only if it is regarded as supra-rational, as transcending thought. The infinite does not exclude the finite. Yet there is no conceivable relation between the two. That is why the relation is called *māyā* by Sankara. The experience of the infinite is the presupposition of our experience of the finite. Though the Absolute transcends thought, it is not unconscious.

The concept of organism belongs properly to the sphere of life. The Absolute which is much higher than life cannot be an organism. It is not a system of ideal contents. It is an integrality the wealth of which cannot be exhausted by conceptual determinations. The so-called perfect disjunction which is said to exhaust the nature of the subject through the predicates is a fiction, and at the most can be found only in geometry, which is a science of the barest abstractions, but not in other sciences the subject-matter of which is more concrete.

Similarly, if we regard the Absolute as a system of individual selves the individuality of the individual is not saved. The individuals must be regarded, as Sankara regards them, as different phenomenally, and as the same noumenally. It is only by postulating the principle of *māyā* that we can do justice to individuality. On the Hegelian view, the individual is only a system of ideal contents, a mere conflux of universals.

The nature of the Absolute is not conceptual. Thought can express neither the formal nor the material nature of Reality. It is because thought is inadequate to Reality that the difficulty about the relation between the Modes and the Substance of Spinoza arises. And the difficulty is an ultimate one.

Not merely so. Thought is inadequate to express even temporal process, not to speak of the metaphysical, which is inexplicable. The form of judgment is inadequate to any process except that of the logical, which is implication.

Hence logic cannot determine the nature of Reality. It is because Hegel depends merely on logic that he explained away creation as a mere *Vorstellung* of implication.

By regarding the Absolute as a coherent system Hegel and the Hegelians banished time even from the phenomenal world. In order that the Absolute can be a coherent system, its members must be eternally existent, because the Absolute is eternally perfect. But the members are the phenomenal things. Therefore there can be no novelty even in the phenomenal world. For the novelty to exist, the Absolute must be indeterminate, that is, supra-rational.

For similar reasons Hegel's Absolute cannot be dynamic. Regarding it as identity in difference conflicts with its regarding it as creative. Because Hegel wants to carry the lower categories to higher levels, he is obliged to carry the contradictions also of the lower to the higher. Therefore he cannot reach the level of the Absolute which is without contradictions. It is of course impossible to descend logically from the Absolute, because the Absolute is above logic.

The process by which the Absolute assumes the forms must be what the Advaitins call *vivarta*. It cannot be evolution in which the cause expends its being in the effect. It is a process in which the cause, itself remaining unaffected, puts forth the effect.

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF THE INFINITE HEGEL, BRADLEY, AND SANKARA¹

WHAT is dealt with in this chapter is that aspect of Hegel's Absolute called its infinity. I have, therefore, left out the consideration of the "mathematical infinite,"² the "infinite of its kind,"³ etc. These infinities, on Hegel's own view, are not the true infinite, at least in so far as they are objects of thought. As an object of thought each of these infinities has thought set over against it, which is detrimental to its self-determination, that is, to its infinitude, and freedom which is characteristic of infinitude. Hegel asserts that every system is an infinite as a Being-for-Self. A true infinite, he says, "consists in being at home in itself with its other."⁴ He gives as instances the "I," the "Quantitative Ratio," etc. So the mathematical infinite also, when interpreted not as an endless something, but as a system, may be said to be covered by Hegel's definition. But Being-for-Self is not fully realized in these lower categories. "When we say 'I,' we express the reference to self which is infinite, and at the same time negative. Man, it may be said, is distinguished from the animal world, and in that way from nature altogether by knowing himself as 'I,' which amounts to saying that natural things never attain a free Being-for-Self, but as limited to Being-there-and-then, are always and only Being-for an other."⁵ Thus the mathematical infinite and the so-called infinities lower than the Absolute Idea are also Beings for an other, as they are always objects of thought and limited by it.

Hence, according to Hegel the Absolute Idea is the only true infinite. But if we accept the description of that Idea given by him, it too cannot be the true infinite.

¹ This chapter was published in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1933, with very slight modifications.

² E.g. 0·9

³ As found in Spinoza's system.

⁴ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 175

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

I

Hegel insists upon the fact that the infinite should not exclude the finite. The two are not opposed to each other. "And one can easily see," he says, "that when they are so opposed, the infinite which of course ought to be the whole only appears as a single aspect and suffers restriction from the finite. But a restricted infinite is itself only the finite." "Dualism in putting an insuperable opposition between the finite and the infinite, fails to note the single circumstance that the infinite is thereby only one of the two, and is reduced to a particular, to which the finite forms the other particular. Such an infinite which is only the particular is coterminous with the finite which makes for it a limit and a barrier: it is not what it ought to be, that is, the infinite, but is only finite."¹

If it is here objected that the infinite as an aspect of *ens realissimum*, is beyond the reach of thought, Hegel replies that the very fact that we are able to speak of it implies that it is not so. He says "A little consideration might show that to call a thing finite or limited proves by implication the very presence of the infinite and the unlimited, and that our knowledge of a limit can only be when the unlimited is *on this side* of consciousness."² This view, Hegel thinks, is a corollary of the theory that the idea of the infinite is a positive idea. The infinite is not merely what is not finite. The fact that we are dissatisfied with the finite shows that we are comparing it with the infinite—which is a positive entity. Unless we have had some experience of the infinite, we would not have pronounced our judgment upon the finite. Descartes expressed a similar view in trying to prove the existence of God. "Gassendi, who had denied that any knowledge of the infinite was possible, questions the fact that we have a definite idea of it. Descartes's answer to this is that just as one who is not familiar with geometry has nevertheless the idea of a triangle as a whole, so we, although we have no exhaustive knowledge of the infinite, yet apprehend not merely a part

¹ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 177.

² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

of it, but the infinite in its entirety"¹ "And I must not imagine that I do not apprehend the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation of the finite in the same way as I comprehend repose and darkness by the negations of motion and light since on the contrary, I clearly perceive that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and therefore that in some way I possess the perception (notion) of the infinite before that of the finite, that is, the perception of God before that of myself; for how could I know that I doubt, or desire, or that something is wanting to me, and I am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparison of which I know the deficiencies of my nature."²

As the infinite, therefore, falls on this side of consciousness, it can be known by thought. It should not be described as not finite as if the finite only is the object of thought, but not the infinite. Besides, the infinite or the Absolute Idea, according to Hegel, is of the nature of thought. Otherwise, thought would not have been able to know it. The Absolute Idea is only thought's return upon itself.

Moreover, in the Absolute Idea the lower categories are preserved. The finite is not lost in the infinite. The Idea is the unity of all the lower categories. It does not negate them completely, nor is it like an acid in which they dissolve and disappear. As the infinite is of the nature of thought and is not alien to it, or is not something into which thought disappears, thought can retain all its forms.

So far we have given what seem to be the important features of Hegel's conception of the infinite. We shall now see how far such a conception is satisfactory.

Now, it cannot but be accepted that the infinite does not exclude the finite. Hegel's criticism of the position that the infinite is not the finite is certainly right, if that negative relation is interpreted as exclusion. For then the infinite falls short of its infinitude by just so much as it excludes. But most of the philosophers whom Hegel attacks do not mean exclusion by negative relation. Hinduism—by which

¹ Erdmann *History of Philosophy*, vol. 11, p. 15

² *Discourse on Method*, Tr. by John Veitch, p. 104.

Hegel seems to understand only Sankara's Vedānta—never says that the finite and the infinite are two entities, each standing by the other and thus excluding it. When it says that the finite is not the infinite, it denies every relation between the two. In a similar vein Bradley says "I may perhaps remind the reader that to speak of a relation between phenomena and Reality is quite incorrect. There are no relations properly except between things finite. If we speak otherwise, it would be by a license."¹

It may be objected that according to Bradley the infinite is beyond the reach of thought. In his Absolute thought disappears as such. Hence as the Absolute cannot be an object of thought, the latter cannot relate the finite and the infinite. But according to Hegel, the infinite is not beyond the reach of thought. So on his view, the objector may contend, thought can relate the finite and the infinite. The reply is that Hegel's view is here untenable. The infinite certainly is not an object of thought. If it is, for that very reason it ceases to be infinite. The position involves that the infinite as an object has thought standing over against it. But unless the infinite includes thought it no longer remains an object. But then thought, too, would be no more in order to relate the finite and the infinite.

Here the question may be asked: If the infinite is not an object of thought, how can we talk of it? None of the idealists have denied that we have some idea of the infinite. All admit that it is the logical presupposition of our finite knowledge. Sankara, in the commentary to the first of the *Brahmasūtras*, foresees this objection. Is the *Brahman* (Absolute) known or not? If known there is no need of any enquiry regarding it. If not, no enquiry is possible. For how can we enquire, if we do not know what to enquire? But he answers by saying that we have some idea of Brahman. Yet the descriptions of it are various. Hence arises the need of enquiry. And Vāchaspati, in explaining a passage in Sankara's introduction to the first *sūtra*, points out that we have a vague knowledge of the infinite.² We have an idea of it. But we perceive it only through *upādhis*

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 322 ² *Na tāvadāyamekāntenāvirshayah.*

or limitations. It may be said that our knowledge is a suggestion. In this sense even if we call it an object of thought, it cannot be an object in the ordinary sense. Thought cannot determine its nature. Hence it cannot fix the relation between the finite and the infinite. There is no meaning therefore in asking, What is the relation between the finite and the infinite?

There are of course certain passages in Hegel which try to prove that thought can determine the nature of the infinite. The Absolute Idea is the unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea. It is thought's return to itself, a Being-for-Self. But as this whole unity is of the nature of thought, there is nothing in the former impermeable to the latter. The unity is mediated immediacy, where immediacy as such is removed. But such an idea of the infinite gives rise to a difficulty that is ruinous to Hegel's conclusion that thought can determine the nature of the infinite. For if immediacy is removed, how can thought exist? Thought is mediation, but it must have something to mediate. So if immediacy is removed mediation too goes with it. Dr McTaggart also thinks that thought cannot exist without something to mediate.¹

II

It is at this stage of development from Hegel that Bradley is useful. He admits that we have some idea of the Absolute, yet denies any conceivable relation between it and its appearances. Thought distinguishes the predicate from the subject, and yet tries to restore the original integrity. It is its very nature to divide the original whole into parts,² to make distinctions within a continuous unity. This is

¹ *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, para. 45

² One may say that thought does not produce the parts but finds them. But it is all the same when we are speaking of objective thought. Besides, its nature is to find differences. It is a phenomenon which appears in time. Therefore differences too appear along with it. So we may say that its nature is to create differences. The expression is, however, loose, though usually adopted. I have only followed the usage.

what is implied in Hegel's assertion that the infinite by its very nature expresses itself in judgment¹ There is the return movement of the infinite to its original integrity, to self-containedness The process of this circular movement is the relational form of thought We can understand even in this way Bradley's assertion that thought cannot transcend the relational form It is the nature of thought to distinguish and try to synthesize But it cannot get rid of its other trait So Bradley leaves out thought and states that the nature of the Absolute is sensuous experience or something akin to it In this way does Bradley conceive the original integrity and make a sure advance upon Hegel But the latter believes in the powers of thought to grasp the ultimate reality It is true that thought is both analytical and synthetical *But the latter quality is indicative only of a tendency, not of a power*, and can restore only as much unity as is possible in any relation. Hence thought cannot be the nature of the infinite. If it is, then while the lapse into judgment is sure, the infinite cannot regain its original unity There would even be no meaning in saying that the infinite lapses into judgment. For thought is relational and the infinite, too, as thought, cannot but be relational, i.e. it exists always only in the form of judgment Hence there is no need of a lapse from the original unity. But then the infinite can never get rest from its exertions to gain unity. It cannot be self-contained and will always remain restless.

Furthermore, Hegel's infinite cannot be an accomplished fact. It always remains in the process of accomplishment, but never attains its end The end always remains an ideal for it. This infinite is in the same position as that of thought in Bradley. He says that truth is always an ideal, which, so long as it remains as such, is never realized But as soon as thought attains truth, thought commits suicide and truth becomes reality. Hence as an end eternally attained, the infinite cannot be of the nature of thought.

This conclusion seems to be implied in a passage of Dr. McTaggart. "The very existence of the dialectic thus tends

¹ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, pp 353, 357

to prove that it is not in every sense objectively correct. For it would be impossible for any transition to be made, at any point in the process, unless the terms were really related according to the type belonging to the notion. But no transition in the dialectic does take place exactly according to that type, and most of them according to types substantially different. We must therefore suppose that the dialectic does not exactly represent the truth, for if the truth were as it represents it to be, the dialectic itself could not exist. There must be in the process besides that element which actually expresses the real notion of the transition, another element which is due to the inadequacy of our finite thought to express the character of reality we are trying to describe."¹ If the dialectic does not adequately represent reality, and if thought is essentially dialectical, the infinite cannot but be taken as transcending thought.

There is an oft-quoted passage in Hegel's *Logic* which is conspicuous in its conflict with the rest of his system. "Within the range of the finite we can never see or experience that the end has already been secured. The consummation of the infinite end, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world, and the result is that it need not wait upon us, but is already by implication as well as in full actuality accomplished. This is the illusion under which we live. It alone supplies at the same time the actualizing force on which the interest of the world reposes. In the course of its process the idea creates the illusion by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action consists in getting rid of this illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error or other being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result."² The passage suggests many difficulties of which we may take up one. If the Good is eternally accomplished, if the infinite is

¹ *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, para. 119

² Wallace. *The Logic of Hegel*, pp. 351-2

eternally present, then what is the relation between it and that which is in the process of being accomplished? Of course, as we have noted above, Bradley denies any relation between the two. But can Hegel, who is emphatic in his assertion that the nature of the infinite is thought, explain the relation? Here he falls back upon illusion. But then he is admitting the bankruptcy of thought. If the infinite is thought, if thought itself is creating the illusion, it must be able to understand its own mystery. That thought is unable to do so is sufficient proof that the nature of the infinite is not thought but transcends it.

Bradley has thus been able to save logically both the immanence and transcendence of the infinite. It is immanent in thought, because it is the presupposition of all our knowledge, the underlying basis on which the superstructure of thought rests. It is the ideal unity of the separate elements of thought. Yet it transcends thought because thought must vanish, if the ideal is to be realized.

So far Bradley has escaped some of the difficulties found in Hegel. Yet he could not set aside his Hegelian bias. Though the infinite is beyond the reach of thought, Bradley proclaims it to be a harmonious system. He says "I mean that to be real is to be indissolubly one thing with sentience. It is to be something which comes as a feature and aspect within one whole of feeling, something which except as an integral element of such sentience, has no meaning at all. And what I repudiate is the separation of the feeling from the felt, or of the desired from desire, or of what is thought from thinking, or the divisions—I might add—of anything from anything else."¹ Here Bradley insists upon two things, viz. that thought disappears as such in the Absolute, and yet in the Absolute distinctions can be made. "What we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made but divisions do not exist."² But the doubt here is as to

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 146

² But compare, "And a distinction grounded on no difference must certainly be called a monster incapable of life except within a one-sided theory" (*The Principles of Logic*, p. 664). If this view is accepted, the Absolute should contain differences and so relations

whether any distinctions can be made in the Absolute. He himself says that it is thought that distinguishes the predicate from the subject, and in trying to restore the original unity has recourse to relational form. "The relational form is the compromise on which thought stands and which it develops. It is an attempt to unite differences which have broken out in the felt totality. Differences forced together by an underlying identity, and a compromise between the plurality and unity—this is the essence of relation."¹ Now that distinctions can be made in the Absolute, the relational form still persists. But how can it do so if thought has disappeared? It is the nature of thought to make distinctions. Bradley cannot say that the predicate is separate from the subject, but only that it is distinct. As he points above, relation is but a compromise between difference and unity. And certainly we think of the subject and the predicate as being related. If therefore distinctions are to persist in the Absolute, thought must be there to make them. But such a conclusion contradicts Bradley's view that thought as such disappears in the Absolute. Moore has pointed out that time as we find it and time as merged in the Absolute cannot be called by the same name. Similarly, thought cannot be called thought when it enters the Absolute. If so, what guarantee is there for the persistence of the relational form? Any distinction is inconceivable without a relation. We can distinguish between the rose and the red-colour in the judgment "the rose is red." That is, we are able to think of red things which are not roses and roses which are not red things. If these differences do not exist, the distinctions between the rose and the red cannot be drawn. But we cannot say that even the distinction between the substance and attribute can remain in the Absolute. For

In that case the Absolute cannot be supra-rational and supra-relational. So, as Professor Muirhead says, Bradley in his *Terminal Essays* is more a Hegelian than a rebel against Hegel. But Bradley should be either a consistent supra-rationalist by denying even distinctions which imply differences in the Absolute, or a thorough-going Hegelian by regarding the Absolute as rational and relational. Only as a supra-rationalist does Bradley approach Sankara.

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 180

to make this distinction thought must persist, but it does not. Hence to speak of distinctions in the Absolute is not justified. Otherwise, to describe it as supra-rational would be meaningless

At another place Bradley observes "But the fact remains that feeling, while it remains as a constant basis, nevertheless contains a world which in a sense goes beyond itself And when we ask for a unity which holds together these two aspects of the world, we seem to find given to us nothing but this unity of feeling which itself is transcended Hence as I have urged elsewhere, we are driven to postulate a higher form of unity, a form which combines the two aspects neither of which can be excluded That such a form is given to us directly in any experience I have never pretended"¹ If such a form is not given to us in any experience, it inevitably follows that it is beyond thought and therefore beyond distinctions

Now, if the infinite is taken as ineffable, we cannot describe it as a one in many or an identity in difference. When, as Bradley himself admits, there can be no relation between the real and the phenomenal, we cannot say that the phenomenal aspect of diversity persists in the real. Of course, the real cannot be described even as a one Both one and many are forms of thought. They are both inadequate to express the nature of the infinite. Bradley says. "Amongst ideas, which, though imperfect, must necessarily be used, I may mention here the ideas of identity and difference. Identity must not, on the one side, be confused with resemblance, nor again, on the other side, can it be taken as abstract There is, for instance, in the end no such positive idea, at least to my mind, as numerical sameness and diversity. On either of the above alternatives (I do not offer to argue out the point here) identity is destroyed On the other hand, when you take it otherwise as one aspect of the concrete union of sameness and difference, identity when you think it out, becomes inconsistent. It leads at either end to an infinite process and the same again is the case with diversity These ideas cannot therefore be ulti-

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p 190.

mates and we naturally desire to get beyond them to something wholly consistent. Yet if we find we cannot do this, the ideas still must be accepted. They will remain the best means we possess of approximating to the truth, or of removing ourselves, if you prefer that, from the furthest extreme of error."¹ But if identity and difference are inconsistent categories, how can they be applied to the nature of the infinite? It may be said that though each by itself will not do, both taken together, viz identity in difference, will. But the answer is, like the relational form, identity in difference is a compromise of thought between the original integrality and the differences developed later. Hence the infinite is not an identity in difference. It can only be described as what transcends thought, as *neti neti*, not that, not that. Hegel's confidence in the powers of thought is therefore not justified. McTaggart says "He (Hegel) lived in an age of idealism, when the pure scepticism of Hume has ceased to be a living force, and when it was a generally accepted view that the mind was adequate to the knowledge of reality."² Kant fought the sceptics and established the ideas of God, Soul, and Immortality, through his transcendental proofs. Now that they have been established, Hegel appropriates them as objects of thought. But if he is to face the sceptic, his constructive method, which can work only when thought is admitted to have the powers which he attributes to it, has to yield. "For," says McTaggart, "the transcendental form becomes necessary when the attacks of scepticism are to be met, and its absence, though due chiefly to the special character of the audience to whom the philosophy was first addressed, has led to the reproaches which had been so freely directed against Absolute idealism, as a mere fairy tale, and a theory with an internal consistency, but without any relation to facts." The existence of the infinite can be proved only by a transcendental argument, and never in the way in which Hegel wants to prove.

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp 240-1

² *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 49

III

We now arrive at the position of Sankara. He does not deny that we have a knowledge of the infinite as the presupposition of all our finite knowledge. But it appears to us only through limitations. Hence the enquiry as to its real nature. Philosophy in its attempt to grasp the infinite may fail as a process of thought, yet it may lead to another way, viz the process of life, which is religion. Hence the inadequacy of thought to the knowledge of the real is no reason for giving up the attempt. And thought itself must prove its shortcomings to us.

All this discussion may appear as a mere negative criticism. In a sense it is so. To describe the infinite there is no better way possible. It can only be described in negative terms. We have shown that the infinite is not what is opposed to the finite. It includes the finite only in the sense that the latter loses itself in it. The denial of any relation between the two must be interpreted as the inconceivability of any relation. It is meaningless to raise the question as to whether there is any relation between them. The question should not arise.

The same reply is to be given to Hegel's criticism that the infinite is not an acid in which all things dissolve, but a spirit. Giving it a name does not explain the fact. The infinite may be called a spirit, but how are we to explain the relation between it and the finite? No relation is conceivable. To say that the relation is an identity in difference may be at the most a restatement of the problem, but not its solution. If it is an identity in difference, what is the relation between identity and difference? To take it as an ultimate fact with no further explanation is to admit that thought is permeated through and through by an inexplicable element. Hence identity in difference is not an ultimate logical explanation for the very reason that thought itself is not satisfied with it, but craves for something higher. The only explanation is the admission that there is no conceivable relation between the finite and the infinite. Thought cannot overcome the other element so long as it remains thought.

Besides, it is very essential that the finite in no way affects the infinite. The dialectical process, as Hegel says, is a process from error to truth. Yet the Absolute Idea is not a process and is in no way to be affected by it. Hegel admits in the case of the Good and the Evil that the process is due to illusion. If so, the process in no way affects the Idea. The same must be the case with regard to the dialectical process from error to truth. It is useless to postulate a higher synthesis of the eternal perfection of the Absolute and the development of the dialectic. For we shall have in that case to postulate a further synthesis of the eternal perfection of the Absolute and this synthesis. And the process has to be continued *ad infinitum*. Here Sankara disagrees with Bradley whenever the latter says that the finite or part becomes part and parcel of the infinite when it enters it. For such a view implies that until thought becomes merged in the infinite, the latter cannot be perfect. But the implication is ruinous to the view that the infinite is everlastingly perfect.

It may here be objected that if thought disappears in the Absolute, the latter must be unconscious. But no such conclusion is justified. The Absolute would be unconscious only on the assumption that thought is the only form of consciousness.¹ But it is not so. The infinite is attained only

¹ Professor C. A. Campbell seems to express this opinion in his criticism of the idealistic view that to know the limit is to transcend it. "The significant thing about self-consciousness, it is pointed out (by the idealist), is that the self is here not merely opposed to an 'Other,' but is conscious of itself as so opposed. And to be conscious of an opposition is in principle to transcend it" (*Scepticism and Construction*, p. 69). In this argument, according to Professor Campbell, the root error lies in "treating the consciousness of the unique opposition of self and object as though it were analogous to the consciousness of particular oppositions within the objective continuum" (*Ibid.*, p. 72). This reply shows that Professor Campbell has left out the consideration of the deeper significance which the idealistic argument possesses. The mistake of the idealist lies in saying that because we are conscious of the opposition, thought itself is able to transcend it. To be limited and yet to transcend it is a contradiction. But for the idealist the contradiction does not seem to exist. So far his view is defective. The explanation of the contra-

in the attempt of thought to overcome the immediacy, to absorb the object. But, as we have shown above, when immediacy is removed, mediation too vanishes. That is, thought can exist only so long as there is some unmediated immediacy. As Bradley says, in a judgment the full meaning and content of the subject is never before thought. The explanation lies in the very nature of thought. We may therefore conclude that impermeability is the essential nature of objectivity. The object is never fully transparent to thought. Yet the object falls within thought. So thought is never completely transparent to itself. Complete transparency is therefore the ideal of thought. But this ideal is the same as the Absolute. Hence the Absolute cannot be said to be unconscious.

To sum up. We have tried to prove that the infinite does not exclude the finite, that it is immanent and yet transcends it. We are unable to describe it, not because we can have no experience of it, but because determinate thought has no access to it. For the same reason, we cannot conceive of any relation between the finite and the infinite. And because the Absolute is fully transparent to itself it is not unconscious.

diction lies in the fact that we are not simply thought, but something more. As thought we are limited, faced by an Other. But as something more, we transcend it. It means, in other words, that we are not merely finite but also infinite. Even for Hegel we are finite-infinite. Our difference from him is that, for us, we as infinite cannot be thought. If consciousness knows its limits, they must certainly lie within it. And if they lie within it, it can certainly transcend them. To transcend the limit it is not necessary to place it in the objective continuum. Thus, as we have shown above, what transcends and what is transcended cannot be the same in every respect. So if thought is what is limited, what transcends the limit must be another form of consciousness.

CHAPTER II

THE ABSOLUTE AS AN ORGANISM

THAT the categories of the lower levels of reality are not adequate to the higher has been much stressed upon recently even by men of science. The conception of inorganic matter as the promise and potency of life, mind, and the higher values, is already an exploded theory both in science and philosophy. The sciences of mind and life have been rescued from the tyranny of physics and chemistry which tried to appropriate physiology, and treated mind as a secretion of brain-matter as bile is that of liver. But even now physics has turned philosophical, and begins to wonder whether pan-psychism cannot be its own theory. Thus the gain to philosophy has been considerable, because its opposition to inorganic sciences has been lessened.

But philosophy does not seem to have risen much above the categories of life. The concept of organism belongs properly to the sphere of life. But it has been sublimated, glorified, and applied to the Absolute itself. An organism is an integration of elements which sustains itself in diverse circumstances. It is not merely acted upon but acts upon the environment. It aims at self-preservation, and its activity is guided by purpose. But none of these characteristics can be attributed to the Absolute. It is all-comprehensive. So diversity of environment is not applicable to it. For the same reason we cannot conceive of any purpose of the Absolute.

It may be said that though there is no environment in the sense of externality to the Absolute, it may still be conceived as an organism in the sense of a system of integrated elements. Then, what would be the relations between its elements? The relations would all be internal and therefore constitutive. That is, the nature of any element in it must be such as will be exhausted by its relations with others. But then, the element would have no individuality of its own, because its nature can be explained in terms of others.

It cannot be said that only a part of its nature is constituted by its relations and the rest not. For then this latter part would be its individuality proper, and must be regarded as not entering into integration with the other elements. But then to that part the relations would be external. And we have in our hands the difficulty about relations. If the relations are external to the terms, the former would require other relations to join them with the latter, these again other relations to join them with the first set of relations and terms, and so on. So external relations must be debarred from existing in the Absolute.

Besides, if part of the nature of an element is not constituted by its relations, then that part could not have entered into an integration with the other terms. If it enters, then the whole of its nature must have been constituted by the relations. But this amounts to saying that in the Absolute there are neither relations nor terms. As Spaulding says, if there is universal interpenetration of things, then there would be no things. If the Absolute is fully integrated, it leaves no room for any distinctions. But an organism without distinctions and differences between its members is inconceivable. It is, of course, true that because of these differences and distinctions, finite organisms are imperfect, exhibit discord, and give scope for distinction between purpose and fulfilment. And a hand cut off from a living body may not exist as a hand outside, yet it does exist somehow. If this operation were not possible, we would not have been able to distinguish between body as the whole and hand as its part. But in the Absolute such an operation, and therefore distinction, is not possible. Nothing can exist outside it. So nothing can be regarded as its part or even as its element. The imperfections present in the ordinary organism cannot be found in it. Hence purpose and its fulfilment mean nothing for it. To say that the Absolute is eternally fulfilling itself can mean either that it is complete and that process in time does not exist for it, or that there is no moment of time when some finite self or other is not striving for self-completion, expressed in edifying language. But we cannot think that the Absolute itself is

trying for self-completion. Hence we are not justified in thinking that the Absolute is an organism. Moreover, an organism perfected and sublimated cannot remain an organism.

One may say that the question of even internal relations does not arise at all in the Absolute, much less that of external relations. One may thus differentiate between a relational system and a non-relational system. But a non-relational system is meaningless, like the circular square. A system, if it is to be a system, must be a system of elements. And whenever plurality appears relational form accompanies it. But then will follow upon it the difficulties pointed out above. And if the Absolute is not such a system we should not call it so.

Yet we can call the Absolute the ultimate subject of every judgment. But to be the ultimate subject does not make it a system or organism. It is the subject, not because it is a system, but because it is always a 'that' that can never be reduced into a 'what'. If one does not agree with the view, one should say that what we call the 'that' is only another 'what,' that lies *beside* the first 'what,' but not *beyond* it. For example, in the judgment "The rose is red," the red, as the 'what,' does not exhaust the rose, which is the 'that'. According to the objector, this is due to the fact that the other 'whats' which are in the rose cannot be taken up in the same judgment and placed on the side of the red. But the rose is after all only a system of such 'whats'. Therefore the other 'whats' lie *beside* the present 'what,' i.e. red. So long as thought remains at the red, the other 'whats' become the 'that.' But as the 'that' is reducible into a number of 'whats,' thought will ultimately succeed in transforming the whole 'that' into a system of 'whats'. But this view assumes that the individuality of anything can be exhausted by a number of conceptual determinations. We believe, on the contrary, that the rose, for example, possesses an integrality which cannot be so exhausted.

It may perhaps be objected that in the disjunctive judgment the alternative predicates exhaust the subject's nature.

According to Bosanquet, "it is a generic judgment, because it deals with an individuality, a content which is a whole or system in itself . . . What then is directly predicated of the subject content? I see no theoretical reasons to deny that the 'either-or' considered as an articulate analysis of attributes can be intelligibly or categorically predicated of it."¹ "By true disjunction I mean a judgment in which alternatives falling under a single identity are enumerated, and are known in virtue of some pervading principle to be reciprocally exclusive and to be exhaustive"² "The disjunction is therefore the only judgment-form that can in strict theory stand alone. All connection is within a system, and only that judgment is self-sufficing which affirms at once the system and the connections within it"³ But first, positive exhaustion of all alternatives never seems to be possible. Such exhaustion rests, as Bradley says, ultimately on our impotence.⁴ Of course, he says in the "Additional Notes" that, "so far as our knowledge is completely systematized privation . . . ceases to exist."⁵ But whether such systematization is ever possible is a moot question. If it is, the alternatives of a disjunction can be regarded as exhaustive. But only if they can be regarded as exhaustive can we maintain that such systematization is possible. Because of this vicious circle, we cannot at present accept that the alternatives of every disjunction can exhaust the nature of the subject.

Moreover, let us examine disjunctive reasoning. I see the trunk of a tree in dusk at a distance and make the judgment that "It is a tree trunk or man." This would be called an imperfect disjunction by Bosanquet, and may perhaps even be treated as a mere doubt or suggestion which is no judgment. So any argument in which this judgment stands as a premise would be an imperfect disjunctive argument. Now the judgment "This triangle is either scalene, or isosceles, or equilateral," is said to be a perfect disjunction, and can form a premise. Next we may have "It is not isosceles or equilateral; therefore it is scalene." Bosanquet

¹ *Logic*, vol. 1, p. 327

² *Ibid.*, p. 323.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 328

⁴ *Principles of Logic*, p. 136.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

certainly holds that inference is a more developed form of thought than judgment. So he should admit that, if the disjunctive argument based upon the so-called perfect disjunction is self-contradictory, the latter must be a fiction. Now in the example, do we come to know the second premise after the first premise is made, or along with it? In the first case, the disjunctive judgment is certainly based upon ignorance, and it is ignorance that necessitates the argument, because we admit that we do not know, when we make the disjunction, as to which of the three kinds the triangle belongs. In the second case, there is no need of inference at all. For the second premise must have been based on a knowledge of the conclusion. Otherwise, how could we have known that the triangle is not equilateral or isosceles? The positive basis of this negative judgment would be that the triangle is scalene. That is, the second premise presupposes a knowledge of the conclusion. Without a positive basis no negative judgment could be significant. Hence the inference is superfluous and no true inference. If the disjunctive inference is thus self-contradictory, the so-called perfect disjunction on which it is based is a chimera.

It may be said that the negative premise may be known through other sources. But what can these sources be? If the triangle is not equilateral or isosceles, because it possesses a characteristic X which is incompatible with its being equilateral or isosceles, then this X must be a characteristic which is incompatible with all triangles or with the above two. In either case, it can preclude the thing in question from being an equilateral or an isosceles triangle. It cannot be the first case because we already know that the thing is a triangle. Besides, if X is incompatible with every triangle, this incompatibility cannot enable us to infer from its being neither equilateral nor isosceles its being scalene. So whatever be that characteristic, it must be something which is compatible with some triangle, but incompatible with the equilateral and the isosceles. So the very relevancy of the characteristic presupposes its compatibility with the scalene. Otherwise, how could we have known that it is compatible with some triangle at all? So we should have known that

the triangle is scalene before we know that it is not equilateral or isosceles. The objection only pushes the difficulty a little back.

It may be contended that the first premise ought to be "The triangles are scalene, or isosceles, or equilateral," but not "This triangle is scalene, etc." But it is only the second judgment that is the required premise, not the first. It may be said that an argument with the first premise may be put thus:

Triangles are either scalene, isosceles, or equilateral,
 This is a triangle,
 It is not equilateral or isosceles,
 Therefore, it is scalene

If one has no objection to the form, one may say that the starting-point is a disjunctive judgment about triangles in general, and the reasoning is valid. Even then how we can get the third premise without knowing beforehand the conclusion cannot be understood. Again, after the second premise another which ought to be the conclusion of the first two, viz "This triangle is either scalene, isosceles, or equilateral," may be inserted. If it is, the difficulties shown above will become apparent.

It may be said that, when there is no reference to disjunctive argument, the disjunctive judgment about triangles in general implies no element of ignorance. The judgment, "This triangle is scalene, etc.," is only a particular judgment whereas a perfect disjunction is generic. But whether such a judgment is a disjunctive judgment is doubtful. It is only a judgment of classification where the classification is exhaustive. And it shares with the collective judgment most of its characteristics. Like the collective judgment it exhausts all its members. If we take a collective judgment, e.g. "All the members of the Reich are Nazis," we can have a perfect disjunction even here. If we take any one Nazi we cannot say that he can be all. They are mutually exclusive. Thus the judgment, "Triangles are either scalene, etc.," means "Triangles are of three kinds—scalene, isosceles, *and* equilateral." The presence of 'and' here shows that the judgment is really conjunctive, not disjunctive. And even

if taken as disjunctive it can hold good mostly in geometry, which is admittedly a science of the barest abstractions. In the present case we are able to know that, given the Euclidean space, there can be only three kinds of triangles when the number of equal sides is made the differentia. But when more concrete cases are taken into consideration such certainty is not obtainable. No botanist can guarantee that the varieties of a particular plant are only those known to him. Nature cannot be reduced to geometry. Such perfect disjunctions, as Bosanquet wants, are in Nature possible only where the alternatives are limited to two. Because in it contradiction and contrariety are combined,¹ the alternatives can be so limited. But to limit them so is arbitrary. Nature should not be chopped off in order to fit into our logic. On the contrary, our logic should conform to Nature. And Bradley's opinion on the point is justifiable. He writes: "The necessary duality of disjunction—in the sense that the incompatibles, which are each possible, cannot be taken as more than two—is to my mind a view which, so far, is contrary to fact."²

If disjunction is not limited to two alternatives which are at the same time contraries and contradictories, to make a perfect disjunction requires knowledge of the Absolute in detail. But then we can question whether there would be any judgment at all. Judgment is possible only if there is a finite being to judge. To make a perfect disjunction he must have a detailed knowledge of the Absolute. To have it he must become one with the Absolute. But then there would be no judgment at all, because the finite being must have disappeared by becoming one with the Absolute. Besides, there would be no point for making it. Bosanquet himself writes: "If I say that the fire is burning in the dining-room, this judgment is no doubt compatible with various grounds and various consequences, and in the judgment as I mean it some particular ground and some particular consequence are probably included. Such a statement would not be made *a propos* of nothing, or if it were, it would be resented just as talking gibberish would be

¹ *Logic*, vol. 1, p. 291

² *Principles of Logic*, p. 137

resented. There is some point or purpose to which it must be taken as contributing, and some reason—though possibly falling outside the content of judgment—which serves as a ground for making it.”¹ Now that the finite being has become one with the infinite, there would be no point or purpose for him to make any judgment. And if judgment itself disappears, disjunction too vanishes with it.

So perfect disjunction as conceived by Bosanquet leads to insurmountable difficulties. If so, it is not possible to prove that the individuality of even a finite thing can be exhausted by conceptual determinations, not to speak of that of the Absolute. Hence the Absolute cannot be regarded as an organism or a system.

¹ *Logic*, vol 1, pp 284-5.

CHAPTER III

THE HEGELIAN ABSOLUTE AND THE INDIVIDUAL¹

THE aim of the chapter is to show that, on the Hegelian conception of the Absolute, the individual self is not saved. Hegel is fond of reiterating that his Absolute is not a bare one, but a one in many, an organic whole, a perfect and

¹ This chapter was published with very slight modifications in *Philosophy*, July 1934

It is still a controversial point whether Hegel held the view of personal or even of impersonal immortality. Some, like McTaggart, believe that he held the view of personal immortality. Stace says "It is a matter of dispute whether Hegel believed in immortality in the *literal* sense. I have only space here to indicate, without reasons, my own opinion, which is that he did not take it literally, but regarded it as a *Vorstellung* for the infinitude of spirit and the absolute value of spiritual individuality. Immortality is a present quality of the spirit, not a future fact or event" (*The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 154). Lord Haldane holds the same view.

Dr. Haldar, too, expresses a similar opinion, though not exactly the same, in his *Philosophical Essays* (the chapter on "Hegelian and Immortality"). On one of his principles, it is true that Hegel could not have held the view of immortality. Dr. Haldar points out that, according to Hegel, the relation between body and mind is very intimate. So when the body is destroyed it inevitably follows that the mind ceases to exist. If so, how is the individual self preserved in the Absolute? Are we to be nothing after the continuous warfare of a whole life? Immortality cannot be a mere *Vorstellung* for the infinitude of the spirit. It is unreasonable to contend that spirit which is eternal will cease to exist after the death of the body.

Yet on another of his principles Hegel cannot deny immortality, though, unlike Rāmānuja, he is not explicit on the point. Western philosophers do not make any distinction between mind and self. And according to Hegel, mind as it is here must be a product of illusion of *Tauschung*. The final end is eternally attained in the Absolute, all our strife is due to illusion, mind is actually in strife here, hence mind as it appears here is due to illusion, and must have another aspect, which is perfect. From the Absolute point of view mind is eternally liberated. So when mind realizes this state it becomes immortal. And in order to distinguish between the two aspects of mind Western philosophers should draw a distinction between mind and self.

harmonious system of an infinite number of finite selves. The individual, as in Spinoza and Schelling, does not lose itself in the Absolute. The latter is not a lion's den into which all animals enter but from which none returns, not a mere darkness in which all cows are black.

But it is impossible to retain the individual self in the Absolute. The latter, or *Īśvara* as it is called by Rāmānuja, is an organism. The innumerable selves are its members.¹ But then, in the liberated state, how are we to distinguish one *jīva* or self from another? We can find no differentia. If they are different, the difficulty about relations, which Bradley raises, appears in the Absolute itself. But in the Absolute no contradiction can be left unsolved.

Here it may be objected that, when Hegel asserted that he has saved the individual, he means that the self, which is regarded as unreal by Sankara and others, is really the individual. Even then his position is not tenable. Besides, the difficulty of relations, and the objection that the striving self, according to Hegel, must be an illusion, there are other difficulties in his view. The theory of internal relations is a corollary of the organic conception. In a system any act of one member necessarily affects the others. Its relations to other members are constitutive. As Bradley says, even spatial and temporal relations have to be regarded as internal in it. If an individual changes his place, there arises a change in his very nature, though imperceptible to our finite view. Thus individuality becomes only a "matter of content." The individuals would be only "pipes through which the Absolute pours itself, jets, as it were, of the fountain." Each of them is only a "conflux of universals or qualities," mere adjectives of the Absolute. But then we cannot see how the individual is saved.

We can now understand why even Bosanquet is forced to conclude that in the Absolute there is a blending of the individual selves, or, in Bradley's phrase, "an all-pervasive transference." The contents and qualities of the different selves are, as it were, shaken up together and neutralized, and supplement one another. But as the end is already

¹ According to Rāmānuja, they form the body of *Īśvara*.

attained in the Absolute, the individuality of the individual must be mere illusion, for the contents of different individuals are already shaken up together and neutralized. The conclusion is necessarily implied in the premise that the Absolute is an organic whole.

Royce seems to have striven hard to save the individual.¹ Individuality is not merely a matter of content but has some uniqueness in it. It is impenetrable. It is not merely a conflux or system of universals. If otherwise interpreted, it loses its very nature. Royce lays emphasis upon its uniqueness and indescribability in other terms. Thus far he seems to be very near the truth. But when he falls back upon the Hegelian conception of organism, and says that the individual, as a unique purpose, forms a member of a system of such purposes, he loses the ground he has gained. To be a member of a system means to be interpretable in terms of others. Though in society some of our actions can be interpreted thus, our ultimate nature cannot be so interpreted. Royce thinks that the Absolute too is a purpose, though a system of our finite purposes, and that we, in realizing our aims, are in truth realizing the Absolute aim. But, as Aliotta says, if what seems our aim is the aim of the Absolute, it cannot be truly ours and vice versa.² If the individual is preserved the Absolute is lost; if the Absolute is preserved the individual is lost. The conclusion is inevitable.

Pringle-Pattison in criticizing Bradley and Bosanquet says that the individual should be a substance in the Aristotelian sense, not in the Spinozistic.³ But if Pringle-Pattison remains a Hegelian by accepting that the Absolute is an identity in difference, little advantage is gained by making the individual a substance even in the Aristotelian sense. Though we can attach predicate after predicate to it, its ultimate nature remains only a matter of content. Being a member of an organic whole it is through and through pierced by others. That is why Bradley says that even

¹ *The Conception of God*, pp. 247 sqq.

² *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, pp. 262-3.

³ *The Idea of God*, pp. 270-1.

spatial and temporal changes produce corresponding changes in the individual's nature. Bradley and Bosanquet make the Absolute the ultimate subject of every judgment. Yet it is only a system of ideal contents. And the Absolute for them is the only real individual, and from the metaphysical point of view, we, as finite centres of experience, are its adjectives. And their conclusion logically follows from the position.

To avoid these consequences, philosophers like McTaggart assert the ultimate and metaphysical substantiality of the individual. It is a "substance existing in its own right." McTaggart says, "If the opponent should remind me of the notorious imperfections in the present lives of each of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal, and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is considered as eternal. *Sub specie aeternitatis* every self is perfect. *Sub specie temporis* it is progressing toward a perfection as yet unattained."¹ But as a Hegelian, McTaggart cannot dispense with the organic conception. The Absolute is the unity of the selves, and the unity is not external to them. "The unity must be completely in each individual, yet it must also be the bond which unites them." But to attain such a unity—if McTaggart is serious with his organic conception of it—the selves must be internally related to each other. It is not enough to say that all the selves form a complete whole. There must be something in the constitution of each self to be a member of a perfect system. Even pre-established harmony as in Leibnitz, cannot explain the fact. The nature of the individual must be such as to provide such a harmony. The theory of internal relations is therefore indispensable. The result will be that no individual can exist in its own right. We cannot have both a plurality of self-dependent substances and an essential unity between them.

Besides, if there is an individual who can exist and act in his own right, there must be scope for possibilities on the universe. They must be due to the freedom of the individual. But, for example, Bradley is forced by the logic

¹ *Mind*, N.S., vol. ix, p. 388.

of his position to remove the difference between the possible and the actual, or rather to leave no scope for possibilities "Chance is the given fact which falls outside of some given whole or system"¹ But actually there can be nothing which falls outside the harmonious system of the Absolute Hence there could be no chance The conclusion strictly follows from the Hegelian view which cannot give the individual the freedom even to err To call freedom self-determination in no way strengthens the position.

The Hegelians seem to be obsessed by the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Any action proceeding from an individual must have a cause. In order to save his freedom, the cause is regarded not as external to him, but as his very nature Yet his nature is formed by the externality, the rest of the universe In it lies the final explanation of his actions Freedom is freedom of self-determination, but the self is determined by the not-self So all that issues from the individual is already there in the rest of the universe Whatever be the causes that led the ancient philosophers to formulate the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*, it has been called in question recently Even realists like Russell do not accept it. In Indian philosophy Sankara too questioned an unmodified interpretation of it Strictly interpreted it means that the effect exists in the same form in the cause The followers of Sankara cite as an instance the ordinary fact that out of cowardung scorpions are born. Whether we accept the principle at the empirical level or not, it should not be applied in determining the nature of the individual, and must be considered invalid for the purpose

Let us now examine Sankara's theory We have seen that the chief condition of individuality is some unique indivisibility. Sankara's conception of *jīva* or finite self satisfies this condition in one way On the principle of *māyā*, Sankara need not hold the theory of internal relations Relations do not constitute the individual's nature When one *jīva* is affected in one way, there need be no corresponding change in the others Though his lower Brahman can be more or less compared to Rāmānuja's *Īśwara* or Hegel's Absolute,

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 388

Sankara asserts that the admission of its existence is only a compromise to some people's demand that philosophy should satisfy our religious instinct. In criticizing the Sāṅkhya conception of the one-ness of *Prakṛiti* on the ground that when one *Puruṣa* (self) is liberated, all the rest also should be liberated, the Sankarites point out that their *māyā* can be many¹ On one's own *māyā* or *avidyā* ceasing to exist, those of the rest need not *Māyā* can be one with regard to *Īśvara* and many for the *jīvas* Yet it cannot be said to be a one in many like Hegel's Absolute For the relation between the many is not organic. So far even the *jīva* can be unique.

Yet Sankara would say that our analysis of *jīva*'s nature is not complete. Though what is contributed by *māyā* to the *jīva* is unique, its contribution forms only a part of *jīva*'s nature. The *jīva* owes its consciousness to *Brahman*. Ultimately both are identical. Without it the *jīva* could not have the sense of "I" So as regards its conscious nature, the *jīva* is not fully unique Hence, on Sankara's view, the *jīva* as such, though unique phenomenally, is not so noumenally And noumenally its *jīva*-appearance vanishes, and it becomes completely identical with *Brahman* Yet as identical with *Brahman*, we should say, it is unique even noumenally For Sankara, there is no personal immortality in the sense of the immortality of the self as distinguished from a not-self Immortality for the *jīva* means its own identity with the *Brahman*, and thus losing its own personality

Sankara's conception of *Brahman* satisfies our condition of individuality to the full. In the sense of one among many his *Brahman* is not an individual. But we have seen above in examining the view of McTaggart that a one among many cannot be an individual, if the many are to be essentially interrelated. Nor is Sankara's *Brahman* an individual in the sense of a system of ideal contents. For such an individuality is a matter of content, a conflux of universals, not a real individuality

Bradley and Bosanquet are more logical and advanced

¹ *Sarvadarśanasangraha*, p. 144

than the other Hegelians. They have shown that the individual selves as members of an organism cannot retain their uniqueness. The individuals somehow transform each other, blend with each other, and form the Absolute which is the real individual. Thus they are lost in it.

A few steps can easily lead us from Bradley to Sankara. According to the former, the many as such are lost in the Absolute. They all blend and together form the One. If so, they cannot remain there as many. They lose their many-ness in it. Strictly speaking, the Sankarites say, the Absolute cannot be said to be even the One. If many-ness disappears in it one-ness also vanishes. For one and many are cor-relatives and categories of thought, but the Absolute is above thought. If thought as such disappears in the Absolute, the categories cannot exist in it. Hence Sankara regards the Absolute as indescribable, *avāggammya*. Bradley says that it is inexplicable how the appearances blend in the Absolute, and how they issue forth from it. It is this principle of inexplicability that Sankara calls *māyā*.

In this connection Bradley seems to occupy a position between that of Rāmānuja and Sankara, and is thus a little in advance of the former. It is true that what he rejected as appearances he reclaimed as forming part of reality. Also, his Absolute, like Rāmānuja's is a one in many, an organic whole. The finite centres of experience or *jīvas* are the adjectives of the Absolute in both. But Bradley seems to have been more impressed by the self-contradictory nature of our finite existence than Rāmānuja. The former points out that the conception of finite self is riddled with contradictions, and hence it cannot exist in its own right, or even in the Absolute. Finite selves must blend and undergo complete transformation. But in Rāmānuja there is no such conception. Had Bradley given up his Hegelian bias, rejected the appearance as such as in no way forming part of reality, and thus saved the eternal perfection of the Absolute, he would have joined hands with Sankara. Professor Radhakrishnan says "At the centre of Sankara's system is the eternal mystery of creation, a mystery in which every movement of our life and every atom of the world are

implicated."¹ Bradley's philosophy also has this mystery in its "somehow" by which the appearances issue forth from the Absolute. But the mystery loses its force and charm by his reclaiming the appearances as belonging to reality. It is only unwillingly, as it were, that he admits the impotency of thought to grapple with the mystery of creation and atonement

The crux of all monism, says Professor Radhakrishnan, is the relation of the finite to the infinite. And Sankara seems to be the most successful in solving this problem. He has saved the individuality of the finite self both in its phenomenal and noumenal aspects, and that in a peculiar way. Of course, noumenally *jīva* is not unique as a personality in the sense of a self distinguished from not-self. For at the noumenal level *jīva* as such does not exist. There it is one with the *Brahman*, which is without a second. Yet in this sense it is unique and is therefore an individual. Phenomenally the individual self is the product of *māyā*. But *māyā* can be many for the *jīvas*. On the liberation of any *jīva* its own *māyā* vanishes. Hence each *jīva* is unique so far. Sankara has also overcome the difficulty—which McTaggart could not—of bringing the different selves existing in their own right into essential unity. Both make a distinction between the eternal and temporal aspects. But Sankara makes all selves identical *sub specie aeternitatis* and many *sub specie temporis*. *Māyā* permits them in the phenomenal world as much individuality as is necessary, and in no way impairs it in bringing them together. In their eternal aspect the *jīvas* are one, and the problem of uniting them does not arise for Sankara at all.

¹ *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 656

CHAPTER IV

THOUGHT AND REALITY

THE problem of the relation between Thought and Reality is one of the most complex. Hegel asserts that thought is identical with Reality, but his assertion can be variously interpreted. It may mean that thought reveals Reality, or that it is organic with Reality, or that it is the same as Reality. Even these interpretations can have different meanings, and very diverse conclusions can be deduced from them. To say that thought is organic with Reality may simply mean that thought cannot exist separately from Reality. To this interpretation none can object. But from this it may be concluded that from a study of the nature of thought the nature of Reality can be completely known. But this view cannot be accepted, and our reasons for not accepting it are given in various places in this work. We do not accept the absolute identity also of thought and Reality, and the arguments in favour of our position are also given in different pages of this work. We may admit that thought reveals Reality in the sense that it is the presupposition of knowledge that it *discovers* reality, yet we cannot accept that the ultimate nature of Reality can be expressed adequately by thought. It is this view that we discuss in this chapter.

The contention of Hegel is that thought expresses both the formal and the material nature of Reality. He writes. "The form of feeling is the lowest in which spiritual truth can be expressed. The world is spiritual existences, God himself, exists in proper truth, only in thought and as thought. If this be so, therefore, thought far from being mere thought, is the highest, and in strict accuracy the sole mode of apprehending the eternal and the absolute."¹ The content of thought is not different from the form. "The fact is that in a notion there is nothing further to be thought than the notion itself."² Thus God, who, for Hegel, is the same as Truth, exists in thought and as thought, and thought

¹ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 33.

² *Ibid*, p. 8.

constitutes both the form and the content of Reality. Hegel regards the form of thought which is adequate to the content of Reality as inference or syllogism. His thought is the same as the Reason of Kant, not the same as his Understanding.¹ But is the form of inference really adequate to the content? It is true that inference aims at explicating the element of necessity in the content. But does it succeed in doing it satisfactorily? Bradley proves that it does not.² For it is we that make the conclusion, but claim to have found it.³ "Every inference falls into three parts. We first have a *datum*, then comes an operation, and then follows the result. And our question really asks how the last of these is related to the first. What is given appropriates the result of an experiment, and we demand the title on which it proceeds. We enquire how it justifies the taking to itself of this new possession." But "the new attribute does not truly belong to the subject if your choice and caprice is the bond of their union." "Or, more properly, the premises would be wrongly laid down; for they should have included the action of our minds. And just as failing one condition the others are powerless, and in no sense are any a cause of the effect, so failing the element of our arbitrary choice, the premises we assigned are no premises at all. The conclusion, if it comes, is merely precarious, it is hypothetical. It must wait upon chance, and the result that ensues is given, but not claimed."

Besides, in inference the conclusion necessarily contradicts the premises. "(i) If the 'premises' are really all that is there at the start, then that is altered in the result; and by the result it is, I should say, contradicted. And (ii) if it is urged that the beginning is denied, not as it is, but as it appears . . . a dilemma awaits us. For (a) the process will still be a self-contradiction, though what contradicts itself will now be no more than an appearance; or (b) there will now be no real process and hence no inference at all. Further (iii) if the 'premises' are widened so as to take in all that

¹ Wallace *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 230, 315. Also see Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 400

² *Principles of Logic*, pp. 552 sqq

³ Loc. cit

is really implied at the start, then (as before) either (a) you have included so much that the process, and therefore the inference, disappears; or (b) the end, as I think, still contradicts the beginning"¹

Such is in short Bradley's criticism of the formal validity of inference. The central point is the conflict between finding and making the conclusions. It is the presupposition of knowledge that it discovers things, but in inference we make the conclusion. We think that without our interference the conclusion could not have been there. Yet we want to believe that the conclusion is only found. Hence the view that the premises by themselves can give us the conclusion and demonstrate its necessity is undermined. And we are therefore obliged to acknowledge that the form of inference is not adequate to its content. If so, can Hegel still maintain that thought is an adequate form of truth?

Nor is thought the material of Reality. Bradley advances sufficiently strong arguments to show that it is not. Can inference, the higher form of thought, materially constitute Reality? If it does, then the distinction between finding and making reality must be abolished. But on this very distinction is founded the nature of knowledge. Moreover, the distinction between cause and reason too must disappear. Bradley writes: "When the middle of our process does not answer to the cause, where it is not the reason of the conclusion's existence, but merely the ground which we have for belief in it, in every such case our mental experiment does not even pretend to reproduce fact"² Much less, we may add, to produce it. Unless we can say with certainty that the operation of thought is the same as the actual process in things, we have no ground to assert that inference is materially valid.

The elements we ideally synthesize in inference do not exist in isolation. "They cannot exist every one by itself. Apart from one another they indeed may be found, but none separable and divorced from all existence. Yet this context, which makes them real as events, and without which they could not appear in the series, is ruthlessly

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 573.

² *Ibid.*, p. 580.

stripped off in our mental experiment And so, what we use in the ideal synthesis, is nothing but an artificial preparation " "And if the separation of the elements is not true, so also their union and construction is fictitious " ¹ "And our conclusions can hardly fare much better Begotten of falsehood it cannot be so far misbegotten, as to show us in the end the features of fact The parental disease still vitiates the substance. Abstract and symbolic it mutilates phenomena It can never give us that tissue of relations, it cannot portray those entangled fibres which can give life to the presentation of sense " ²

If, therefore, inference is not materially valid, the assertion that thought or reason can be the material of truth cannot be defended It is unreasonable to think that thought can constitute Reality Thought, of course, may be found in it It is not separate from Reality. So also are many other aspects of our conscious life An over-emphasis on the one and an attempt to make it all-inclusive, will certainly end in failure Either its determinate nature would be lost and it would meet destruction, or the view obtained through it would be dwarfed and imperfect As Bradley has demonstrated, thought cannot constitute even sensible reality, much less can it constitute the Absolute.

The same inadequacy of thought to Reality is exemplified in the conception of the relation between the Modes and the Substance of Spinoza The process from Substance to Modes and back again may be compared to the outward and the return movements of the syllogism But then how are we to fit in with that view the assertion of Spinoza that the modal appearance is due to the finite intellect? Will it be answered that the finite intellect is not necessary for the modal appearance? The answer is not tenable. In the absence of the finite intellect the problem of the relation between the Substance and the Modes does not arise at all If we were given the eternal vision, viz of viewing things *sub specie aeternitatis*, we would not have seen the modal appearance Hence for the modal appearance finite intellect is necessary If so, can the necessity of the Modes lie in the

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 585.

² *Ibid.*, p. 586.

Substance only? Again, is not the finite intellect itself a mode? If it is, to what is its modal appearance due? These questions are ultimate, and cannot be answered by the finite intellect. For the inability is due to the very nature of the reasoning process. Without our interference the conclusion cannot be obtained. Yet we demand that the conclusion must be obtained without our interference. Similarly, the finite modes cannot exist without the finite intellect, The modal appearance is due to it, or in Bradley's phrase due to our interference. Yet we want that the modal appearance should be deduced directly from the Substance. When we ask, Is not the finite intellect a mode? we imply that the Substance by itself should be able to account for the Modes. So the relation between the Modes and Substance cannot be understood with the help of the movement of thought as present in inference. But we have no better means. So the question is unanswerable by us.

CHAPTER V

PROCESS AND JUDGMENT¹

IN the previous chapter we have shown that inference is not adequate to its content. By the very denial that reason cannot be the cause is proved that the process of inference is not the process of the real. In this chapter we shall examine whether the latter process can be adequately expressed. Expression is through judgment. Our question now is, Can judgment express process? If it can, so far it has to be admitted that logic is adequate at least to the phenomenal reality. If it cannot, we have to acknowledge that logic is inadequate to it even, not to speak of the ultimate reality. For the ultimate Reality transcends the phenomenal.

Now, Bosanquet admits that there is a psychological process from the subject to the predicate.² But logic cannot incorporate the process in the judgment. In it the subject and predicate form an ideal whole. It is not a relation of two mental states.³ If such is the nature of judgment, and if the whole Reality is a single judgment which sustains the structure of the world,⁴ and whose elements are the logical ideas, there is no scope for any process except that of implication to be present within Reality. In support of Bosanquet's view it may be pointed out that judgment is the unit of thought, that perception at the level of definite knowledge is judgment, and as, for example, in the judgment, "The rose is red," we do not perceive at first the rose and then the red, but both together, we neither see a process from the rose to the red, nor can we think of it as implied.

But it is open for us to say that our first impressions need not always be true. The difficulty arises when we are to regard the judgment as objectively true. The red is not

¹ This chapter and the next were read as one paper at the Poona session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1934

² *Essentials of Logic*, p. 102

³ *Logic*, vol. 1, p. 77

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

an idea which is attached to the rose by us, but is a quality of the rose itself. Yet the judgment can have a meaning only so long as there is somebody to judge. Though Bosanquet does not seem to attach importance to this point, yet the dialectician in Bradley noticed a similar point, and tried to explain it, though unfortunately in psychological terms. He writes "Are we to insist that psychological conditions are excluded from logic and remain in every sense outside? To this enquiry our answer must after all be No. . . . We may return here to the instance where the relative force, say, of certain sensations was the cause which brought into existence a certain judgment. This force, I repeat, remains as force, external to the judgment. It cannot in its own character pass into the content of the judgment and there claim recognition. But every judgment . . . must, on the other hand, contain and depend on an internal X. It is never mere R, but always R (X) that in the end we qualify as S-P."¹

Here Bradley is discussing how S-P holds true of Reality as a whole. In our example, taking the rose as real, the problem is as to how the red can hold true of it. Here the language which calls P an ideal content referred to reality S is misleading. For when the judgment is true we do not regard the red as an idea referred by us to the rose. Therefore we cannot but agree with Hegel when he asserts that the predicate should not be an extraneous addition to the subject, but something put forth by it.² If logic claims objective validity, it should not reject Hegel's view at the outset. It might be that, in the end, logic may not be able to substantiate its claim. Even in such judgments as "A is to the right of B" we cannot deny that A has a qualifying relation, which somehow or other claims objectivity. If, therefore, Bradley's psychological explanation can be changed into a logical one, and if the problem is referred to the general problem of the relation between the Absolute and the Individual, can we say that a process from the rose to the red is implied? If we can, what sort of process can it be?

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 497.

² Baillie *Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 84.

Our point is The predicate red is to be regarded as belonging to the rose So far as this judgment is concerned, the red is the 'what' or the ideal content, and the rose is the 'that' or the existence That is, the rose is the existence to which the red is referred. But the reference of the ideal content is possible only so long as there is the finite individual to refer it But, as Bradley says, the ideal content is the outcome of psychological process But to the individual, so far as that judgment is concerned, the existence of the 'that' is independent of this process like the Absolute Logically, the Absolute is putting forth the ideal content through the individual But the individual is, relatively to the process, permanent. Thus both the individual and the 'that' are, relatively to the process of putting forth the predicate, permanent. Thus we are led to conceive of a state of the 'that' previous to the appearance of the 'what' and therefore to postulate a process from the former to the latter That is, in the judgment, "The rose is red," there is to be postulated a process, from the rose to the red. But we do not perceive it, nor can we understand how the process operates. For to understand it, we have to understand the nature of the relation between the Absolute and the Individual. But this is an inexplicable relation Therefore the relation between the rose and the red, too, is inexplicable But because the process is not explicitly recognized in the judgment, we should not say that there is no such process. This process is inexplicable Between the Absolute as the ultimate Subject and every predicate the relation is the inexplicable relation of *māyā* Similarly between the rose and the red. It means that the breaking up of an integrality into the form of subject and predicate is due to the process of *māyā*

Nor can we conceptually determine the exact nature of the temporal process Let us suppose that a chameleon is continually changing its colours It is true that the process cannot find expression in a judgment like "The chameleon is red " As Bergson says, our thought takes only cross-sections of reality, because it always works with ideas or ideal contents. When we say, "The chameleon is red," if

we are to regard the judgment as identical with reality, we must have checked the temporal process by predication. Yet that there is a process in the chameleon to become red we do not deny. If the chameleon were yellow before, it must have absorbed that yellow and undergone a process to be red. Yet this process is not explicit in the predication. But the absence of explicit recognition does not mean the absence of the process. The process cannot be expressed even in the judgment, "The chameleon is becoming red." For if the chameleon is still undergoing process, it could not have become red as yet. It would therefore be untrue to say that it is becoming red. If it has already become red the judgment that "it is becoming red" would be false. If the judgment is simply, "It is undergoing process," then the form of the judgment is not adequate to the content. The process is surely from some state to another. But the aim of the process can never be expressed by such judgment. And unless that is given, the nature of the process cannot be determined. So it must be admitted that the form of judgment is not adequate to express even temporal process. If so, from a study of the nature of judgment, we cannot determine the process of the real.

Because logic cannot incorporate either the metaphysical or the temporal process into its judgment, it in a way misrepresents things when absolutely depended upon. Hence the claim that logic can penetrate to the core of Reality, and that the real is the rational and the rational is the real, has to be amended.

CHAPTER VI

THE ETERNAL PERFECTION OF THE ABSOLUTE AND THE TEMPORAL PROCESS

WE have shown in the previous chapter that there is implied in every judgment an inexplicable metaphysical process. In some judgments a temporal process also may be implied. But neither process can get adequate recognition in judgment. So we can conclude that any significant process cannot find a place in the province of logic. It is no use to say that there is time *in* the Absolute. For admitting for the sake of argument that there is time in it, if the Absolute is a system of ideal contents lifted out of time, time may be one of them, but to no purpose, as it cannot have any influence on them. The difficulty is due to the logical conception of the Absolute.

From the absence of explicit recognition of process in predication, we cannot conclude that process is not. If so, we may call in question Hegel's view that the idea of creation is a mere *Vorstellung* of implication. It is true we cannot conceive of a state of the Absolute where no finite exists. But the reason may lie in our impotence, but not in the falsity of creation. Our logician cannot understand its process. It is because Hegel and the Hegelians have attempted the impossible task of turning the whole of Reality into a system of ideal contents, in which the relation of every member to every other is that of implication, that process and time are expelled even from the phenomenal world. The difficulty can be removed only by recognizing that the ultimate nature of Reality is not logical but indeterminate.

We may next ask Sankara and his followers how the *jīva* can be *anādi* or beginningless. For what has no beginning cannot have an end. Otherwise, even the Absolute can be proved to have an end. It is true that the finite individual cannot say when and how he has begun his career. To answer the question he must transcend his very nature, when the question itself will be no more. And the inability to answer

the question does not justify us in saying that the finite individual is beginningless.¹

The requisite for the existence of time in the universe is that logic should allow novelties. These are the new determinations or fresh forms that appear in the Absolute. But by making a judgment we are not enriching the Absolute. If we consider Bosanquet's statement that the proximate subject may be compared to a stimulus given to Reality and the predicate to the response to the stimulus,² and that the whole Reality rearranges and requalifies itself in responding to the stimulus, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that the Absolute is eternally progressing. It is difficult to understand how Bosanquet can reconcile this view with his criticism of the philosophies of progress like the Italian Neo-idealism. On his view, nothing is lost in the Absolute. Therefore every predicate must be preserved even after a new arrangement. It is a tenet of the upholders of the coherence theory of Truth and Reality, that everything, even falsehood, is ultimately preserved in the Absolute. If so, as there is no limit to the stimuli and response both in time and space, whether we want or not, the Absolute continues to be more and more enriched. One answer which Bosanquet may give is that what he means by a predicate being preserved is that though its form is lost its essence is there. But this essence is the same as

¹ The Sankarites instance *prāgabhāva* or absence prior to the first moment of the existence of a thing as being beginningless, but as having an end. For example, a child is born at this moment. There is the absence which is without a beginning prior to its birth. Though without a beginning, its absence has an end, for it terminates the moment the child is born. On this analogy it is sought to prove that the *jīva* too, though without a beginning, can have an end. But on the same analogy the Absolute too should have an end. Besides, prior absence is negative, whereas *jīva* is positive. And what holds good of the former may not hold true of the latter.

² *Implication and Linear Inference*, p. 120. It does not make any difference for our present purpose, even though the statement occurs in his treatment of inference. For as Bradley and Bosanquet show, judgment is inference in essence, as Reality is an ideal system. In the words of Bosanquet, it is judgment itself that expands like a telescope in inference.

the original R(Reality), which, as the P's are not essential for it, would be indeterminate. That is, the essence of P's is the R. And though P's vanish, R remains the same. But unless all P's remain together R cannot be regarded as a coherent whole. So if P's vanish leaving only their essence, Bosanquet's position resolves itself into that of Sankara. But the former could not accept the latter's view. For, if he does, his theory of coherence, his view that the Absolute is a coherent whole, and that in it negation or negativity is not lost but is foundational,¹ have all to be given up. If he preserves the form of P he should admit perpetual progress of the Absolute, which implies that it is not eternally perfect. But, on the other hand, if he accepts the eternal perfection of the Absolute, and also the preservation of the form P, all novelty and creation should be banished. For, as complete, the Absolute contains all P's from eternity to eternity, and there would be nothing new in it. But we see, there can be and is novelty. Our logic may not be able to give an intelligible explanation of the relation of this novelty to Reality. Yet it should not deny this fact.

Logic could have explained the connection, had it known the conditions under which the Absolute is putting forth the predicate. Bradley wants to explain the fact. According to him, R puts forth S-P under the condition X. If we do not postulate X, we cannot understand how R puts forth S-P. Thus the categorical judgment of the Absolute, R-(S-P), would be turned into a hypothetical judgment, R(X)-(S-P). That is, if (RX), then (S-P). This procedure of turning the categorical into the hypothetical, when carried to the logical extreme, not only banishes time and process from the universe, but also tries to treat X as something separate from R, and as influencing it from outside. But we can think of nothing as existing outside R. Of course, it may be asked: Even from the standpoint of P, does not R, to put it forth, depend upon X, even if X is regarded as the inexplicable principle of *māyā*? The question is an ultimate one and we cannot give an affirmative answer to it as thus put. Yet we can point out our difference from Bradley. Is X a positive

¹ *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 324

condition? It cannot be, because besides R, there can be nothing. But is it non-existent? Here too an affirmative answer is not possible, because without something like X we cannot conceive how R could put forth S-P at that particular time and place. So we cannot think of it either as real or as non-existent. That is why it is called *māyā* by Sankara. So X cannot be treated as an ideal content in order to turn the judgment into a hypothetical one. If one still thinks that R(X)-(S-P) can be treated as hypothetical, one will have to be satisfied with an explanation which is inexplicable. And as X cannot be said to be real, the judgment cannot be treated as universal and therefore as hypothetical. One may still insist on calling it hypothetical, but its difference from Bradley's hypothetical is apparent.

As we have said, the Absolute must allow novelties in order to leave place for creation. It can do so only if it is left indeterminate. If the Absolute already contains the predicate P, there is no need of the temporal process, nor any scope for it. If it does not contain P already, the Absolute must be treated as comparatively less determinate. On the strictly Hegelian interpretation, the Absolute is the system of P's. But we are now required to treat the P's as evanescent. If so, we cannot regard the Absolute as an organism or system of which the P's are the members. If not an organism, the Absolute must be supra-rational and supra-relational. Hence it should be indeterminate. Indeterminacy is not derogatory to the value of the Absolute. Hegel and the Hegelians are chiefly responsible for the light way in which such an Absolute is treated.¹ It is indeterminate, not

¹ Hegel makes the insinuating remark that the philosopher who thinks that philosophy can be attained only by a select few, because philosophic intuition, like poetic talent, is not gifted to all, assumes prophetic airs, pretends to be of "a different species from other men, and is trampling the roots of humanity under foot." But, as Erdmann says, "he grants that not all but only the select few, i.e. those who begin to reflect upon their standpoint, attain to philosophy" (*History of Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 685). For Hegel writes "Their difficulty (viz. that philosophy is unintelligible) lies partly in an incapacity—which in itself is nothing but want of habit—for abstract thinking, i.e. in an inability to get hold of pure thoughts and move about in

because of its poverty and emptiness, but because it is too full for us to know its fulness. It is dark not because it is wanting in light to display its colours, but because it is "too bright to hit the sense of human sight." Thought is unable to determine it, or find determinations in it.

It may perhaps be maintained that even if the Absolute is regarded as a system of universals, scope to temporal process can be given. Every member of this system, it may be said, gives rise to a number of phenomenal things, as the Ideas of Plato do. These universals are noumenal, whereas the things are phenomenal. Though there is no temporal change in the noumena, it can be found in the phenomena. If, for example, the Absolute is a system of universals A, B, C, etc., which would form the noumena, then each of these would give rise to infinite phenomena—A producing A_1, A_2, A_3 , etc., B producing B_1, B_2, B_3 , etc., and so forth. Then the objector admits that $A_1, A_2, A_3, B_1, B_2, B_3$, etc., do not constitute the Absolute, but are allowed to fade away into nothingness. Otherwise, A must be regarded as a system of A_1, A_2, A_3 , etc. But if these are coming into existence and going out of it, A cannot be their system. If they are eternally present in A, they cannot be phenomena, and the phenomenal process must be denied. So they do not constitute the nature of A and therefore of the Absolute. Then the way in which A produces A_1, A_2, A_3 , etc., must be admitted to be inexplicable. Thus the inexplicable principle of *māyā* has to be postulated. If it is postulated, the element of plurality, A, B, C, etc., in the Absolute would be unnecessary. For the Absolute itself through this inexplicable principle can create the differences $A_1, A_2, A_3, B_1, B_2, B_3$, etc. Applying the principle of parsimony, when we can dispense with plurality, we should not keep it. There is no need of

them." But is not such abstract thinking given only to a select few? And if any of these few says that his abstract thinking does not give the same results, will not Hegel be able still to escape refutation by saying that his thinking is not abstract enough? Both philosophic intuition and pure thought are given only to a few. But it is doubtful whether anybody is given pure thought which can penetrate to the core of reality.

postulating a noumenal plurality corresponding to the phenomenal.

The objector may again say that the true Absolute is the indeterminate Absolute plus the appearances. And as the appearances are fleeting, there is temporal process in the true Absolute. But then what is the relation between the true Absolute and the appearances? Is it merely togetherness? If they are not merely together, are they organically related? If so, the appearances cannot be fleeting and must be as eternal as the indeterminate Absolute. Besides, if this Absolute and the appearances are equally necessary moments of the true Absolute, do they not act on each other, and sublate each other? Will this sublation leave them as such? If not, there is no need of postulating the second Absolute. Even in the first Absolute the appearances can be sublated. Otherwise, if the appearances are left as they are, then a new synthesis of the second Absolute on the one hand, and the first Absolute and the appearances on the other, has to be postulated, and then a third synthesis of the third Absolute on the one hand and the rest on the other, and so on *ad infinitum*. So we have to stop with the Absolute which is indeterminate.

IS HEGEL'S ABSOLUTE DYNAMIC?¹

THE answer to this question is to some extent anticipated in the previous chapters. There we have dealt with the question whether the Hegelian Absolute has true place for temporal process. Here we shall see whether the Absolute is itself dynamic.

It is being pointed out by many that Hegel's Absolute is dynamic and Sankara's static. But the truth seems to be that Hegel's cannot be dynamic, while Sankara's, though not said to be so, is not opposed to movement. The evolution of Hegel's dialectic is not evolution in the ordinary sense. His category of one in many or identity in difference is a logical category, which, for its application, requires that the object should be static. It cannot explain change. For example, when A becomes A₁, in order that the category of one in many may be applied, all the changing states of A have to be looked upon as existing simultaneously. But such a process of thought implies that in the Absolute there exists everything as it was, as it is, and as it will be. If so, it is difficult to say that the Absolute is dynamic.

James, in his *Pluralistic Universe*, repeatedly brings the charge of vicious intellectualism against Hegel. And the latter is really open to it. For, according to the above view of the Absolute, a thing which appears to me as X at a moment will always remain as X and nothing else. Hegel may not admit this charge. But if X, X₁, X₂, etc., are to remain as such in the Absolute from eternity to eternity, he cannot gainsay it. X in course of time may exhibit other qualities, or it may even cease to be. Caesar cannot be crossing the Rubicon even now in the Absolute. Even the principle that everything 'is' and 'is not' at one and the

¹ This chapter was published with some modifications in, *the Review of Philosophy and Religion*, March 1933.

same time is not sound.¹ A thing T may be X now and Y at another time. But the fact does not mean that T exists and does not exist simultaneously. Nor can we say that T 'is' and 'is not' because it is X and not X. For T is X at one time and not X at another. Besides, these appearances have to be taken as not affecting T in any way. For if it is affected in its first appearance as X we cannot say that the same T exists in its second appearance as Y. We have to postulate some other S which exists unchanged and unaffected in all these appearances. Then only is the category of one in many applicable. But this S would be the Absolute of Sankara, which one the many do not affect. But strictly speaking, this S is not a one in many, for the many do not exist all at once for the S to be in them.

In fact, to apply to the Absolute, one in many is more an absurd category than not. It is not clearly intelligible. It may be taken to mean that the one becomes the many in succession or that the one exists in the many. The first alternative is not possible. For, in the above example, if T has become X and T's nature as such has changed, we cannot say that when X becomes Y, it is T that has become Y. Nor is the second alternative possible, as the many do not exist in one and the same time. If they do, there would be no change.

Sankara's position can be defended from James's charge. Both assert that the intellectual categories are inadequate to describe the real. In this respect Sankara is more anti-intellectualistic than James. The difference is due to Sankara's being an idealist and James's being a realist. The concepts, according to James, partially express the nature of reality, while to Sankara they cannot do even so much.² Sankara's Reality is something beyond the sensible world.

¹ *Māyā* is not a principle of this type. It neither 'is' nor 'is not,' but not both 'is' and 'is not.' For this reason it is inexplicable. But Hegel does not say that his principle is inexplicable. To admit so will conflict with his view that the real is the rational.

² Cp. "While it is not necessary that the idea should resemble its object, the idea will ordinarily be some fragment of the object, abstracted and made to serve for the whole" (Perry *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 359). This is the view of James.

According to Hegel and his followers, absolutists like Sankara, Spinoza, and Schelling know only how to reach the Absolute, but not how to return from it. But what seems to be true is that the former can neither reach it nor come down from it. They cannot reach it, because in spite of their believing that they rise to the higher levels from the lower, they actually do not and cannot. Hegel, Dr. Haldar points out, goes from the lower to the higher categories, without solving the contradictions of the former, and wants to include them under the latter. "To move to the higher categories," he remarks, "is no doubt to avoid, but not necessarily to conquer the difficulties connected with the lower ones."¹ In the dialectic, so long as the opposites are there as such, their contradictions are not solved. But when the synthesis is attained, the lower ones are merged in it and therefore lost. Otherwise their jarring nature and mutual opposition will continue. Unless a new integrality is attained, the contradictions of the lower categories cannot be overcome. But when it is attained, the contradictions themselves disappear, because the terms as such are no more. That is how we can understand Dr. Haldar's assertion that they are avoided but not solved. If they are preserved as such, we not only cannot solve the contradictions, but also cannot rise higher. For example, there is the opposition between the North and the South Poles of the earth. But the moment we take the earth as a whole, the opposition vanishes. To the earth the North Pole is not in the north, nor the South Pole in the south. What is north to the earth lies above the earth and what is south below. If the earth were self-conscious, it may distinguish between its North Pole and South Pole. But so long as it distinguishes them, its integral experience of itself is left out, and the opposition between the two poles is felt. But when the latter experience is not had, the opposite Poles are merged in a higher integrality and are no more.

Bosanquet writes "Now it is natural to think that when a 'contradiction' is 'solved' nothing like it survives in the solution. But this cannot really be so. If it were we should

¹ *Neo-Hegelianism*, p. 477

not feel it to be a solution or satisfaction. There is always the sense that something has been overcome, and the one term is expanded by coalescence with the other."¹ For him, therefore, though contradiction is removed, negation remains. The question whether the view satisfies all temperaments we may here leave out. Let us consider only its logic. If the contradiction is solved, how is it solved? If the terms that conflict with each other are left as such, then they do not cease to conflict. If they are not left as such, then the terms themselves cease to be. Bosanquet observes. "Contradiction, as we have tried to explain it, is an unsuccessful or obstructed Negativity, Negativity a successful or frictionless contradiction."² That is, contradiction when solved, becomes mere otherness. But, for example, when the Absolute is attained, who is to know the otherness? If A and B are the differences in the Absolute, whose opposition to each other has been removed, how can the Absolute know A and B? So long as the Absolute consciousness is not attained, the contradiction between A and B is not removed. But when the Absolute consciousness is attained, how is the difference between A and B to be known? If the Absolute comes down to know A, then the Absolute consciousness is lost, and there is consciousness of A. But at the level of A its opposition to B is felt again. So if the Absolute is to know the differences between A and B, it cannot avoid feeling the contradiction between them.

Bosanquet's theory can be defended only if we adopt the spectator point of view. If the Absolute is not required to know its differences, if it is we as onlookers of the process that are to know them, we can say both that the contradiction is solved and yet there is contradiction, or that what is called contradiction is after all only negativity. But such a point of view is not the right one. When thought reaches the Absolute it ceases to be thought. And in the passage from the lowest category to the highest, thought continually undergoes metamorphosis. That thought undergoes metamorphosis is supported by the view that thought

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. xxviii.

² *Ibid*, p. 231

commits suicide in the Absolute. The scale of the categories represents the levels of Reality. Each level is an intuition into which thought as the lower category with its contradictions falls. Because at the level of the Absolute there are no contradictions, thought ceases to be relational, and therefore ceases to be itself. As the pragmatists say that judgment appears when we are faced with a problem, thought arises only when there is a contradiction, which is of course the problem for it. So for thought which has become the Absolute there would be no contradiction, no solution, no negation. In the Absolute the contradiction is eternally solved. That is, there is no contradiction at all for it, and therefore no solution is needed.

Next, as regards descending from the Absolute. Hegel and his followers assert that everything finite is already there in it. Yet Hegel has to have recourse to the theory of illusion or *Tauschung* in order to keep his monism intact. For if every thing and every phase of it exists eternally in the Absolute, the question whether the appearance of the thing or phase exists from eternity or not still remains to be answered. If it does, then why are all phases of all things not present simultaneously? If not, what is it that makes these phases appear in succession? Hegel admits the principle of illusion while discussing the relation between the eternal Good and its achievement. Here, too, he must admit it. The Absolute is eternally complete, the ultimate end is already attained. It is only illusion that makes us see otherwise. Hence the descending from the Absolute must be admitted by Hegel to be due to illusion. For every imperfection is ultimately illusion.

Besides, Hegel cannot be successful in deducing the lower from the higher. When he has once come down, he knows that he is, and may attempt to describe logically the relation between the individual and the Absolute. But how the individual appears at all he cannot explain. So also with regard to the categories. The assertion that the individual has no beginning, and that the relation between the Absolute and the individual is eternal does not explain the fact. First, we have shown above that the individual cannot be

said to be beginningless. Or let us grant that the individual is unborn in the ordinary sense. But that he is created, that he is a creature who is at one time and not at another cannot be denied. Even if it is said that he is so only from the finite standpoint, but not from that of the Absolute, and that from the latter standpoint he is identical with the Absolute, it has to be explained why the finite standpoint appeared at all. We call the individual individual only so long as he is finite. But how the finite appears at all, and how he is to be deduced from the infinite is the question. To say that the individual implies the Absolute is not an answer to it. The finite feels its finitude only so long as it is finite and postulates the Absolute which is infinite. In this sense we can say that the individual implies the Absolute. But if the finite becomes one with the Absolute, it is certainly difficult to understand how the implication of the finite by the Absolute is possible. Implication is possible only between two terms which are both existing. But to know how the Absolute implies the finite, we have to become one with the Absolute. But then the finite can no longer exist. Therefore, though we can think of an implication by the finite of the Absolute, we cannot understand how the Absolute implies the finite. And the implication so far as it is admitted, that is, of the Absolute by the finite, cannot explain how the finite can be deduced. Hegel may admit here the principle of illusion in the sense of ultimate inexplicability. But then he must acknowledge that the powers of thought are limited and that it is not possible to deduce anything from the Absolute.

Here Hegel may put the question. Does not the Absolute include everything? Can we leave out the appearances? The difference between the Absolute of Hegel and that of Sankara is that the one tries to include all the appearances, and the other not. Both say that there is nothing outside the Absolute. But to Sankara the world of appearances is unreal from the Absolute point of view and so does not exist; but to Hegel it forms an essential part of the Absolute. Both the individual self and Nature are its elements.

But when Hegel says that the final end is eternally attained

in the Absolute, and the fever and fret of life are only an illusion, he necessarily implies that time, change, and evolution are unreal. The Absolute must be everything minus time, change, and evolution. If so, all of Bergson's strictures against this sort of intellectualism would be quite justified. Hegel would be leaving out of the Absolute exactly that which is needed for movement. If so, how can his Absolute be said to be dynamic?

Though we have said that appearances are included in the Absolute by Hegel, and not by Sankara, we have to note that what is appearance to Sankara is not so to Hegel. The individual self is an appearance to Sankara, but not so to Hegel. So also Nature. The phenomenal plurality must be real to Hegel, because it has to form a moment of the Absolute. But change and evolution, and time which is connected with them, are an illusion. And actually, it is only these that can be appearance to Hegel, for everything with all its phases is already there in the Absolute. It is only the manifestation of it which requires time and implies change and evolution, that is appearance and illusion. So when we take into consideration what appearance means to Hegel and to Sankara respectively, we find that both do not include appearances in the Absolute. Hegel may say that time, etc., may form elements of the Absolute. But we do not understand how they can, if they are to be treated as illusion.

Besides, if the Absolute is a one in many, an organic whole which is perfect from the beginning, no individual would like to act in it. Action is for something unattained, but the individual here has nothing to desire. And the whole being organic, the change in one individual produces a corresponding change in the others. For example, the loss of one individual will be the gain of another. But we cannot conceive how the first change in the Absolute can occur, how its equilibrium is destroyed.¹ If the first individual

¹ Hegel's Absolute in this respect may be compared to the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya, which is at rest if the three *Guṇas* which constitute it are in equilibrium, and begins creation when they are not. The difference between the two conceptions is that though both are identity in difference, Hegel's Absolute is conscious, while *Prakṛti* is unconscious, *yada*.

undergoes a loss through its own free will, it can be maintained with equal justification that all the other individuals may undergo a similar loss and may not make it up. There is no reason why we should allow freedom to some individuals only. If all are allowed equal freedom, it is difficult to see how they form an organic unity of the Absolute. If they do form an organic unity, we but consider the Absolute to be static but not dynamic. The theory of internal relations based upon the conception of the Absolute as an organic whole does not allow any other view. But Sankara's Absolute is not an organic whole. He can therefore easily dispense with the theory of internal relations.

Thus by leaving the Absolute indeterminate and indescribable Sankara has an advantage over Hegel. The latter's Absolute, if his organic conception is rigidly applied, comes into conflict with every change and movement. His endeavour to include everything in the Absolute prevents him from rising to the higher levels in the dialectic and so to the Absolute. But Sankara's Absolute is not static. Nor is it merely dynamic or mere change. Rest and movement are concepts of thought. But the Absolute includes both and transcends them. As such, it is not opposed to movement. And though by postulating *māyā* he admits that we cannot deduce the finite from the Absolute, it is easy for him to reach the latter from the former. For he does not carry the contradictions of the lower level to the higher. They simply disappear the moment the higher is reached. Nor can Hegel claim any superiority of his system over that of Sankara, by pointing to the principle of *māyā* and saying that it means admission of defeat. For he too has been driven to take the help of illusion.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ABSOLUTE AND ITS MANIFESTATION

IN the consciousness of the individual the higher categories are realized only as what are already existing. But do the lower categories, too, exist similarly? Hegel seems to give an affirmative answer. For him the Absolute implies the world, God implies man. Besides, in the *Logic* he says that the Absolute Idea particularizes itself into the system of specific ideas by an act of judgment.¹ Yet we may start even from Being which makes a judgment, and by putting itself thus as its own other rises to higher and higher categories.² This means not only that the lower implies the higher, but also that the higher implies the lower. And if the position is not admitted, Hegel could not have said to have preserved the lower categories in the higher.

If so, as pointed out in the previous chapters, the creation of the world cannot be the creation of something new. But now a defence of the theory may be made by saying that the world is a manifestation of the Absolute. But in what sense is it a manifestation? If Hegel is consistently to maintain that everything is already there in the Absolute, he has to say that even the manifestation is already there.³ But if the manifestation is already there in the Absolute, then there is no need of manifestation. For what is manifestation? Is it the creation of something new? The answer must be in the negative, according to Hegel. For to the Absolute there is nothing new. If it is not the creation of something new, manifestation must be the showing of something already existing *as* something new. If this showing too is not something new but is already there in the Absolute, then the showing of something *as* new is not possible. Hence to say that the manifestation exists already in the Absolute means that there is no manifestation. And if the manifesta-

¹ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 353

² Ibid., p. 376

³ Hegel's view here resembles the Sāṅkhya theory of *Satkāryavāda*, the theory that the effect exists already in the cause.

tion is eternal, how is it that the world is not cognized all at once? What is the need of change and evolution in the universe, through which some forms go out of existence and others take their place? It may be said that manifestation requires this form of process. But then what becomes of those forms which no longer appear? Hegel should say that they go back to their noumenal existence. Then he acknowledges two states of these forms—the first is that which belongs to them as they exist in the Absolute, and the second is that which belongs to them as they exist for us. The second state must surely be said to be something new. Otherwise, as pointed out, there could be no manifestation at all. Manifestation is therefore a novelty, the creation of something new.

Again, manifestation is of something to some consciousness. Is this consciousness eternally contained in the Absolute itself? If so, it must have known all the forms of the Absolute eternally. And there would be no need of manifestation. So this consciousness must be said to have a beginning, and therefore it must have been created, i.e. is a new appearance. Thus also manifestation implies creation.

Hegel may say that both the manifestation and its prior existence are in the Absolute. But the assertion is not easy to understand. The Absolute is something which the individual postulates as something greater than himself and with which he wants to become identical in order to be perfect. But when it is attained there will be no individual to perceive the world. Similarly, it is the manifested world that points beyond itself to the Absolute. But when the Absolute is reached where can the world exist?

Hence the world cannot be said to exist and form part of the Absolute. The former is something which as such is not contained in the latter. Hence it is something new, created. Now, what is the nature of this production? Is it an evolution of the Absolute? If what is evolved is said to be richer than that from which it is evolved, then the world cannot be said to have evolved out of the Absolute. Otherwise the world must be said to be richer than the Absolute. But the former is certainly less perfect than the latter. Yet the

world cannot be treated as a lapse of the Absolute from its perfection. For the Absolute is eternally perfect, and there is no reason why it should lapse. It is all-inclusive, and there could be nothing beside it to force it down from its height. Nor can it be said that the world exists in a perfect state in the Absolute from which it lapses. For if it were once perfect like the Absolute, it should have become identical with it. And we have shown above that the world as such—that is, as distinct from the Absolute—could not have existed in it. If it had become identical with the Absolute, we cannot conceive how it lapses.

For another reason, too, the Absolute could not have undergone a change in order to become the world. If it does, so long as the world exists, the Absolute ceases to be. But this is a view with which Hegel would not associate himself. So we must think of a process of creation through which the Absolute, itself remaining unchanged, puts forth the world. Such causation is called by the Sankarites *vivarta*.

Parināma is the name given to that causation in which the being of the effect is equal to that of the cause, e.g. the change of milk into curd. When once milk has turned into curd, we cannot get back the former. But in *vivarta* the being of the effect is unequal to that of the cause, e.g. the production of the world by the Absolute. In the former case the cause spends itself in the effect. And if the Absolute undergoes such change, it cannot save its perfection. But in the latter case the latter retains its being unaffected, and produces the world which is relatively imperfect and possesses an inferior being. Hence if the perfection of the Absolute is to be defended, while at the same time admitting creation, we have to adopt the idea of *vivarta*.¹

¹ *Parināmo nāma upādānasamasattākakāryāpatih Vivarto nāma upādānavishamasattākakāryāpatih*

PART II

THE PROBLEM OF NEGATION

.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

HEGEL applies the principle of negation to the Absolute in deriving the world. But in none of its senses can negation be applied to the Absolute.

Besides, negation is not ultimately valid. The concept has been examined thoroughly by Advaitins and shown to be untenable. Not even difference can be defended.

Affirmation does not imply significant negation, though significant negation implies affirmation. So it cannot be said that, though the Absolute is positive, as every positive implies a negative, negation should belong to reality. As the Advaitins say, negation has no existence. It has no ontological validity. Ontologically, negation is identical with its basis, which is positive.

In these chapters the reader will not find much about Hegel's use of negation in his dialectic. The topic has been well dealt with by Dr. McTaggart and others. Negation can perform the function which Hegel attributes to it only if it possesses the significance which he gives to it, that is, only if it is ontologically valid. So the view that negation is ontologically valid is examined here, and shown to be untenable.

CHAPTER I

THE ABSOLUTE AND NEGATION¹

THIS chapter aims at examining the principle of negation as applied by Hegel to the Absolute in deriving the world of plurality. We shall see whether the principle is adequate to explain the appearance of plurality

I

Hegel asserts that negation is the principle of creation. The limitations which the Absolute is said to undergo in issuing itself forth as the plurality are due to negation. Is this negation what Josiah Royce calls pure symmetrical negation?² If it is, then the relation between the world and the Absolute must be symmetrical negation, which Royce defines as non-relation. This non-relation is again a one-to-one relation. The Absolute and the world, if the relation between the two is symmetrical negation, must be two different things, having nothing in common. Is such a negation possible between the two? Can the world exist without being sustained by the

¹ This chapter forms the major part of an article under the same title published in *The Review of Philosophy and Religion*, vol. v, no. 1

Hegel uses the words negation and negativity sometimes in different senses. The positive character of a thing A, whereby it is A, Hegel calls Reality, and its negative character whereby it is not B, its Negation. And negativity is the law or the process of the Absolute, whereby it produces the world of plurality, destroys it, and absorbs it into itself. But this latter conception is based on the former, and Hegel explicitly makes use of the principle that every negation is determination, which is limitation, and hence the cause of plurality. As in Spinoza the indeterminate Substance produces the world through determination, in Hegel, the Subject gives rise to the world through negation. It is the same negation that is made use of by Fichte in deriving the Non-Ego from the Ego. Therefore I have used the word negation in the general sense instead of the word negativity (See Josiah Royce's article on "Hegel's Terminology" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*)

² See his article on "Negation" in *The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*

Absolute? If it cannot, the relation between the two cannot be non-relation. Hegel himself denies such a view. But, then, shall we say that the Absolute and the world are mutually supporting? Hegel gives an affirmative answer.¹ But here arises the difficulty. The concept of creation has a dynamic content. What is created has something new in it. Otherwise, the word creation would be meaningless. But if the Absolute is as necessary for the world as the world is for the Absolute, nothing can be created. The Absolute stands as something beside the world. Moreover, if the Absolute and the world are mutually supporting, the Absolute loses its nature as an ultimate synthesis. And we have to look for another synthesis which comprehends both this Absolute and the world. But the same difficulty arises even at that level.

An escape from the difficulty may be sought by saying that the Absolute is a system of things, an organized plurality. But then the explanation becomes a mere tautology. We accept the plurality as already existing in the Absolute; therefore the process of giving rise to plurality is not explained by it. The Absolute is then like the Supreme Being of Kant, which he compared to a disjunctive syllogism. As this Supreme Being is already the manifold, there is no meaning in our trying to deduce the latter from the former. Also, pantheism, which Hegel tries to repudiate, is inevitable. For the Supreme Being as a system of the manifold is the manifold. It is no answer to the objection to say that the Absolute is the organizing principle. For is this principle different from the manifold or not? If it is, it is not a mere system of the manifold. If not, the charge of pantheism cannot be refuted.

We may here point out that Hegel has not given up the spirit of Spinoza's mathematical method. The charge of Bergson against Hegel, Kant, and others, of attempting to turn metaphysic into universal mathematic, is not without justification. It is the spirit of deduction that has obsessed most of the idealists. Because Spinoza's Substance does not contain the plurality which he tried to deduce from it, Hegel placed all the plurality in the Substance and called it Spirit.

¹ "Without the world God is not God." *Philosophy of Religion*. Tr. by Spiers and Sanderson, vol. 1, p. 200

Yet in Spinoza, if we attach less importance to his favourite word deduction, the world appears as something new and created. But in Hegel this novelty disappears as he deduces only what he puts in the Absolute. It is true that he tried to set aside the mathematical method by calling the Absolute by the term Subject. But by making it a system of plurality, he lost what he gained. And the only improvement he has made is a more consistent application of the mathematical method.

If Hegel asserts that the Absolute and the world are mutually supporting, this relation, as we said, cannot be one of symmetrical negation. Nor do all philosophers criticized by Hegel mean that the relation between the finite and infinite is symmetrical negation. On the contrary, Hegel seems to make use of such a conception when he proceeds from the thesis to the antithesis. But if the movement is Idea's own, then the negation could not be symmetrical, it could not be pure non-relation of the one-to-one type.¹ At the very start Hegel ought to have exposed the defects of such a conception and proceeded otherwise. As Sriharsha says in another connection, we cannot think of difference without thinking of non-difference.²

It is true that on Hegel's view a thing both 'is' and 'is not'. On this principle of the identity of the opposites, it may be attempted to prove that Hegel does not mean by negation the above type of non-relation between the thesis and the antithesis. If so, the question then is: Is the identity of the opposites present in the thesis, or the antithesis, or the synthesis? It cannot be present in the thesis, for at that stage thought does not know the opposite. It may be present in the synthesis, but we do not criticize Hegel for so saying. Our contention is that Hegel ought to admit its presence in the antithesis. Hegel does admit it in the sphere of the Notion. There the antithesis is not an opposite of the thesis.

¹ McTaggart has similar reasons in his mind when he says that negation is of secondary importance in Hegel's system (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 131).

² *Abhedam nollikhanti dhīrnabhedollekhanakshamā* (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhāḍya*, p. 187).

but an advance upon it.¹ In itself it comprehends the thesis and something more. But then the word antithesis loses its significance

What Hegel admits in the sphere of the Notion ought to have been admitted even in the lower spheres. Thought dissatisfied with the thesis passes over into something else. But this something else should be positively higher, not the mere opposite. For thought started with the confidence that there is positive Truth, and, when in search of it, it would never have accepted a mere opposite.

II

Can we regard the relation between the Absolute and the world as asymmetrical negation or privation? First, let us see whether there can be a negation that can be asymmetrical between two *things*. There seems to be none. Blindness is regarded as the privation of sight, but sight may equally be regarded as the privation of blindness. One may be startled at the assertion. But unless we bring in considerations of value, logically, of two things, one cannot be the privation of the other. It may be said that blindness or sight should not be taken by itself but as existing in a whole. But here, are we comparing the blind man with sight or with one who is gifted with sight? In both cases negation is symmetrical, for, like the blind man and sight, the blind man and the one gifted with it are mutually exclusive. Hence asymmetrical negation is true only in a relative sense. Spinoza, in his letter to Blyenberg, observes that it is only our abstract intellect that is responsible for the concept of privation. We define man in a particular way as having sight, and when we perceive somebody as not having it we say that he is deprived of it. "But," says Spinoza, "as God does not know things through abstraction, or from general definition of the kind above-mentioned, and as the things have no more reality than the divine understanding and power has put into them and actually endowed them with, it clearly follows that a state of privation can only be spoken

¹ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, pp. 288-9

of in relation to our intellect, and not in relation to God"¹ Spinoza's remark amounts to saying that privation as such has no existence.

It may perhaps be said that the process of the Absolute may be taken as privation, because the categories in the descending scale fall shorter and shorter in richness. The higher the category the more comprehensive it is. And the principle accords well with the theory of the degrees of truth and reality. But then, are we to regard the Absolute as divisible? And are some parts kept back for itself and not given to the lower categories? If some are given away, how can the Absolute remain perfect? These questions cannot be answered if we accept the principle of privation.

III

There is another kind of negation in Hegel, which is the same as his negativity. This is the negation "characteristic of consciousness which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated."² It is this conception which enables Hegel to incorporate the historical method into his dialectic. In this process of evolution it is the same individual that advances from stage to stage. It is this kind of negation that is at work in it. The negation is through the individual himself, not through something else. In the supersession of one stage by another he is not lost.

Now, can this principle explain the process by which the Absolute manifests its appearances? The idea of progress is essentially linked up with the historical method. The finite individual, in his evolution from stage to stage, is gaining something new. In Hegel's dialectic the category of Being, as it advances through Essence to Notion, is becoming richer and richer. But we cannot think of the Absolute as being benefited in any way by evolving the world. If it is, whether logically or chronologically before the appearance of the world, the Absolute must be poorer. For which reason we

¹ *Spinoza's Works*, Tr. by R. H. M. Elwes, vol. ii, p. 303.

² Baillie *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 234.

are not justified in calling it the Absolute. The category of Being is quite insignificant when compared with that of the Idea. The status of this meagre Absolute would be in no way higher.

If we cannot think of the Absolute as gaining anything by assuming the world of forms, we should not attribute to it the preservation of the forms sublated or negated. First, it is not necessary to preserve them, for they do not contribute to its richness. Secondly, unless one form is given up the second cannot be assumed. In the Absolute one finite individual may be changing forms rapidly, while another does slowly. Therefore, while one form disappears, a second may still continue. But when we consider the Absolute as a whole we cannot conceive how it can retain its previous form, while a new one has appeared. If one is given up before another is put on, we cannot understand how the former is preserved. In the process of preservation, is the form as such retained or transformed? In the first case it is impossible for the new one to appear. In the second it is meaningless to speak of the old one as preserved.

Even in the case of the finite individual it is open to question whether all the sublated forms are preserved as such. There are strong reasons in favour of a denial. Yet we have to admit that his experience has become richer. But the Absolute does not become richer for its appearances. If it does, we cannot predicate eternal perfection to it. A perfect Absolute then becomes a future event like Professor Alexander's Deity. But certainly Hegel could never accept this conclusion.

It may be contended that we may apply the historical method minus the concept of progress to the Absolute. But we must not forget one point here. The world is a manifestation of the Absolute. Yet the whole Absolute is not the world. We cannot equate one to the other. Nor is it right to say that a part of the Absolute is the world. For the Absolute is not divisible. In the case of a finite individual, he could be rightly identified with the boy at the stage of boyhood and with the youth at the stage of youth. But the case of the Absolute is dissimilar. It is and has to remain

perfect, and yet it must throw out the world of forms. The latter goes on changing, but the former has to remain unperturbed in its perfection. Yet the process is such that the world cannot exist unless sustained by the Absolute. Hence the historical method cannot be applied to the Absolute. .

CHAPTER II

THE MEANING OF NEGATION

THE category of negation has been given an ontological significance by Hegel and most of his followers Bradley too, though he at first wanted to regard it as only subjective in the chapter on "Negative Judgment,"¹ recants his position in the "Terminal Essays," and says that "all negation is real"² And in his *Appearance and Reality*, though many categories that claim reality are placed in the crucible, negation somehow escapes As the concept occupies a very important place in the systems of the Hegelian idealists, we shall here examine it³

Now, what is it that is called negation? Is it the function of the negative? If negation is an existential category, it must be the function of something which exists And that something must be the negative. This negative something performs its function by negating or repelling But this function of negating or repelling is found in the positive also So there is no need of postulating a negative in order to assign the function of negating to it A pen, for example, existing at a particular place and time, does not allow any other thing to exist at the same place and time. Yet the pen is not a negative entity but a positive one, and the function it performs is also positive

It may be said that a positive entity can perform a negative function, and the function itself is negation. But if a positive entity performs a function, unless it is non-performance, it cannot be negative. If a thing A does not allow another thing B to exist in its place, it is by the possession of a positive nature that A does so So the function which A performs here is not negative, and to call that function by

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p 112

² *Ibid.*, p 665.

³ What follows in this chapter and the next is based upon the criticisms of Negation and Difference by Śrīharsa in his *Khaṇḍa-nakhaṇḍakāḍya* (See pp 1051 sqq) Many of the arguments are borrowed from him and expressed in my own way.

the name negation does not express the truth. We do use the expression that 'A negates B,' but the truth of this negative function of A is the positive function which A performs, namely its possession of a particular nature¹

When it is said that that which performs the function of repelling is a negative entity, one may instance not-A as repelling A. As the word 'negation' is ambiguous in that it means both the act of negating as well as that which negates, one may say that not-A is negation, and negation is that which repels. But just as not-A is said to repel A, A also repels not-A. For this reason A ought to be called negation. But it is a positive entity. Therefore, for want of a special mark to distinguish it from a positive entity, negation cannot be a distinct entity. That is, it cannot be real.

Besides, if the negative is opposed to the positive, is it opposed to every positive or only to some positive? If the negative is distinct from the positive, every negative must be opposed to every positive. But then, is the absence of the inkstand on the table in front of me opposed to the presence of that table? Certainly not. So every negative is not opposed to every positive. We have therefore to say some negative is opposed to some positive only. But this kind of opposition exists between two positives also, and is not a special feature of the negative. Whereas if the negative is a distinct entity, it must have a peculiarity of its own to distinguish it from every positive.

It will not help the defender of negation to say that it is exclusion or impossibility of co-existence and so forth. For these expressions are synonymous with negation and share the same fate as that of negation. Exclusion or impossibility of co-existence is found between A and B just as much as between A and not-A. So not-A cannot be proved to have a distinct existence.

Negation may be said to be the object of that cognition

¹ It may still be said that the negative and the positive functions are two aspects of the same thing. Chapter v of this Part contains the answer to the objection. There it is shown that a significant negative implies a positive, but a positive does not imply a significant negative.

which is the result of the knowledge of the counterpart.¹ For example, not-A is the object of the cognition which is the result of the knowledge of A. But what does this counterpart mean? Does it mean only an 'other'?

In that case the object of a cognition, the cause of which is the cognition of the object's 'other,' need not be negation. For example, we have the perception of two things in contact. The cognition of the contact is certainly determined by the cognition of the two things. And the things form the 'other' to the contact. But the contact is not negation. It may be said that the counterpart must be opposed to the entity in question, whereas the things in the above example are not opposed to the contact. But then, what is this opposition? It can be nothing else than negation. It is to understand this negation that we have started, and so far have not understood what it is.

The counterpart may now be defined as that non-existent entity which determines the nature of negation. Thus negation may be the object of that cognition which is determined by a non-existent entity. But again, what is this non-existence? Is it not negation? Then, in order to understand one negation we have to introduce another, and so forth *ad infinitum*. Moreover, the cognition of a past thing, which is now non-existent, is also determined by it. For example, the nature of my knowledge of Caesar is determined by Caesar, who is not living now. But my knowledge of Caesar is not the knowledge of negation.

It may be said that negation is that which is cognized as being characterized by what is to be repelled.² For example, in the negation of A—that is, not-A—A is repelled, and not-A is characterized by A. Because A is the characteristic of not-A we call this particular negation by the name not-A, and not by the name not-B. But in this view we are introducing the word 'repelling,' which means negation. And to understand negation in terms of negation is certainly futile.

¹ *Khandanakhandakhādyā*, pp. 1054 sqq. The counterpart is called *pratyogī* in Sanscrit. In the negation not-A, A is the counterpart. That which is negated is the counterpart of that negation.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1057 sqq.

Further, let us understand the implication of the word 'characterized' in the above view. A thing A, we say, is characterized by a characteristic X. But is the thing here different from the characteristic? Can we cognize an entity without cognizing its characteristics? We cannot. When we perceive a pen we perceive the colour of the pen also. Similarly, when we perceive not-A we must perceive A also. Though it is possible to perceive a thing without perceiving its unessential characteristics, it is not possible to perceive it without perceiving its essential characteristics. Otherwise we cannot know a thing to be that particular thing. A must be the essential characteristic of not-A. Otherwise we could not have perceived not-A as not-A. So when we perceive not-A we must perceive A also. But when we perceive A, how can we perceive not-A? If not-A is to be characterized by A, not-A cannot exist apart from A. The defender of negation asserts that not-A is existent. If it is, its characteristic also must be existent. But where A exists not-A cannot exist. Therefore negation has no existential or ontological validity. That is, it is not ultimately real.

CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF DIFFERENCE

NEGATION is often identified with difference. We shall therefore examine the concept of difference in this chapter. Now how is this difference known? We say that things are different from each other. Is this difference cognized as the form of things, or as their mutual negation, or as the difference of their properties, or as something else?¹

I

If difference is the form of things themselves, the form of a thing A and that of another, B, would be their difference from each other. Thus the form of A would be its difference from B, and, therefore, B must be included in the form of A. For in perceiving the form of A we have to perceive B also. But if B is included in the form of A, how can A be different from B? It cannot be maintained that the form of A is not its difference *from B*, but mere difference. For in that case the words 'form' and 'difference' would become synonymous. Besides, difference is always difference from something, but not mere difference. A difference which is not difference from something is never cognized, and can never be valid. Moreover, how can we understand the statement that the difference of A, which is of course difference from something, does not refer to that something?

Besides, if it is said that the difference is the form of A, which must be determined by the counterpart, say B, then to be a counterpart, it must be said, is either the form or the property of B. If the first alternative—namely, that it is the form of B—is accepted, then as the difference here is the same as the form of A, to be the counterpart of that difference means to be the counterpart of the form of A. Thus the form of B is equated to 'the counterpart of the form of A.' So the form of B must include the form of A.

¹ *Khandanakhandakhāḍya*, pp 184 sqq.

If so, how can they be different? Here too it cannot be contended that to be a mere counterpart without being the counterpart of *something* is the form of B, and that it does not matter whether it is the counterpart of A or C or D. For a counterpart which is not the counterpart of something in particular is unthinkable.

If the second alternative, namely, that to be a counterpart of A is the property of B, is accepted, then we should admit that A enters B as its property.¹ And just as A becomes the property of B, B becomes the property of A, for A is the difference from B just as much as B is the difference from A. But the view that a thing, A, is the property of another thing, B, and that B again is the property of A, is certainly absurd. Besides, is there or not any relation between the thing and its property? If, without being related, one thing can become the property of another, then anything can become the property of anything else. If related, is the relation identical with the thing or not? If not identical, then the relation has to be related to the thing by means of another relation, and the second again by a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the relation is identical with the thing, then this relation, as it is the relation of the second term too, must be identical with it. And in that case, as the two terms are identical with the relation, they are identical with each other. If so, there is no scope for difference.

Next it may be said that when A is perceived by itself it is known as A. But when A is ascertained through B it is known as difference. But now, when it is said that, when A is perceived by itself, it is known as A, the admission is made that the form of A need not be the same as difference. The cognition of A then would be of the form 'It is A'. Then if it is to be known through B, the cognition of A must be of the form 'It is not B.' But whatever is not B cannot be A. So in order to ascertain A through its differences from other things, all things in the universe except A must be cognized. If we use for 'all things except A' the symbol *n-1*, then the form of the cognition of A would be 'It is not *n-1*'. And this difference from the rest of the world may

¹ *Khaṇḍanakhandaśāstra*, pp. 191 sqq.

be regarded as the form of A. But none can claim to have cognized *n*-1. Therefore the form of A as difference can never be cognized. And if difference is such, it must be admitted that none has perceived it. And if none has perceived it, there is no evidence for its existence and no need of postulating it.

Moreover, if difference is the form of things, there ought to be no mistaking of identity.¹ For example, we ought never to mistake a rope for a snake, because the form of a rope is, according to this theory, its difference from the snake. But we do mistake one thing for the other. So the form of a thing is not the same as its difference from other things. The rope before us possesses some form, and that form is its difference from the snake. It is maintained that this difference is existential. Thus just as, where a pen exists, its absence cannot be perceived, where the difference from the snake exists the identity with the snake cannot be perceived. Only because the form of the rope is not the same as its difference from the snake, we perceive a snake there. The point becomes clearer when we examine a mistaken recognition. Suppose I falsely recognize A as B. We first perceive A when we certainly perceive the form of A. Now this form of A, according to the theory criticized, is the same as the difference from B. So when we perceive A we must have perceived the difference from B. And when we perceive the difference from B we could not have identified A with B, saying 'A is the same as B'. But we do sometimes commit this mistake. So difference is not the same as the form of things.

II

Difference, even as the mutual negation of things, cannot be ultimately valid.² For things which mutually negate each other enter into each other, as shown above,³ and the difference between them vanishes. Besides, mutual negation is the negation of numerical identity. So the latter is the counterpart of the former. Now negation is significant only

¹ *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, pp. 1141 sqq.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 193 sqq.

³ See p. 102 of this work.

when the counterpart is a possible existence. But the counterpart of mutual negation is not a possible existence.¹ Caesar and Brutus mutually negate each other because they are different men. That is, the negation here negates the numerical identity of the two. But the counterpart of this negation, that is their mutual identity, is never possible. Thus mutual negation always negates only an impossibility, and is therefore not significant.

It may be contended that the counterpart of mutual negation is not one but two things, for actually there are two negations here.¹ A negates B, and B negates A. The counterpart of one negation is A, and the negation exists as B. The counterpart of the other negation is B, and the negation exists as A. Thus the objection that mutual negation is without a possible counterpart is avoided. But in this case difference is reduced to two negations. And that negation is not a valid concept has been proved in the previous chapter.

Or it may perhaps be maintained that the mutual negation of A and B means that in A the property of being B does not exist, and in B the property of being A does not exist. But then, is there any property in the property of being B and any other in the property of being A, which prevent each from existing in A and B respectively? If there is one, say X, in the property of being A, and another, say Y, in the property of being B, there should still be a fifth property in X and a sixth in Y in order to prevent X and Y from existing in each other's substrates. And the number of the preventing properties would run to infinity. If, on the other hand, there is no property in the property of being B and none in the property of being A, then the two properties would be identical, for they cannot be different without some reason, that is, without having some peculiar properties of their own. Then when the property of being B is negated in A, if this property were identical with the property of being A, the latter property also would be negated in A. And A would be cognized without the property of being A, which is absurd.

¹ *Khandanakhandakhāḍya*, pp. 1144 sqq.

Besides, in the case of every negation we must have known the counterpart before we know the negation. For example, we must have known A before we could know not-A. But in the case of mutual negation the counterpart is known only after the negation is known. For the numerical identity of A and B, being a fictitious entity, is thought of as an entity only after the particular negation is thought of. Then are we not involved here in a vicious circle? To know the counterpart we have to know the mutual negation beforehand. But any negation can be known only after we know the counterpart. Every negation is the negation of the counterpart. And if we do not know the counterpart beforehand, what could there be for us to negate?

Again, what is the locus of mutual negation? It must be the counterpart itself. The mutual negation of A and B must be found in A and B themselves. But A and B are the counterpart itself of the negation. Then how can a negation exist where a counterpart exists? An escape from this difficulty may be sought by saying that A and B are known as the counterpart so long as they are not known as the locus of negation, and they are known as the locus of negation so long as they are not known as the counterpart of negation. But when A and B are known as the locus of negation they must be known as the locus of negation with some counterpart, and this counterpart is nothing but A and B. So even when A and B are known as the locus of negation they *are* known as the counterpart. And the concept of mutual negation cannot be defended from the objection that it is to be cognized where its counterpart is cognized.

It may be said that the counterpart of the negation is not A and B taken together, but the numerical identity of A and B. So though the locus of this negation is A and B, as the counterpart is the numerical identity of A and B, the above objection cannot hold. But now the defender of difference places himself in a still weaker position. If the counterpart of this negation is not A and B, but the numerical identity of A and B, then this negation negates an admitted impossibility, and is quite trivial and not worth the consideration of serious logic.

It may be said that the counterpart of negation is always remembered, whereas the locus of negation is perceived. Thus A and B as the locus of mutual negation are perceived, but as the counterpart of mutual negation they are remembered. And as remembered they are different from themselves as perceived. But this is an absurd view. For when remembrance and perception of the same thing are found together there would naturally be recognition. And when A and B existing before us are recognized as such it is not possible for a negation of which they are the counterpart to exist in the same place.

Moreover, it is maintained that A and B are perceived as the locus. But the locus must be the locus of something. And any locus is a locus because of that something of which it is a locus. Then if a locus is perceived, that something also of which it is a locus must be perceived. Here A and B are the locus of negation. So mutual negation as the essential characteristic which makes A and B the locus must also be perceived. But mutual negation is the negation of a counterpart, and is characterized by the counterpart. The counterpart again is the essential characteristic of negation, because it makes the negation what it is. So when negation is perceived, the counterpart also, as its essential characteristic, must be perceived. Thus it is not enough to remember the counterpart, it has to be perceived. Thus when A and B are perceived as the locus of negation they are perceived as the counterpart also of that negation. Hence the self-contradictory nature of mutual negation obtains.

III

Nor can the difference between two things be regarded as the difference between their properties¹. Why are these properties different? Are they different because of the difference of their properties? Then the difference of these properties would again be due to the difference of their properties, and so on *ad infinitum*. On the other hand, if the difference between the first set of properties is not due

¹ *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, pp. 202 sqq.

to the difference between their properties, then they cannot be different and become identical. For as it is maintained, difference is the difference of properties, and where there is no difference of properties there can be no difference. If so, how can A and B, on which the first set of properties, which are not different, are said to subsist, be different? For no reason is given for the difference of these properties. And if their properties are not different, they themselves cannot be different.

Moreover, does the difference of the properties subsist in the properties which are different from the things or which are identical with them? In the first case, what is the nature of the difference between the property and the thing? Is it also due to the difference of the properties of the property and of the thing? If it is, the same question will be repeated, and we have to end by postulating innumerable differences between the thing and its property and their properties. It may be said that these differences embrace a thing even while it is being born. But then which difference of properties determines which difference of properties cannot be decided. The first difference of properties can subsist only when the second is there; but the second in its turn needs the third, and so on. And that difference which can subsist by itself can never be found. And the chain of differences thus remains unsupported in the air. If we can know the difference between two things only when the infinite number of other differences between their properties and their properties and so forth are known, we can never know any difference. Every regress to infinity is vitiated by three defects.¹ What is first postulated has to be given up for the second, the second for the third, and so forth. Thus what is prior vanishes. The second defect is that we have no ground to prefer any one of these as final or as basal to the others. Thirdly, there is no evidence in the world to show that such an infinite regress is an existent fact.

It may perhaps be said that after going some way we may stop at a difference and say that it is not due to the

¹ *Khandanakhandakhādyā*, p. 207. *Prāgloṇḍhakaśāstrīnigamatvapramāṇāpagamaivbhvet Anavasthīrāsthāturachakṛtsya tridoṣhatā.*

differences of the properties of the entities concerned, but is the form of the entities themselves. In that case the view accepts two accounts of difference, namely, that the difference of two entities is due to the difference of their properties, and that difference is the form of entities. But both these views have been examined and shown to be untenable.

Again, if difference is due to the difference of properties, as negation is different from affirmation or position, it must have a property which is different from the property of the latter. But what can this property be? We have not been able yet to know the peculiarity of negation. If negation does not possess such a property, it would be identical with the universe, as it has no peculiarity to differentiate it from anything else. If it is said that its form is itself its difference from other things, this view has already been examined and proved to be defective. Further, if its form itself is difference, is it difference from something or from nothing? If difference can be difference from nothing in particular and yet be difference, then it can be difference from itself also. But difference as different from itself cannot be difference, and therefore must be identity. But this conclusion is self-contradictory. If, on the other hand, it is difference from something, what can this something be? For example, A is different from B, and B from A. Is the difference in this case different from both A and B? If it is different from both, where can it subsist? And of which things can it be the form?

It may be said that the difference here is not one but two. A's difference from B is the form of A, and B's difference from A is the form of B. But this view of the case has already been examined. The form of A is said to be the difference from B, then B must certainly have been included in A's form. And as A's form is itself the difference, and consequently includes B, the difference cannot be the difference from B. Similarly, B's form which is difference from A cannot be difference from A.

IV

It may now be said that difference is the property of things. But what can the nature of this property be? For example,

red is the property of A, and green that of B. Is the property of A's difference from B the same as the red, or is it something else? If it is the red, then the red as difference must be said to have a counterpart, just like not-red. But when we cognize red we cognize it by itself, and there is no reference to a counterpart in our cognition of it, just as there is a reference to a counterpart in our cognition of negation.

If the difference is a property of A other than red, what that could be we do not understand. Besides, if this difference as a property is a distinct entity, then does this entity again contain the property of difference or not? If it does, this second property would have a third property of difference within it, and so on *ad infinitum*. If it does not, as this would not be different, therefore, from the rest of the universe, the latter would be identical with it and difference disappears.

It may be said that an infinite regress does not vitiate the concept of difference itself. The first difference remains; it is only the further stream of differences that is invalidated by the infinite regress.¹ But this defence cannot be accepted. For the very reason that makes us accept the first difference makes us accept the others also. And if those that follow the first are rejected, the first also ought to be rejected. If, arbitrarily, the first is accepted and the rest denied, why not accept the second and deny the rest? One may say that the third too, for the same reason, may be accepted and the rest denied. And even if a hundred differences are accepted and the rest denied, the infinite regress can be avoided. But who is to fix the number?

Another move may be made by the defender of difference. Red, green, etc., are themselves the differences. They are cognized usually as red, green, etc., yet whenever they are cognized with reference to a counterpart they are cognized as differences. But now the judgment 'It is red' and the judgment 'It is not green' are not one and the same. Nor can it be said that, because the second judgment is made

¹ *Mūlakṣaṇaṅkarīm prāhuraṇavasthām hi dūṣhanam*, quoted in *Tatwadīpikā*, p. 166.

with reference to green, it has acquired that form. For the additional factor, the mere reference to green, need not necessarily turn the judgment into 'It is different from green.' The judgment could also have been 'It is red and green.' So the mere reference to green could have resulted in either form. If it results in the form 'It is different from green,' the result must be due to a peculiar property of red, that must have been taken into consideration. Then why not treat that peculiarity itself as the difference instead of the property red itself? If we treat it as the difference, the old difficulties crop up again.

Furthermore, if red and green are themselves differences, red becomes the counterpart of green and green that of red.¹ But this mutual dependence is vicious. For then red will be equal to not-green and green to not-red. So red will include green and green red. In that case they could not be different. It may be said that the cognition of red requires, only when regarded as difference, the knowledge of green. But even when regarded as difference, if not-green constitutes the form of red, there is no use denying that red, even when cognized by itself, includes green. For red is always of the same form. If it is said that its form changes in the two cognitions, then how can we maintain that the red is the same?

ADDITIONAL NOTE

The author of *Tatwadīpikā* criticizes the view that difference is known through perception in the following way.² Does perception reveal merely the difference or the thing too from which it is difference? In the second case, is the difference known first and then the thing, or the thing first and then the difference, or both together? The first alternative is not possible, because no difference without its counterpart—that is, no difference which is not the difference from something—can be cognized. For the same reason the second alternative, too, must be rejected. Nor can the third alternative be accepted, because mind never operates if it once

¹ *Tatwadīpikā*, pp. 1163 sqq.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 165 sqq.

rests satisfied with a cognition¹ If the mind knows, for example, the pen as pen, there is no necessity in this cognition to know the pen again as the not-pencil Even the last alternative cannot be maintained For then it must be said that the cognition of cause as cause and the cognition of the effect as effect exist simultaneously The thing is the counterpart of negation and is the cause of negation, because the negation is what it is through the thing Now you say that both the counterpart and the thing are cognized together But what you say is not possible We can perceive two things together But they cannot be perceived simultaneously as cause and effect The perception of the effect always follows the knowledge of cause, and vice versa.

Those who maintain that difference is the form of the thing itself will have to admit that difference can be cognized without a knowledge of the counterpart But the view is absurd. It may be said that cognition is based upon usage, and a thing, say four inches long, is said to be small even without reference to a longer thing. Similarly, a thing can be called difference even without knowing that from which it is different² But there is dissimilarity between the two cases In the case of smallness, smallness is not the form of the thing And when we see the form of the thing we may simply add the adjective small, omitting the reference. But in the present case difference is said to be the form of the thing. And when we perceive the form we must have perceived it as different from a particular thing.³

¹ *Buddhervivramyavyāpārābhāvāt*

² *Tatwadīpikā*, p. 166

³ The author sums up his criticism of the view that difference is the form of things in one stanza thus *Sāpekshatvātsāvadheśchātate advantaprasangatah, ekābhāvādasandehānnarūpam vastunobhidā* (p. 167) Difference is never the form of things, because difference always refers beyond itself, whereas the form of a thing does not, difference is always qualified by the counterpart and therefore enters the form of the thing as its determination, and the defender of difference will be obliged to accept non-dualism, if the form of every thing is difference, then the form of difference too must be difference, and the form of the whole universe must be difference, and the idea developed to its logical extreme would result in nihilism, moreover, if difference is the nature of a thing, we would never have doubted its identity, for the moment we see it we should have seen it as different from other things

THE COGNITION OF NEGATION

THE Naiyayikas maintain that when the material things are perceived there is need of contact between senses and substance. But in the case of negation there is no need of such contact. The contact exists between the sense and the basis. But the basis is known as the characterized and the negation as the characteristic.¹ And if what is characterized is seen through the senses, the characteristic also must be so seen.

But this is a view with which we cannot agree. Leaving out the idea of contact with matter which is now an exploded conception, we cannot understand how we can *see* negation. It has been said that we cannot *perceive* distance even, not to speak of perceiving negation. One may with justification say that, though the idea of distance is an interpretation, it is an unconscious and involuntary interpretation, but we cannot say even so much about negation. It is of course an interpretation, but is quite a voluntary interpretation. For example, in an empty room a thief may be said *to see* absence of gold, whereas a housewife absence of furniture. And if absence is not a voluntary interpretation, but an existent fact or an interpretation like that of distance, both the thief and the housewife must have seen the same fact. It is only the usage of the word 'absence' that makes us think that we *see* it. And the expression that we *see* negation is of course loose. So much is implied in the Naiyayika view that we cannot perceive negation unless we remember the thing negated, that is, the absence of which we are said to perceive, and think that, if it were there, it would have been perceived.²

¹ Visvanādhā: *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, p. 46.

² See Keava Misra: *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 67, and Visvanādhā: *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, p. 44. *Tena abhāvopālamāṇe pratyogyupālamābhābhāvah karanam Tatra योग्यात अपेक्षितं सा चा प्रत्योगिसत्वाप्रसङ्गनाप्रसङ्गिप्रत्योगिकतावरूपं.*

It is for these reasons that Kumārila says that negation is not perceived through the senses, but only through the mind ¹ Yet he thinks that negation belongs to reality itself. He says that we are able to distinguish things only because negation is existentially valid, i.e. has being ² But as the *Vaiśhāṣikās* say, negation has no individual nature of its own ³ If negation is an existential category, just as one thing is different from another, one negation must be different from another negation. But do the thief and the housewife, in our example, see the difference of their negations in that empty room? We cannot see differences of negations. If we do, we could have been able to differentiate them. But we cannot. And just as negations must be different from each other they must be different from positive things also, i.e. from their bases. But as shown above, it cannot be proved that they are.

Besides, negative is the non-positive. We can understand what a positive thing means. Or at least we cannot understand the negative unless we understand the positive. And one who says that he understands the negative must admit that he understands the positive. But is there anything that corresponds to the 'non' in the word non-positive? Can that be a thing of flesh and blood? When we make the judgment 'It is not green,' is there any existent fact that answers to the 'not'? Otherwise how can we maintain that negation is a category of existence?

¹ *Śloka-vārtika*, p. 482 *Grhītvā vastusadbhāvam smrtvā cha pratyoginam, mānasam nāstitajñānam jñyate akṣhānapekṣhanāt.*

² *Ibid*, pp. 473-4. *Vastwasankarasiddhīścha tatprāmānyasamāśrayā Kṣhīre dadhībhave devamdadhmī kṣhīramghale patah, Sase syngam pr divyādau charitanyam mūrtirātmanī apsu gandho rasaschāgnau vāyau rūpeṇa tau saha, vyomni samsparsitā te cha na chedasya pramānatā* Things are not mixed up, only because negation is valid. If it is not valid, milk would be the same as curd, and curd milk, the pot would have been a cloth, the hare would have horns, the earth and other inorganic things consciousness, the soul would have a form, water smell, fire taste, and air colour, and one can even touch ether.

³ M. M. Lakshmi-puram Śrīnivasa-charya. *Mānameyaraḥasya-śloka-vārtikam*, p. 267. The arguments given here are similar to those of the *Vaiśhāṣikās* against negation.

Hence, though Bradley has always been trying to recant his position, and acknowledge allegiance to Hegel by following Bosanquet, the truth lies towards the view at which he independently arrived. He writes "The reality repels the suggested alteration, but the suggestion is not any movement of the fact, nor in the fact does the given subject maintain itself against the actual attack of a discrepant quality. The process takes place in the unsubstantial region of ideal experiment. And the steps of that experiment are not even asserted to exist in the world outside our heads"¹

It would not be out of place to refer here to a view of Kumārila, which is relevant to our discussion. He says that as senses cannot come into contact with negation, but as we cognize negation, we have to postulate a peculiar way of cognizing it, viz. *anupalabdhi* or absence of knowledge. But those who maintain that negation is not an existential category and does not belong to reality, but is only a mental construction, cannot accept this special way of knowing. So Chitsukhāchārya brings the following objections² against Kumārila. According to the latter, absence of knowledge produces knowledge of absence. Yet he says that this is not inference, because the relation of reason and consequent can exist only between two positive entities, but absence of knowledge is not a positive entity. Now Chitsukhāchārya asks: Can absence of knowledge produce knowledge of absence? If it does, absence of particular knowledge in deep sleep ought to produce knowledge of particular absence. But it does not. It may be added that absence of only *possible* knowledge can produce knowledge of absence. In deep sleep knowledge is not possible, therefore we have no knowledge of absence. In that case, if absence of possible knowledge necessarily leads to knowledge of absence, then the relation between the two must be that of cause and effect or reason and consequent. If so, *anupalabdhi* is not a way of knowing different from inference, for, as in inference, we proceed from reason to consequent. Besides, how do you know that you have absence of knowledge? Is it because you have know-

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 120.

² *Tatwadīpikā*, p. 277.

ledge of absence? But this knowledge of absence must be due to another absence of knowledge, which in its turn must be due to another knowledge of absence, and so on *ad infinitum*. This infinite regress is not avoidable, and vitiates the view.

Again, is this absence of knowledge the prior absence of knowledge, or absence due to the destruction of knowledge, or the mutual negation of knowledge and its absence, or the eternal absence of knowledge? It cannot be the first, because in that case when a thing, say a post, which has already been seen is destroyed we cannot have a knowledge of its absence. For the absence here is due to destruction, but is not prior absence. Nor can it be the second alternative, because in that case we cannot have a knowledge of the other kinds of absence. Nor can it be the third. Here the absence of knowledge and knowledge are said to mutually negate each other. But in order to mutually negate each other both must exist together. If so, where there is knowledge how can its absence exist? The fourth alternative, too, cannot be accepted. For then other kinds of absence cannot be known.

Moreover, absence of knowledge cannot be said to be instrumental in producing knowledge of absence. For how does it operate? It is only positive entities that can perform any function.

Further, what can be meant by this absence of knowledge? Is it the absence of valid cognition? Or is it the absence of some cognition or other? It cannot be the first. For when we mistake a rope for a snake we have no valid cognition. But there does not necessarily arise a cognition of absence at that time. And if, as you say, the absence of valid cognition leads to the cognition of absence, the illusion ought not to have arisen. Instead of the cognition of the snake we ought to have the cognition of the absence of the snake.

The second alternative, too, cannot be accepted. For we do always have the absence of some cognition or other, but we do not always have the cognition of absence. Moreover, the man suffering from jaundice ought not to see things

yellow according to you, for he does have the absence of some cognition or other at the time. But he sees things yellow. So absence of knowledge is not instrumental in producing knowledge of absence.

Thus negation is neither an object of perception nor an object of the special way of knowing called *anupalabdhi*. Yet we adopt the expression 'perception of negation' because of its usage.

The Advaitin in his denial of *anupalabdhi* as a way of knowing is not to be interpreted as accepting the Buddhist theory that negation is an inference.¹ Even Kumārila rejects it, for the process of negating, though ideal or reflective, lacks the middle term. It may be said that the counterpart, which has to be imagined or remembered before negating, can act as a middle term. But an imagined counterpart cannot be a middle term, for the middle term must be real.² And we do not always negate some particular thing actually seen previously and remembered at the moment in question. The Advaitin therefore regards negation as a voluntary interpretation of a positive thing, an interpretation made to serve a purpose. The reflective activity involved may be regarded as an ideal experiment, but as in judgment, it is so spontaneous that it cannot be treated as inference.

¹ Th. Stcherbatsky *Buddhist Logic*, Vol I, p. 366.

² *Ślokavārtika*, p. 484.

CHAPTER V

NEGATION AND AFFIRMATION

It may be said that as every negative implies a positive, every positive implies a negative. Reality cannot be regarded as merely positive, but must be regarded as negative too. Therefore, as forming an aspect of Reality, negation must be real. Bradley writes "As to whether affirmation and denial are co-ordinate, we may say that in the end they are so, because the conscious use of ideas as ideas implies both a positive and a negative aspect."¹ "For the single positive is no more than a one-sided abstraction, that, like a mere 'matter of fact,' lies at the farthest remove from final reality and truth."² That is, every judgment is double-edged. It is both affirmative and negative.³ Not only every judgment is both, but also negation belongs to reality itself.⁴

Taking Bosanquet's conception of reality as expounded in his *Logic*, we can understand how negation belongs to it. Whatever Bosanquet might say about Beauty and Goodness, so far as Truth is concerned, we can say that he is more a Hegelian than a Bradleyan.⁵ Truth can therefore be relational and negation can belong to it. But Bradley could not have maintained this view. For him reality is non-relational and without differences. And we have shown above that without differences distinctions cannot be made.⁶ Hence negation ought to disappear in it. Negation appears only because we make selections,⁷ and emphasize one aspect in abstraction.

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 125.

² *Ibid.*, p. 666.

³ Bosanquet *Logic*, vol. 1, p. 281. Cp. also Bradley. *Principles of Logic*, p. 662. "Thus every judgment is in essence, though not explicitly, negative and disjunctive." Cp. also Kumārila *Śloka-vārtika*, p. 476. *Svarūpapararūpābhyam nityam sadasādā imake vastuni jñāte ke karschidrūpam kinchit kadachana*.

⁴ *Principles of Logic*, p. 665.

⁵ Later he has become a Bradleyan even in his conception of Truth. But the reader should not forget that here we are confining ourselves to what is given in his *Logic*.

⁶ See also footnote 3, p. 40 of this work.

⁷ *Principles of Logic*, p. 663.

from the rest. In order to make this selection thought must exist. But in the Absolute thought has no place. Therefore at its level no selection is made. Hence there is no scope for negation to subsist. And if Bosanquet's conception of Truth is not ultimately tenable, if Truth is non-relational, he too should accept our position.

Besides, both he and Bradley admit that negation is more reflective than affirmation. Bradley says "But denial can be called more 'reflective' in the sense that we become aware of it later."¹ "You may, when it is compared with affirmation, call it if you please more 'reflective' in the sense that we perhaps generally know that we assert before we know that we deny."² Bosanquet, too, writes "Further, however, it is also true that in the beginnings of knowledge negation is a degree more remote than affirmation; and this character of ideality clings to the negative form through its whole development, though without debarring it from the acquisition of objective value."³

If the negative judgment is more reflective than the affirmative, we cannot understand how negation can belong to reality itself. It may do so for Bosanquet, for whom reality is logical, but it cannot for Bradley. According to the latter, thought creates a division in the felt whole, and we get the subject and the predicate. Thus the original integrity of the whole is lost. Thought now aims at regaining it. Reflection begins from the moment subject and predicate are distinguished. And at the level thought is able to make the judgment " S is not P_1 but P_2 " it has become more reflective—which means that thought is moving farther and farther away from the original integrity. But until the original integrity is attained, thought cannot have got at reality. So if the affirmative judgment itself is a falsification or misrepresentation of reality, the negative one is much more so. If reality is not of the form of judgment at all, it would be unreasonable to say that negation belongs to it. Bradley should either accept⁴ that reality is of the nature of thought and is therefore⁵ a continuous judgment, as

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 125

² *Ibid.*, p. 665.

³ *Logic*, vol. 1, p. 280

Bosanquet does, or must give up the Hegelian conception that negation belongs to reality. And if the previous chapters have succeeded in showing that reality is not of the nature of thought, negation should not be given ontological validity.

Moreover, no negative judgment can be significant unless it implies a positive. When we say "The ink is not red," we should have known that it is of some other colour. Though what it is is not expressed, the man who makes the negative judgment must have known it. But no such external reference is present in the affirmative judgment, for example, "It is green." Here we need not think of the red or the black or the blue. So we should say that every significant negative judgment implies an affirmative one, but every affirmative judgment does not imply a significant negative. Bosanquet writes "The fact seems to be that affirmation presupposes the idea of negative relation in general, while the negation presupposes *the idea of* a corresponding affirmative relation in particular."¹ We fully agree with Bosanquet. But the full significance of his statement does not seem to have been noticed by him. Every affirmative judgment may presuppose the idea of negation *in general*, but a general negative relation is only a bare negation, and is therefore not significant. When we say "It is an elephant" the judgment excludes all that is not elephant, but the not-elephant is very indefinite, and can be the predicate only of that negative judgment which is called by Hegel the infinite judgment. It is therefore quite insignificant and logically of no value. We should therefore admit that the significant negative implies an affirmative, but not that the affirmative implies a significant negative.

That is why the followers of Sankara say that negation has no metaphysical validity. They do not deny that we do not make use of the idea of negation or difference, they only assert that the idea is not ultimately valid. Negation does not exist. We say that we perceive the absence of the pen on the table. But what is it that we actually perceive? It is only the table. Our senses are in contact with the

¹ *Logic*, vol 1, p 281.

table,¹ but not with the absence of the pen. So ontologically or existentially absence or negation of anything is identical with that on which it is said to subsist. That is, absence is not a separate entity from its basis.²

It may perhaps be said that though absence or negation is not separate as a positive entity from its basis, it is separate from the basis as a negative entity. But it is not so. It can be separate from its basis only if it is different from its basis, but there is no way of proving that it is so different. It may be objected that if negation is identical with its basis, we ought to see the absence of the pen on the table even when it is there. For when we see the table which is the basis of negation, we ought to see the negation also which is identical with it. The reply is that the negation cannot be seen on a basis which is experienced along with the counterpart. And of course, in the perception of negation the reflection that had the pen been there it would have been perceived is a necessary accessory.

Moreover, if negation is significant only because it implies an affirmation, it is true of reality not by itself but through the affirmative. It is significant, because it leads us to the real, and the real is the positive or affirmative.

¹ This statement does not mean that our senses *come into* contact with *dravya* or substance, but they are in contact with what is positive. Therefore we are not accepting the Naiyāyika position, that our senses first come into contact with *dravya*.

² *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p. 165

PART III

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE Hegelian view that truth and reality are identical, and that the criterion of the one is the criterion of the other, cannot be refuted. Yet this view does not imply that thought is the same as reality.

There is a tendency in some recent philosophical writers to differentiate between the nature of truth from its criterion. But this procedure is untenable. The criterion of anything, if it is a true criterion, must be based upon the nature of the thing. So the nature of the thing itself must be its criterion. Hence Professor Campbell's view that correspondence is the nature of the phenomenal truth while coherence is its criterion cannot be accepted. Not only correspondence and coherence, but also utility and workability, are aspects of the empirical truth and can form its tests. Yet none of them, nor all combined, can be final.

The coherence view is defective because, as shown in Part I, coherence cannot be the nature of the Absolute. And as expounded by the Hegelians, it cannot distinguish between the empirical truth and the empirical falsity. It does not do justice to the dualistic aspect of finite truth. On the contrary, it comes into conflict with it.

The defect of the correspondence view is that it cannot be a criterion of reality and is satisfied with being merely a criterion of truth.

The object of illusion is as much an object as the object of right cognition. It is not an idea or even an ideal content. It is not a universal. And when negated by the right cognition its object is not absorbed by reality, but somehow vanishes. The view of the Hegelians that error is absorbed by reality cannot be accepted, because it leads to certain absurdities. The predicate of the perceptive judgment is not an ideal content, a universal cut loose from its psychic existence, but a particular objective fact.

Māyā is the principle of inexplicability. Every system of philosophy has to admit it at some place or other. It is what is neither existent nor non-existent. It is not an entity

possessing an existence distinct from that of the Absolute. Hence there is no dualism of *māyā* and *Brahman* in Sankara.

Non-contradiction as the nature and criterion of truth is more satisfactory than coherence. In fact, the two should not be identified as they have been by Bradley and Bosanquet. Most of the defects found by Professor Joachim in the coherence notion are not present in the notion of non-contradiction.

That truth is its own criterion means that truth is self-revealing. But finite truth, on the coherence view, is not self-revealing, and therefore the passage from the finite truth to the ultimate truth, according to it, is not continuous. But the difficulty is overcome by the view of non-contradiction.

We cannot accept the Platonic theory of Ideas or universals. There is only one universal, that is the Brahman or the Absolute. The ideal contents are not real universals, they are only concepts. The real, or what Bosanquet calls the concrete universal, must be sought towards the subject of judgment.

Logically, there are five levels of reality. These levels should not be called by the name of degrees, because the word degrees implies the idea of more and less, and that falsity somehow forms part and parcel of truth.

Existence is identical with reality. No distinction should be drawn between the two.

The view developed here has a realistic basis. It does not start with subjective idealism, as Bosanquet's does. Subjective idealism is not accepted even as a propaedeutic. Hence the present theory satisfies the demands of both realism and idealism.

CHAPTER I

TRUTH AND REALITY

THE problem of truth is more or less identical with the problem of philosophy. Especially from Descartes onwards, it has come to occupy the most important place in the systems of different philosophers, until in Hegel it has become *the* problem of philosophy. He writes: "The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the Truth."¹

Hegel's view can be well appreciated only if we realize that the criterion of reality and that of truth cannot be separated. Before Hegel most of the modern philosophers regarded truth as correspondence to fact. The presupposition of this view is that man's knowledge is confined to his ideas only, and that no direct contact is possible with the objects. The latter are not 'within' our mind. But such separation between mind and reality is wrought with grave difficulties. For if man is confined to his own ideas, there is no access at all to the fact. Whatever be the nature of the correspondence, it is in principle impossible to know that our ideas correspond to reality. Hence it has to be admitted that this criterion of truth can never be applied.

But the admission implies the depressing view that man is incapable of achieving truth. And in an age jubilant over scientific discoveries and inventions of machine, enthusiastic over the discovery of new continents, hopeful of the conquest of Nature, and full of self-confidence engendered by these achievements, such a disparaging view of the human intellect was not to the taste of man. Moreover, philosophy has just emerged successful, through the labours of Kant, from the battle with the scepticism of Hume. And the wine of success disabled it to realize the limits of man's intellectual powers. That is why Hegel could remark ironically over Kant's attempt to know the powers of thought before allowing it

¹ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 3.

to answer the ultimate questions of metaphysics, that "to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the resolution of Scholasticus not to venture into water until he has learned to swim"¹

So whereas some of the pre-Kantians said that it is not possible to have direct access to fact, Hegel said that the fact is identical with the idea, that is, thought is identical with reality. What we know is the fact itself, *because it is identical with the idea*². So correspondence is neither the nature of truth nor its criterion. Man is part of the cosmos. It is reality itself that knows itself through man. And man's consciousness as part and parcel of reality knows reality directly. The thing in itself in Kant is a fiction, a shadowy remnant of the pre-Kantian dualism of mind and matter. It is of course true that we feel a constraint from something not ourselves in knowing the external world. But this constraint has to be interpreted, not as being exercised by some object lying outside our minds and beyond its reach, but by its own nature.

This is why Bosanquet regards subjective idealism, though not as an ultimately tenable view, yet as a propaedeutic to his philosophical theory. At first we have to start with the view that we know our ideas only. Otherwise, if the objects are absolutely the same as what we see, there would be no scope for illusion. But illusion is an undeniable experience. Therefore the truth or falsity depends upon something not the ideas themselves. But this something cannot be an object outside our minds. For if it is, by hypothesis, the object is outside our minds, and is in principle inaccessible. But we start upon our philosophical enquiry only with the confidence that truth is attainable. Therefore that constraining object, but for which the distinction between truth and falsity would not have been possible, must be within our minds, though it is not the particular idea in consideration. And this object is nothing else but the peculiarity of mind itself.

¹ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 17

² Even according to the view developed here, in perception what we see is the object itself. But our difference from Hegel is that it is not an ideal content.

Now this identification of thought and reality has led Hegel to the identification of logic and metaphysics. If thought is ultimately identical with reality, then a study of the nature of the former must reveal to us the secrets of the latter. So the reason for this identification by Hegel must be sought in his epistemology. The nature of reality cannot be independently determined. If we are to know reality, we have to know it through our thoughts. Reality can be known by us only as it can be known through thought. "To get at the truth of any object or event, even of feelings, perception, opinions, and mental ideas, we must think it over. Now in any case to think things over is at least to transform feelings, ordinary ideas, etc., into thoughts."¹ Thus we can know reality only through thought. The only way of knowing reality, therefore, lies in the study of thought itself.

If by studying the nature of thought we can know reality, then the criterion of truth and that of reality must be the same. Usually we regard truth as the character of thought or judgments, and reality and unreality as the character of facts. But as proved by Hegel and his followers, thought and reality are identical. Therefore truth and reality also must be the same.

But if thought and reality are identical, how are we to distinguish between truth and falsity, or between reality and unreality? The Hegelians say that truth or reality is what is coherent, and falsity and unreality is what is incoherent. If an idea agrees with the rest, it is a truth and a fact, otherwise a mere idea. Bosanquet writes: "The world of objective reference (i.e. of meanings or ideas) and the world of reality are the same world, regarded in the former case as composed of isolated though determined contents, and in the latter case as composed of contents determined by systematic combination in a single coherent structure."²

But is it possible to regard one fact as cohering with the rest? Of course, one idea coheres with another. But if two facts are found together, we say that they simply *co-exist*, and there is no meaning in speaking of their coherence.

¹ Wallace: *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 8.

² *Logic*, vol. 1, p. 5.

Coherence is not mere co-existence, but implies the necessity of implication or the entailment of one by another¹ But between facts of which reality is said to be a system we cannot think of such entailment² If so, the criterion of truth cannot be the criterion of reality

Here again the epistemology of the Hegelians helps them out of the difficulty For them whatever we know is an ideal content or concept Take any fact, it is already an idea You may point to a thing, and say "*This* is not an idea", but no, just as the thing in front of you is a 'this,' the thing behind you is a 'this' Similarly, there are an infinite number of other 'thises' Hegel writes "It is as a universal, too, that we give utterance to the sensuous fact What we say is 'This,' i.e. the universal this, or we say 'it is,' i.e. being in general."³ Though not with regard to the 'this,' Bradley writes "The content of a given is for ever relative to something not given, and the nature of its 'what' is hence essentially to transcend its given 'that' This we call the ideality of the given finite"⁴ The 'what' transcends the 'that,' because it is an idea That is, the content of a fact is an idea Hegel also writes "The proposition that the finite is of ideal nature constitutes Idealism. In philosophy idealism consists of nothing else than the recognition that the finite has no veritable being"⁵ That the finite has no veritable being means for him that it is an ideal content So what we call finite facts are ideas, universals They are of course said to be not mere ideas, i.e. not psychological They are yet ideal enough to cohere If every finite is therefore an idea or universal, what can be the real fact? It is the system of all these ideas, the Absolute.

¹ Cp Ewing *Idealism A Critical Survey*, p 228

² Cp Bradley "The real connection which seems to be the counterpart of logical sequence is itself not necessary It is necessary for us when in ideal experiment we retrace the process of actual fact" (*Principles of Logic*, p 206).

³ Bailie *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, p 152 Bradley does not seem to hold the same view about the 'this' But in other cases he agrees with Hegel Cp *Principles of Logic*, Book II, Part II, chaps 1, II, III

⁴ *Appearance and Reality*, p 166

⁵ *The Science of Logic*, vol 1, p 168

So far we have given what seems to be the view of Hegel and his followers. Let us now see how far we can accept it.

It certainly does not seem to be possible for us to have separate criteria for truth and reality. We pronounce a thing unreal when the judgment about it is contradicted by another. For example, the two judgments, "It is a snake" and "It is a rope" cannot both be true. If the snake is real, the rope must be unreal, and vice versa. Reality and unreality have to be known through judgments, but through judgments their nature must have been transformed. So truth will be the same as the real, and falsity as the unreal.

But as Bradley's examination of judgment shows, this identification of truth and reality does not necessarily presuppose the identity of thought and reality. There is some truth in the instinct of man who regards truth as the character of thought or idea and reality as that of fact. The problem of truth arises only because man's consciousness faces an object, that is not an idea. Our experience might be the experience of reality through us. But the fact in no way affects the view that in experience we always face an object, the constraint of which is not experienced as the constraint of our mind's own nature. We may accept that the object is spiritual. But the acceptance does not alter the fact that it is an object and it is given. We may not be able to have a separate criterion for reality. But this inability is due to our nature, which nature requires or presupposes also that the fact or the object should stand over against our minds. That is why Bradley says that so long as the 'other' is left unabsorbed thought could not have attained truth, but the moment the 'other' is absorbed truth becomes reality, for thought vanishes. That is, truth and reality have meaning for us only so long as thought faces an 'Other.'

If so much is admitted, Hegel's view that a study of the nature of pure thought can open for us the heart of reality has to be rejected. The wealth of reality is stored up in the 'Other.' And what the latter gives thought when knocked at its door is contingent, i.e. empirical. What motives guide reality when it confers its gifts upon human intellect can be

understood only when we become one with reality But then there would be no knocking at its door for any of its gifts For at that level the distinction between the receiver and the received, the possessor and the possessed, vanishes

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE AND CRITERION OF TRUTH

THERE is a tendency in some recent philosophical works to separate the nature of truth from its criterion. Dr. Ewing writes "The view that finds the nature of truth in 'coherence' should be rejected and a modified form of correspondence theory should be adopted."¹ But he has no objection to regard coherence as a criterion of truth, for "any possible ground of objection can be itself classed as an objection based on alleged incoherence, and therefore falls within the system by assuming that the really incoherent cannot be true."²

Professor Campbell holds a similar view. He accepts a supra-rational Absolute and calls it the noumenal truth. As the subject-object dualism does not remain in it, the conception of correspondence as the nature of truth does not apply to it. Yet he has no objection to regard coherence as its nature "Systematic wholeness," according to him, "is the characteristic of Reality."³ "Reality is a single system."⁴ The question of the criterion of truth does not arise at all with regard to the noumenal truth. For the noumenal truth is beyond our intellect and there is no possibility of testing it. Moreover, coherence as a test is not capable of self-completion and is not therefore metaphysically valid.⁵ So though coherence is the nature of noumenal truth it cannot be its test.

As Professor Campbell comes nearer our position by accepting a supra-rational Absolute than Dr. Ewing, we shall examine the view with special reference to him. As regards the view that coherence is the nature of the Absolute we have considered it in the first part and proved it to be untenable. We of course agree with him in that the notion of the correspondence is neither a criterion nor the

¹ *Idealism A Critical Survey*, p. 440.

² *Ibid.*, p. 245.

³ *Scepticism and Construction*, p. 38.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

nature of the noumenal truth, for in it the dualism of thought and its 'Other' is not found

But with regard to the finite or the phenomenological truth, he writes "We shall find, I think, that the readjustment to which we are compelled affords a qualified vindication of the correspondence view of meaning, though certainly not of the criterion of the truth"¹ Thus as truth at our level always implies the opposition of subject and object, its nature must be that of correspondence. But the test of finite truth is coherence, but not correspondence, because there is no way of getting at the object and comparing it with our idea

But this method of separating the nature of a thing from its test is unjustified. The test, if it is a true test, must have been based upon the nature of the thing. If we know that X is the nature of A, then to find out whether a particular thing is A or not, we have to ascertain the presence of X in it. If the nature of truth at the empirical level is correspondence, we can know whether a particular cognition is true or not by ascertaining the presence of correspondence. That we fail in ascertaining it is a different matter. And we fail in applying the test of coherence too. Professor Campbell himself is aware of this. He writes "There can be no absolute certainty in terms of the coherence test." "But complete certainty is plainly an idle dream"² For at the phenomenological level, even if *per impossible* we exhaust all the possible judgments that can be made, and find them coherent, that all these cohere is itself a judgment, the coherence of which, in its turn, with the previous ones, has to be known. And this process continues *ad infinitum*, so that complete coherence is *in principle* never attained. Numerous forms of the same argument have been brought forward against the Hegelian idealists, whenever they tried to show that correspondence in all its forms is a test which is *in principle* inapplicable. Hence, if these tests fare similarly, why we should take one to be the nature of empirical truth and regard the other as its test is not known. Just as in correspondence it is said that we have in our hands only the

¹ *Scepticism and Construction*, p. 84

² *Ibid.*, p. 100

idea but not the object, in coherence, too, we have the idea, but not the object, because coherence can be said to be the coherence of only ideas.

The uncertainty that dogs the footsteps of these tests is due to the finitude of thought. We can obtain certainty only when ideality and reality become completely identical. But then thought itself disappears and ideality vanishes with it. That is, absolute certainty is attainable only at the noumenal level. If the ideality of the finite is accepted, we are within the realm of the ideal so long as we are within the realm of the finite. But the ideal is unstable. What is stable is reality only. So complete truth is not possible at the empirical level.

But in our practical life we cannot rest content with absolute uncertainty. We want some certainty so that life may be possible. And the certainty needed thought tries to obtain by using all the tests. At the empirical level, not only correspondence, coherence, and feeling of satisfaction, but also utility and workability can be tests of truth only because none of them is ultimate. It may perhaps be said that utility and workability is a test of value but not of truth. But if in any sense a thing means what it does for us, then we must be able to know finite truth at least to some extent by its utility and workability. It is, of course, admitted that none of these tests can be final by itself, nor with the others, for such a defect is inherent in the finitude of thought itself. Yet they are supplementary, and give us enough certainty to base our actions on.

This practical certainty is sometimes the same as what Professor Campbell calls *intellectual incorrigibility*.¹ In direct perception the judgment, 'The Rose is red,' is not intellectually corrigible so far as it is uncontradicted, though it is not *intellectually satisfactory* as the judgment form cannot answer to the ideal of thought. But when the perceptual judgment is lifted up to pure ideality and is turned into memory judgment, doubt begins. Then even when we have attained that incorrigibility we cannot be sure of it. Thought here makes use of all tests to prevent inactivity.

¹ *Scepticism and Construction*, p. 98

And we must always be prepared to give up the cognition as false Professor Campbell writes "The constant possibility, therefore, of having to revise one's mental picture of any reality must be accepted even at the phenomenological level."¹ As this probability is constant, it must be concluded, whenever uncontradicted existence is not given through our cognitions, that certainty cannot be declared to be intellectually incorrigible.

We should admit with Professor Campbell that, because of the subject-object dualism, correspondence expresses an aspect, though not the whole as he seems to think, of the nature of phenomenological truth But coherence also is an aspect of this truth Correspondence appears only because of the ideas. But coherence also arises only because of the ideas. It is the ideas that are to cohere with each other And this coherence is their truth If it is said that we can never know whether an idea corresponds with an object or not, the reply is that we can never know also whether any idea or a system of ideas coheres with the rest It is because of this defect that these tests are said to be metaphysically invalid.

Workability and utility, too, enter the nature of finite truth as an aspect. For as said above, if a thing can mean what it does they must form an aspect of truth But a thing can mean what it does only at the empirical level Therefore workability and utility, too, cannot be attributed to the absolute truth.

¹ *Scepticism and Construction*, p 101.

CHAPTER III

TRUTH AS COHERENCE

THE theory of truth as coherence has been strongly advocated by many idealists, and has been equally strongly criticized by many realists. We shall here examine it from our own viewpoint.

Dr Ewing writes: "Coherence must not be confused with self-consistency. Anybody who believed in a thoroughly pluralistic world in which every fact was logically independent of every other would still hold that his view was self-consistent in that the different facts did not contradict each other, but he certainly would not be maintaining the coherence theory but rather its opposite. What is meant is not merely that the different facts do not contradict each other, which would be compatible with their being all quite indifferent to each other logically, but that they stand in some positive logical relation of entailment to each other."¹

But Dr Ewing seems to have no objection to the view that reality is a coherent system. He writes: "It also seems to me that the importance and indeed the indispensability of coherence as a criterion of truth makes it reasonable to hold that it or something like it is true of the real world."² As we pointed out in the previous chapter, facts as such cannot be said to cohere. They simply coexist. Only when they are treated as ideal contents can we say that they cohere. As reality is spoken of as coherent it is a system of ideal contents. But what is reality? If we understand by it a self-sustaining individual, there could be only one such individual, viz. the Absolute. Every finite thing is not self-sustaining, but sustained by it. So the Absolute only is what is self-consistent. The question is not merely a self-consistency of theory, but also of the real. But reality is a system of ideal contents, each of which implies the rest. Therefore, any content or system of contents which leaves out some others will be affected by them from outside on

¹ *Idealism. A Critical Survey*, p. 228.

² *Ibid*, 232.

account of the entailment Internal discrepancy, or what is the same as want of internal consistency, appears Therefore if reality is regarded as a coherent system, coherence must be said to include self-consistency also

Not only the idea of self-consistency, but also that of all-inclusiveness is included in the coherence notion We have said that any ideal content or system of contents suffers from want of internal harmony by their being affected by what is left out So the only way of removing this discord is by including all For this reason also the Absolute is the only truth

In the first part we have examined whether the Absolute can be said to be coherent We shall here see how far coherence can be said to be nature of the criterion of truth, both the finite and the absolute In a previous chapter we have said that the problem of truth arises at all only so long as thought exists. If coherence as a test requires that, in order to be able to apply it, the finite being should become one with the Absolute, then it is not a real test at all, because it is inapplicable. On the other hand, if the finite being, with the hope of applying it, becomes one with the Absolute, the test as well as the judgment to be tested disappear, and there would be no need of the application of the former. This contradiction is the logical implication of the coherence view Therefore coherence neither as the nature of truth nor as its criterion is metaphysically valid.

Let us take the judgment, "The table is made of teak." How can we know that the judgment is true? According to the advocates of coherence we can know its truth only when we ascertain that it agrees with the rest of the judgments that can be made about the universe Dr Ewing writes "We could not understand fully 'the flower in the crannied wall' without knowing what life as such is and without the general physical state of the earth as a whole which in its turn depends on the sun, while the latter probably depends on the whole stellar system for its condition and movement."¹ Reality must be conceived as a system of judgments Any judgment can be pronounced true only

¹ *Idealism A Critical Survey*, p. 233.

if it agrees with the rest. But taking any judgment or any system of judgments by itself, we can never be sure that it is true unless we have known the rest. But this fact implies that any judgment or system of judgments can be pronounced true only if it is all-inclusive.

If we accept that the nature of truth as well as that of reality is the same, and that it is coherence, we cannot agree with Dr. Ewing when he says "I do not see why one part of a coherent system of propositions taken by itself may not be as coherent internally as the whole system. Granted that it would in that case be logically absurd to assert it while denying the rest, I do not see why there should be any logical objection whatever to asserting it or why its internal coherence should be affected by the non-assertion of the rest." To assert separately from the rest is not to deny the rest.¹ For if the rest is not asserted, we can never know that what is asserted is true. And taken by itself any finite system of propositions cannot be true, because so taking it we regard it as an independent fact, but it certainly is not an independent fact. And when we know what is left out the former is not taken by itself.

Dr. Ewing may say that he does not regard the nature of truth as the same as that of reality, for the nature of truth is correspondence while that of reality is coherence. But we have shown in the first chapter of this Part that ultimately truth must be identical with reality. Dr. Ewing may point out that he is not speaking of any ultimate truth and reality but of the human. But it would not convey much meaning to say that finite reality is coherent. For, as Dr. Ewing himself thinks, if coherence is entailment or implication, then finite reality, which consists of a number of facts, cannot be said to be coherent. As we have said above, implication which is a necessary relation cannot be regarded as holding between facts. And finite truth, we have proved, has not only an aspect of correspondence but also of coherence, immediate apprehension and workability.

So taking the view of Bradley and Bosanquet that truth is the whole, our objection against it holds true. Any judgment cannot be regarded as true unless we know that

¹ *Idealism. A Critical Survey*, p. 234.

it agrees with all the judgments that can be made in the universe. But such knowledge is identical with the Absolute in which thought is said to have no place. And if we attain it there would be no problem of truth at all for us.

While criticizing the conception of coherence we cannot but note the confessions of Professor Joachim, one of its upholders. He writes "The known truth, as the subject of study in a theory of knowledge, is a concrete universal content, a single meaning differentiated into many constituent meanings, and emerging in and for many different minds. But the constituent meanings are themselves universal. They are determinate judgments of science, or system of such judgments, not *this* or *that* opinion."¹ "The difference of *this* or *that* knowing mind . . . is recognized only to be set aside, and if necessary, discounted. They are accidental imperfections, superficial irregularities in the medium through which truth is reflected, limitations in the vessels through which knowledge is poured. . . My and your thinking, my and your 'self,' the particular temporal processes, and the extreme self-substantiation of the finite 'modes' which is error in its full discordance—these are incidents somehow connected with the known truth, but they themselves, and the manner of their connection, are excluded from the theory of knowledge. They are problems to be discussed, if anywhere, in Metaphysics."² "But surely, it will be said, all this is beside the point. The problems connected with the dual character of knowledge exist only for Metaphysics, and Metaphysics may be trusted to deal with them. A theory of knowledge, as you yourself have admitted, studies the known truth, qua timeless and universal, and the temporal and individual aspect of knowledge, if not entirely eliminated, fades away into background."³ "Now I will not pause to contest this objection. . . . And all I will say is this: *No theory formulated under the coherence theory is a theory of knowledge in that sense.* For truth as conceived under the

¹ Cp. the view of Mr. C. R. Morris that idealistic logic bases its theory of judgments on the nature of the judgments of science (*Idealistic Logic*, p. 153).

² *The Nature of Truth*, p. 168.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

coherence notion is the character of one significant whole, and a theory of truth thus conceived is of necessity a metaphysical theory." (That is, as we have said, a theory of truth must also be a theory of reality.) "Hence, if the coherence notion is to be maintained, we cannot exclude these problems and we cannot shift the burden by an appeal to extraneous Metaphysics"¹ "Thus, it must *render intelligible* the 'dual nature of experience,' which a mere 'theory of knowledge,' and a theory of conduct, *assume* as the fundamental character of the subject matter which they have respectively to study."² "And the tale of disaster is not yet finished Our knowledge is thought 'about' an Other, and the opposition of the thought and its Other is apparently vital Truth, i.e. such truth as we attain in judgments and inference, dwells neither in thought nor in thought's Other, but in some sense in the union of the two And the union, to which we give the name of 'correspondence,' demands the independence and opposition of the factors which it unites" "Now we saw long ago that if the coherence notion is to approve itself, 'a continuous passage' must be shown from the conception of things, which renders the coherence notion possible, to the dualistic conception which is involved in correspondence."³ "But this, as we have just shown, is not only *de facto* unaccomplished, but is impossible by the very nature of the case. A theory of truth, based on the coherence-notion, is not itself true, qua coherent; or if true, its truth is a fatal exception which destroys its own basis. No judgment or system of judgments can be completely true if truth is 'coherence'; and therefore the system of judgments (the theory), in which the coherence notion is most adequately formulated, must still of necessity fail of complete truth"⁴

Now, what is this disaster due to? We proved in Part I that a coherent Absolute does not leave any place for the individual. Here Professor Joachim complains that the coherence-notion gives no place for the judgment of particular individuals. Both difficulties are cognate.

¹ *The Nature of Truth*, p. 169.

² *Ibid.*, p. 170.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

Truth, according to the coherence notion, is a system of judgments. But it is the presupposition of knowledge that truth is a discovery, not a construction. Therefore, the ideal truth must be regarded as eternally accomplished. As such it contains even those judgments that will be made in the future. So every new judgment which we think we are making is not really new. Hence, the conclusion that the coherence-notion does not allow the individual to make any judgment.

Moreover, because ultimate truth is a coherent system, and nothing can fall outside it, even error cannot be excluded. But what place are we to give error if it is to be included in truth? Bradley says that error is turned into truth by division and rearrangement.¹ He writes "Error is truth, it is partial truth, that is false only because partial and left incomplete. The Absolute *has* without subtraction all those qualities and it has every arrangement which we seem to confer upon it by our mistake. The only mistake lies in our failure to give also the complement. The reality owns the discordance and the discrepancy of false appearance, but it possesses also much else in which this jarring character is swallowed up and dissolved in fuller harmony."²

But what about the judgment, "There is a devil in the tree," which a child makes seeing the branch of a tree, and the judgment, "It is a snake," which we sometimes make seeing a rope in the dark? Do the devil and the snake belong to reality? Bradley says that they belong to reality not as such but as resolved and modified. In reality there is a reshuffling of all elements, and in the process error loses its nature of being error and becomes truth. But what about the correct judgments? Are they also not reshuffled? They must be, because the nature of reality, according to Bradley, is not of the form of judgment. So in the process of dissolution and rearrangement, not only the erroneous judgments, but also the correct ones lose their forms. But in that case, is the correct judgment given any special treatment by the Absolute? Certainly not. Then are the empirical truth and error the same?

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 192-4

² *Ibid*, p. 192

According to Bradley, the false judgment, "It is a snake," is false because the thing is really a rope, and the rope and the snake collide with each other. We have collision only because the subject is limited to a particular thing. If it is made wider and wider so as to include the whole universe then no collision is possible, because in such a wide subject both the snake and the rope can find place. If the snake cannot exist here it can exist somewhere else.

But on this view will there be any distinction between truth and error? The question is not whether there is a snake somewhere in the universe, but whether it is here. And the judgment is false, not because it does not recognize that the snake exists somewhere in the universe, but because it says that it exists here.

So we may conclude that the coherence notion does not allow the finite individual not merely to commit error but even to make any judgment. And the defect is due to the fact that the Absolute Truth which is eternal is regarded as a coherent system of judgments made by finite individuals. It interferes with their freedom even to err. Had truth been treated not as a system, but as supra-rational and therefore indeterminate, this difficulty would have been overcome. Bradley of course calls his Absolute supra-rational. But he does not seem to have realized the full significance of his conception. If truth is supra-rational, it cannot be a coherence of finite judgments. Then only can free scope be given to finite individuals to err and make their own judgments.

CHAPTER IV

TRUTH AS CORRESPONDENCE

WE have already said something about correspondence. We found that it does justice to the dualistic element in our experience. It cannot be the nature of absolute truth, or its criterion, for there is no dualism in the Absolute. Even in the case of the finite truth, it fails as a criterion, for so long as and wherever correspondence holds the 'Other' always remains and is not overcome.

While the theory of coherence claims to be a metaphysical theory, i.e. a theory of reality also, correspondence view is content with being a theory of knowledge. For the latter truth cannot be identical with reality. In fact, it can say nothing about reality. It cannot provide us with a criterion to distinguish the real from the unreal. Correspondence cannot be a criterion of reality, because there can be nothing to which reality can be said to correspond. It will be absurd to speak of a fact as corresponding to another fact in order to be real.

Moreover, this dualism of experience falls within experience itself. And the point is one which does not seem to be noticed by the supporters of the correspondence theory. In no judgment does the 'that' disappear. Yet it does not mean that the 'that' exists outside our minds, and that we are not in touch with it. So it is a defect of the correspondence view to think that reality falls entirely out of our consciousness, and that we can never know it. It may be that so long as we remain finite ultimate reality cannot be within our grasp. It may be that there may be some correspondence between the ideas used in ideal experiments and the things, and that things themselves cannot be used in them. But it cannot be the case that we can never know the facts or things. Both the dualism of subject and predicate and that of subject and object fall within our consciousness.

So the defect of the correspondence theory as usually upheld is that, though it rightly emphasizes the dualistic

aspect of finite knowledge, it does not recognize the fact that the nature of truth and reality is the same. It has erred by leaving out reality altogether. It cannot say that what is untrue is unreal, because in that case it has to admit that the true must be the real. But what is true, according to the correspondence¹ notion, is an idea, not a fact or an object. But from the dualistic nature of finite knowledge, it does not follow that what we know is always an idea, not the thing.

CHAPTER V

THE OBJECT OF ILLUSION

WHAT IS the status of the object of illusion? Is it a fact or an idea? This is the question which we shall try to answer in this chapter

The older correspondence view, as we have seen, cannot say anything about the object. It has no criterion to distinguish between the real and unreal. To it, all we know are ideas. The distinction between truth and falsity is drawn only among ideas. But whether true or false, ideas always remain subjective.

But correspondence might be advocated in a different form. It may be said that if the idea is identical with the object, it is true; if not, false. But first, it is difficult to understand how an idea can be identical with the object. It is of course maintained that somehow it is identical. Then because it is identical with the object the idea is not subjective. It is only the false idea that is subjective. That the idea is subjective in the case of illusion means that what we know directly is not the object but the idea. But then even in right cognition what we know must be an idea. If this implication is brought to light, this modification of the correspondence view appears to be in no way advantageous.

According to the coherence view the object of illusion seems to be an object which exists somewhere else in the world. Bradley writes: "If the appearance is not real, it is not false appearance, because it is nothing. On the other hand, if it is false, it must therefore be true of reality, for it is something which is. Or, to put it otherwise, an appearance which is must fall somewhere."¹ The same view is found in Alexander who says that the yellow of the false perception, "The rose is yellow," exists somewhere else in the universe. Then how is error to belong to reality? How is it taken in by the latter? Bradley says: By reshuffling. But are we to suppose that the Absolute goes on continually

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 186

reshuffling itself? For in the world, error is continually being committed, and has to be somehow absorbed by the Absolute. But this is a view which conflicts with the idea of the eternal perfection of the Absolute.

It is the presupposition of knowledge that truth is already existent before known and is not constructed through man's effort. But when even an error is committed, some process is to take place within the old truth to absorb it. The truth that afterwards emerges will be a new appearance on the scene. But then the nature of this truth conflicts with the presupposition of knowledge.

Moreover, when we wrongly cognize the trunk of a tree as a man, the upholders of the coherence theory say that though the man does not exist in this particular place, he exists somewhere else. Then is the man cognized in the trunk the man cognized somewhere else? Or is he not previously cognized? Even if he is, how is it that he comes here? Moreover, in the erroneous perception, "That is a man," the man is not cognized as the man who is previously cognized. In the present cognition there is no element or feeling of recognition.

If he is not the man cognized somewhere else, how can we say that he exists somewhere else? The first perception which is illusory is of the form "That is a man." The next perception which is true is of the form "That is a tree trunk," and we say "that no man existed here even before." The negative judgment negates the existence of the man even at the time of the wrong cognition. If so, how can we maintain that the man is real?

It may be said that the man is remembered and the 'that' is seen. The present illusion consists in not cognizing the difference between the two.¹ If illusion is only the non-

¹ This is the view of Prabhākara. *Tadevam sati sarvatra samyag-grahanaṁ bhramah*

The problem of the status of the object of illusion does not seem to be so thoroughly discussed in the Western philosophy as in the Indian. I am giving here only those alternatives which the upholders of the coherence view could have held. Also I am not referring to the creative function of imagination, only because the discussion, as mentioned in the Preface, is from the side of logic.

cognition of the difference between the two, the two are admitted to be cognized. The cognition of the man is remembrance, and the cognition of the 'that' is perception. So the nature of the two cognitions is different, and the 'that' and the man could not have been the objects of the same cognition. But the perception "That is a man," is only one cognition. The nature of our experience of both the 'that' and the man is perception. Further, if man is only remembered, and not perceived, we can never doubt whether he is a thief or only a wayfarer; but we sometimes do doubt. Taking another example, when we mistake a shining piece of tin for silver, if illusion is mere non-cognition, we would never have picked it up with the joy of having come upon a silver coin. Similarly, when the sick man feels the taste of sugar to be bitter, if the bitter taste is only what is remembered, he would not have hated sugar. All these examples show that the illusory object is not what is remembered, but perceived, and illusion is positive.

It may be said that the trunk is seen as the man. That is, illusion consists in identifying one thing with another.¹ Now, according to this theory, both things, the trunk and the man, exist and belong to reality. But what the correct judgment negates is not the man seen somewhere else and remembered, but the man who is perceived in front. And if the man negated is really the man remembered, the negative judgment would be without point. That is, you say that the man in the perception "That is a man" is he who is remembered; but the man negated by the negative judgment "No man existed here" is he who is perceived. But then what would be the occasion for the negative judgment at all?²

¹ This is the view of the Naryāyikas, which also may perhaps be adopted by the supporters of the coherence notion.

² *Bhramabādhayorvayadāhikaranyāpatteh, aprasaktapratishedhāpatteścha* (*Advaitasiddhi*, p. 121). The author of *Nyāyāmṛta* says that the man seen somewhere else may be negated as not existing here. But, says Madhusūdana, the author of *Advaitasiddhi*, in that case, what is negated and what is erroneously cognized would be two different things, but actually the judgments refer to the self-same entity. Besides, if what is perceived is the man seen somewhere else, and what is negated is a different man, there is no reason why

Further, where does this man exist? He is exactly the entity cognized directly. He is the object with which we are in contact in the cognition. According to the present view, it must be said that we are in contact with the trunk, but perceive it as the man. But nothing can be an object of perception unless we are in contact with the object. Then what is the nature of our contact with the man who is perceived? How does he affect our senses? If the man is he who is remembered, he could not be an object of sense perception. So it must be acknowledged that what we erroneously cognize and what is negated by the judgment of correction is the same. What is negated is not a thing seen previously elsewhere and now remembered. The negation denies its existence not only at the time of the judgment of correction, but also at the time of the cognition of the illusion and in the future.¹ Therefore, it is not existent. Yet it is not absolutely non-existent. For an admittedly non-existent thing like the chimera could never have been perceived. But the object of illusion is perceived as existent. Hence it is an inexplicable entity.

This result is not really so startling as it seems to be. It is the very nature of knowledge that the object perceived is an object to it not only in the case of the right cognition, but also in that of illusion. When I perceive a man in front of me in the trunk, I do not perceive him as my idea, but as an object. A glittering thing may be mistaken for gold. But if the gold were cognized as my idea, I would never have tried to pick it up. And it cannot be maintained, as has been shown previously, that though in the right cognition we perceive the object, in a wrong one we perceive our idea. Both in the right and the wrong cognitions what

this particular negation should occur. The example given in the text is that of silver seen in the pearl. Bhrahmānanda, the commentator, writes *Śuktau vyāvahārikarūpyasya tādātmyena jñātatvarūpapraskāterabhāvena tatra tanmishedhāt aprasaktanishedhah. Tadhā cha anubhavaavirodhah*. Because the silver seen in the mother-of-pearl is not the silver which I might have used (in a market), to negate the latter in the mother-of-pearl would be without point. Moreover, it would be contrary to experience also.

¹ The illusory object is *irakālikanishedhapratyogī*.

is perceived is an object. The difference between the real and the unreal is not that the one is an object and the other an idea. The criterion to distinguish them must be different.

The position we have arrived at somewhat resembles that of the neo-realist. He writes: "The picture which I wish to leave is of a general universe of being in which all things physical, mental, and logical, propositions and terms, existent and non-existent, false and true, good and evil, real and unreal, subsist."¹ Even the object of illusion is an objective fact, not a subjective idea. The only difference between it and the real is that the latter exists while the former subsists. But the difficulty here is that as there is no limit to the illusory objects perceived by men, and as they form part of reality, reality will be growing. But this is a view we cannot accept. Further, what is meant by this subsistence? Where do these unrels subsist? In the bosom of the real? But this is quite self-contradictory. How can the unreal subsist in the real? Does it subsist as appearance? If the neo-realist says, Yes, then his position would not be different from idealism.

Bosanquet writes "When we speak of the real world, we are inclined to suppose before we have reflected on the matter that our expression must include all that is in the universe. Everything that is, we should naturally argue, must exist, and everything that exists must be real. But we soon observe that usage does not bear us out in this conception, and that the epithet 'real' inevitably has the efficacy of suggesting a contrast with something unreal, which, however we interpret it, must fall, we should suppose, within the universe which includes everything. Thus the real world *prima facie* contains less than the universe.

"To face this paradox, and boldly, is a considerable achievement of modern philosophy, and its consequences are of great importance. And in the statement of at least this problem we feel, as in other fields, that the neo-realist has done excellent service, and that the spirit of the age has brought into substantial agreement, in the recognition of the problem, if not altogether in its solution, extremists from very

¹ Quoted from Bosanquet *Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 29

different regions of thought.”¹ Bradley is mentioned as the opposite extreme of the neo-realist. “The essential point is made when we have noted with Mr Bradley that the universe must be taken to include both the real and the imaginary. It, the universe, is certainly qualified by the work of imagination, cancel the imaginary—how much of it is gone! It is then certainly changed, and we are tempted to say is changed much for the worse.”²

But how does the imaginary and the unreal, according to Bradley, subsist in the real? Through absorption, by dissolution and rearrangement. But this view we have criticized above. If it is said that the real and the unreal exist together in the universe, then they must exist each by the side of the other. Then this duality must be accepted to be the ultimately real. But Bradley’s conception of the Absolute does not permit such a view. Besides, can they exist together without acting on each other? And what will be the result of this mutual interaction?

Further, the statement that the universe contains more than the real is ambiguous. For what does Bradley mean by the real? Is not the real the Absolute itself? If it is, then as he asserts at so many places, the real is the universe of appearances plus something more. And only because the Absolute is more than the universe is it able to harmonize the jarring elements. If the real in question is not the Absolute, then certainly it is not the ultimately real, but only the relatively real. And of course the universe is a combination of the relatively real and the relatively unreal.

What the neo-realists mean cannot be the same. For them there is nothing which is ultimately real like the Absolute.

However, by both Bradley and the neo-realists the illusory object is given a place to remain. For both it is an object, not a psychological idea. Bradley preserves it in the Absolute by dissolution and rearrangement, while the neo-realist allows it to subsist and not to exist.

We have shown that neither view is tenable. The Absolute is eternally perfect and complete, and it cannot be rearranging itself and absorbing every error we commit. Nor

¹ *Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

is there any place we can think of where illusion can subsist. So the object of illusion must be something which disappears¹ The view that error somehow contributes to truth does not hold true here For through knowledge we discover a thing, but we do not contribute to its existence. So when we perceive the real object we perceive it as already existing The illusory object might have helped us in *discovering* the true one, but not in producing it The unreal, too, does not bring about the existence of the real.

It might be perhaps said that if the illusory object is not included in reality, the latter will so far be the poorer But the non-inclusion of the unreal is not at all detrimental to the perfection of reality Otherwise, on this analogy, the good man may be regarded as imperfect, because he does not commit a murder and is not hanged Committing murder and going to the gallows is certainly an experience which is not undergone by the good man But he is not the poorer for want of such experience

It may be objected that if the object of illusion is neither a subjective idea nor a thing seen on some occasion, but some inexplicable thing which appears at that moment, then its appearance and disappearance ought to give rise to the cognition that it is born and destroyed² But the objection cannot hold Is the cognition of the birth and destruction to be had during the time of the illusion or when it is contradicted? It cannot be had while the illusion lasts, because in the example given the man cognized is cognized as identical with the trunk, which is certainly born long before, and does not go out of existence even when the judgment that it is man is negated Nor can the cognition be had when the object of illusion is denied, because the denial is of the form that the man was not there, is not there, and will not be there. When the thing is so completely negated, it is not possible for the cognition

¹ Cp *Bādhātavīśhayatvamevahi bhramatvam* (*Advaitasiddhi*, p 340) And *bādhā* is defined by the Sankarite as *upādānena saha kāryavirṇāśah* *Bādhā* is the destruction of the effect along with the cause (*Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 97).

² *Advaitasiddhi*, p 648

of the birth and the destruction of the thing to arise. For it is a fact of everyday experience that where there is complete negation what is negated cannot be perceived either as being born or destroyed. To cognize a thing either as being born or destroyed implies the uncontradicted cognition of it as existing for some time. But such existence is completely denied by the negative judgment. If it is asked why the cognition of complete negation should stand in the way of the cognition of destruction and birth, the only reply is that experience so informs us.

In European philosophy it has often rightly been stressed that Evil is not a mere privation of the Good, but is something positive. Pain, for example, is not a mere absence of pleasure. It has a distinct and positive form or quality of its own. Correspondingly in the intellectual sphere, error, too, should be positive. This demand is best satisfied by Sankara. The object of illusion is not merely a part of reality deprived of its relations to other parts, as the Hegelians view it. These may say that error is positive, because it is retained in the Absolute by reshuffling. But it is this reshuffling that makes error a mere privation of truth, for then error becomes a part of truth, just viewed apart from its relations to other parts and the whole, that is, in isolation from them. But according to Sankara, both evil and error are distinct positive entities, which yet cease to exist in the good and truth. They are not mere privations. To regard them as positive, it is not necessary to carry them into the Absolute, but to treat them as distinct facts. On the contrary, the Absolute would be vitiated by their presence.

CHAPTER VI

MĀYĀ OR THE PRINCIPLE OF INEXPLICABILITY

IN Western philosophy the word *māyā* is used only in a despicable sense. If it is shown that a philosopher admitted *māyā* somewhere into his system, it is regarded as tantamount to proving that his system is absurd. It has been more or less a term of abuse. But the previous discussion must have demonstrated by this time that any system which wants to avoid pluralism cannot but admit inexplicability at some place or other. Hegel has admitted *Taushung*, Spinoza clearly gives place to illusion; Bradley says that *somehow*, we do not know how, appearances issue forth from the Absolute and are merged in it; and Du Bois-Reymond cries 'ignoramus' when asked to explain even life. It is doubtful whether even pluralism can satisfactorily explain each and every concept. Bradley's criticism of several categories in the first part of his *Appearance and Reality* shows that it cannot, and at every step it has to admit intellectual defeat.

We must conclude that the principle of inexplicability is inherent in our own thought. To explain means to mediate. If everything is fully mediated, thought itself vanishes. There must be something to mediate, something immediate and unexplained, so that thought may exist.¹ Hence inexplicability is essential to thought.

Though at some place or other Western philosophers have admitted the principle of *māyā*, they have not given it any metaphysical significance. They perhaps think that it is the seamy side of their systems and do not want to expose it. But this attitude is certainly antagonistic to the spirit of truth-seeking. It is not a matter of shame to say that we are finite, that in the bosom of reality are hidden secrets unknown to man and unknowable through his intellect, that the panorama of the universe is the writing of an unseen hand the meaning of which we can only half under-

¹ McTaggart *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, para. 45

stand. We will not be required to apologize for our being finite. Nor should the recognition that our present being is permeated by an inexplicable entity be allowed to unsettle our minds. If that is the truth, so much the better that we should acknowledge it. That we are able to know it shows that in some way we transcend it and can conquer it, though not through our intellect. As intellect we are permeated by it. But that we feel the permeation shows that our nature is different from what it is. And by realizing our true nature we can rise above our intellectual nature and thus above the inexplicable principle.

We have said in the previous chapter that the object of illusion is inexplicable because it is neither existent nor non-existent. We never cognize a chimera as existent. Therefore the man perceived in the tree is not of its nature, that is, he is not absolutely non-existent, because he is perceived as existent. Yet the next cognition that he is never existent contradicts the previous one. Therefore the man cannot be said to be existent.

But it may be objected: How can a thing be neither existent nor non-existent? If it is not non-existent, it must be existent. If not existent, it must be non-existent. How can both the opposites be true of the same thing? But the reply is that existence and non-existence are not opposites. Existence is what is never contradicted. But non-existence is not what is contradicted as what is always unreal, but what is never perceived as existing anywhere.¹ Thus it is only things like the circular square and the sky-lotus that are non-existent. But the man in the trunk is perceived as existent.²

¹ *Advantasiddhi*, pp. 50 sqq. *Tadhāhi atra trīkālābādhyatvarūpasat-varyatwekah nāsatvam, kintu kwachīdāpyupādhai satvena prāṭīya-mānatwānādāhīkaranatvam*

² Madhusūdana gives in his *Advantasiddhi* five definitions of *māyā*. They are (1) *Brahmapramāṭirīktābādhyatwesati satvenapratītyarham chīdbhinnam prapannopādhai trīkālīkanishedhapratīyogī* (p. 20), (2) *prapannopādhai trīkālīkanishedhapratīyogītvam* (p. 94), (3) *jñānanivartiyatvam vā* (p. 160); (4) *swāśrayanishīhātīyantiābhāva-pratīyogītvam vā* (p. 182), (5) *satvena prāṭīyamanatwe sati sadvīkītatvam vā* (p. 195) *Māyā* is that which is not removed except by

Māyā is therefore that which appears as existing and yet is negated on its own basis as never existing. This conception is found even in Bradley. The appearances exist in the Absolute. Without the Absolute they cannot be perceived as existing. But, says Bradley, these are merged in the Absolute and lost in it. And the Absolute is the eternal truth. So the appearances are eternally lost in it. That is, in it their existence is negated in the past, present, and future. And because they are cognized as existing, and yet are denied as never existing in it, they are *māyā*.

Māyā is also called by the term *ajñāna*. If the Absolute is of the nature of experience in which all contradictions are resolved, and there is nothing impenetrable to consciousness, it should be perfect consciousness. If we call it pure intuition, pure reason, mediated immediacy, or self-consciousness which is pure *chaitanya* or unadulterated consciousness, then the appearances which cannot be fully pierced by thought should be due to a principle which makes one thing not transparent to another. Such a principle is *ajñāna* or Nescience, or, as sometimes translated, Ignorance. To it is due the presence of everything unmediated. It is the cause of the whole world. Its nature is 'I am ignorant,' 'I do not understand myself and the other.' It cannot be said that *ajñāna* is mere absence of cognition. For I know that I do not understand. There is therefore the presence of cognition. Hence this ignorance is not merely negative, but has a positive aspect. It is therefore regarded by many of the Sankarites as the material cause of the universe. The knowledge of *Brahman*, and which can be cognized as existent, is different from consciousness, and is perceived as existing on a basis on which it is denied as never existing, or what is denied as existing on a basis on which it is negated in the three tenses, or that which disappears when knowledge arises, or the counterpart of that eternal negation whose basis is the basis of the counterpart itself, or what is different from existence and perceived as existence. All these definitions imply the common factor of the sameness of the basis of the eternal negation and its counterpart. The first definition is formulated rather elaborately to satisfy a particular school of Vedānta, which differentiates between *tvilāvidyā* and *mūlāvidyā*, that is, the illusion which makes us see the serpent in the snake and that which is creative of the world itself.

object in Hegel's phraseology is something unmediated. It is what the individual faces, but is not transparent to him. So long as it remains an object it never allows thought to permeate it fully. If fully mediated it disappears, it cannot exist, is absorbed in Self, is made part and parcel of Self-consciousness. Hence its nature is best expressed by the term *ajñāna*.

It is a mistake of many of the idealists like Fichte and Hegel that they try to represent the most concrete processes through the most abstract concepts of formal logic. The pure Ego, according to Fichte, is the unity of the finite ego and non-ego. According to Hegel, the Absolute is the Subject. Yet it is the unity of the finite subject and the object. To both, it is the principle of negation that creates division and opposition in the Absolute. But negation cannot adequately express the process by which the unity creates the division. When there is division we may say that the subject is not the object and apply the principle of "A is not B." But before division negation has no place at all. At least we cannot understand how it can have a place. Therefore we have to take that process as inexplicable.

Even if the principle of negation is admitted, for the sake of argument, as explaining the division in the Subject, it can divide the Subject into two subjects, but it cannot explain the impenetrability of the one to the other. But the principle of Ignorance can do it. *Ajñāna* is the obstruction that prevents the one from knowing the others. But in the concept of negation there is nothing to connote this obstruction. The all-pervading transparency characteristic of the Absolute Consciousness is somehow destroyed in the empirical level. And as expressing the fact *ajñāna* is a more satisfactory idea than negation.

Even the negativity of Hegel, as shown previously, is unable to save the eternal perfection of Absolute, while at the same time creating the world. But *ajñāna*, which vanishes the moment knowledge arises, successfully performs the required function. The appearance of knowledge is the realization of Self in the object, is the removal of objectivity. As the latter disappears at the presence of *jñāna* or know-

ledge,¹ it has no reality. Yet we should not say that it does not exist, for we actually face it, and only after a great struggle can overcome it. But when we become one with the Absolute it does not exist even for us. It represents the fact that the perfection of the Absolute is unimpaired by the world of forms. Just as ignorance vanishes with its effects after knowledge arises, the effects of *ajñāna* vanish at the presence of Self-consciousness. As we do not mean that the object of cognition has come into existence only along with the knowledge of it, but exists even before we know it, similarly the Absolute remains perfect even while the play of *ajñāna* is continuing. And this idea is not connoted by the principle of negation.

One question remains to be answered. What is the relation between *māyā* or *ajñāna* and the Absolute? The answer is that there is no reason for putting the question. It is the spirit of deduction that is inquisitive here. We think that if we know the nature of *ajñāna*, the Absolute, and their relation, we can deduce the whole world from them. But our desire to deduce the world is preposterous. For unless we know the nature of the Absolute in detail, how can we demonstrate the necessity of our deduction? As Bergson says, no amount of concepts can exhaust the nature of even a finite individual, not to speak of the Absolute. And even many of those who profess to deduce admit that a detailed knowledge of the Absolute is not possible. In this very admission is implied our inability to understand the nature of the above relation. How *ajñāna* comes to be and how it disappears we cannot comprehend. Hegel attributes the process of negation to the Absolute, but we do not hold that *ajñāna* belongs to it. For at that level of consciousness, *ajñāna* does not exist at all. Logic and metaphysics cannot inform us more about its nature.

It is not out of place to refer here to the objections of Rāmānuja against *avidyā* or *ajñāna*.² His standpoint is more or less the same as that of Hegel. Therefore he can be

¹ Cp the third definition of *māyā* given by Madhusūdana, p. 155 of this work.

² *Śrībhāṣya*, II, 1, 15.

answered in the same way. For example, he argues. Does *avidyā* belong to the *Brahman* or the *jīva*? If you say that it belongs to the *Brahman*, you accept my position, for the plurality then would be internal to the *Brahman*. If you say, on the other hand, that it belongs to the finite self, the latter must exist first for the former to belong to it. Thus for the existence of the finite self *avidyā* becomes necessary; if not, without *avidyā*, the finite self would be identical with the Absolute, but for the existence of *avidyā* the finite self is necessary, for without the latter *avidyā* has nothing to subsist on.¹ But to posit such mutual dependence is no explanation.

Now this objection arises only through an inadequate understanding of Sankara's position. Sankara does not think, unlike Hegel, that by calling a thing inexplicable he has explained it. *Avidyā* is something whose nature we cannot understand. To press for its explanation is therefore futile. *Avidyā* is the objectivity present in the consciousness of the *jīva*. But when absorbed into Self-consciousness it disappears. If the objector says that, though *avidyā* loses its objectivity, it still remains in Self-consciousness in a form where all the divisions and distinctions are negated, the reply is that we do not know whether it can remain there as the objector thinks. We have no evidence for its existence in the Absolute, where there is no principle of distinction. Hence we should say that *avidyā* belongs to the *jīva*, not in the sense in which a purse belongs to me, but in the sense that it constitutes *jīva*'s nature as determinate. Therefore it is irrelevant to ask either how *avidyā* belongs to *jīva*, if the latter does not exist previous to the former, or where it exists before *jīva*'s appearance. As we have pointed out, it is the desire to deduce and bring the Absolute into the grip of thought that is at the root of the objection.

Similarly, the objection of Kumarila that Sankara has to forgo his non-dualism if he holds that *avidyā* is external to the *Brahman* is not to the point.¹ If *avidyā* is accepted to have an existence besides that of *Brahman* the objection

¹ Cp the difficulty about the relation between the Modes and the Substance of Spinoza, p. 66 of this work.

holds good. But it is repeatedly asserted that *avidyā* does not exist at that level of consciousness, because it is eternally negated in the Absolute as having never existed. It is the same mathematical mind that sees in Sankara the dualism of *Brahman* and *avidyā*.

CHAPTER VII

COHERENCE AND NON-CONTRADICTION

THE concepts of coherence and non-contradiction have been completely identified both by Bradley and Bosanquet. They speak indifferently of both. Bradley writes "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself, here is an absolute criterion."¹ "Our standard denies inconsistency and therefore asserts consistency . . . And our result so far is this. Reality is known to possess a character, but this character is at present determined only as that which excludes contradiction. But we make a further advance. We saw . . . that all appearance must belong to reality. For what appears is, and whatever is cannot fall outside the real. And we may now combine this result with the conclusion just reached. We may say that everything which appears is somehow real in such a way as to be self-consistent. The character of the real is to possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form."² Bosanquet, too, speaks of the "postulate of reality with a coherent nature of its own,"³ and the principle of non-contradiction for him is a positive and constructive principle,⁴ because it is another aspect of the spirit of the whole. In his *Logic* he writes: "This (immanence) is only another form of words for the principle of non-contradiction, the principle that truth is the whole, and the doctrine that coherence is the test of truth and reality."⁵

What Bosanquet and Bradley say can be true only if appearances are allowed to be members and reality their system. But we have shown that this view cannot be defended. Therefore truth, when we are speaking of the Absolute, cannot be said to be coherent. In the Absolute coherence is to be between the plurality. This plurality can be only phenomena. But the phenomena are negated in the

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 136.

² *Ibid*, pp. 139-40

³ *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 47

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 267

⁵ Vol II, p. 267

Absolute And as the Absolute is eternally perfect the negation is eternal Phenomena exist only so long as thought exists But thought disappears in the Absolute, it has no place there And as the Absolute is eternal the absence of thought in it is eternal Therefore the phenomena is eternally negated in the Absolute So final truth is not coherent Yet we should admit that it is non-contradictory, because there is nothing to contradict it, as it is without a second.¹

Moreover, we almost agree with Professor Campbell when he writes "But does the term non-contradictory not have itself a certain positive significance? Only in a purely *formal* sense Formally, we can give positive expression to it, as the 'self-consistent' or as differences united in a certain way acceptable to the intellect"² That is, what we positively know is the self-contradictory The self-consistent has for us only a negative significance, because the intellect can never grasp the self-consistent So it can mean for us only the non-contradictory

But we shall add that even *formally* the Absolute as non-contradictory cannot have a positive meaning for us, if it is in the sense that intellect can grasp it, for the form of the Absolute cannot be separated from its matter Even to understand the form of the Absolute thought must be there, but it is not allowed to be there Perhaps even Professor Campbell does not use the word 'formally' in this sense.

Further, how do we obtain the idea of coherence? We refer a number of ideas to the fact, and when these agree, we say they cohere and are true But the criterion of truth and reality is said to be the same We can understand the coherence of ideas, but, as we have said, coherence does not apply to facts When I see John and Smith together, they simply coexist and there is no meaning in talking of their coherence Yet we can speak of their mutual non-contradiction So long as they do not negate each other, that is, kill each other, they continue to be real. It may be said that they may have mutual dealings with each

¹ Cp *Satwam cha pramānasiddhāttwam (Advantasiddhi*, p 195).
Pramānasiddhāttwam cha abādhyatwavyāpyamityanyat (ibid , p 197)

² *Scepticism and Construction*, p 79

other which must cohere. But supposing they are indifferent to each other, then the relation between them is non-contradiction. And non-contradiction is applicable both when they have dealings and when they have not, whereas coherence is applicable in the former case only. So instead of having two principles, according to the principle of parsimony, we should have one. Moreover, coherence is not mere coexistence, but as Dr Ewing says, the logical relation of entailment. So if we want to maintain that the criterion of truth and reality is identical, coherence should be given up and non-contradiction accepted in its place. This procedure means also that coherence and non-contradiction should not be identified.

We can easily understand how non-contradiction can be the criterion of truth and reality. Things coexisting certainly do not contradict each other. And non-contradiction can distinguish between true and false ideas also. For when two ideas contradict each other, one of them at least must be false. When they do not they may be true. So non-contradiction is applicable to them also. Thus our principle can be used not only in distinguishing real facts from unreal facts, but also true ideas from false ideas, whereas coherence is applicable only to ideas.

But, it may be objected, is not everything finite ideal, and therefore an ideal content? If it is, what we call finite facts would be so many ideal contents. And as the Absolute is a system of such ideal contents, coherence can hold good even of facts. That is, the criterion can be a criterion of both truth and reality.

But we have said in a previous chapter¹ that though our finite experience implies a dualistic element, the latter does not imply that what we know are only ideal contents and not facts. In perception we are directly in contact with the object and what we see is the object. We have also said that the object of illusion is not an idea but quite as much an object as the object of true perception. It is the object of illusion that becomes, in logic, the predicate of the erroneous judgment. For example, the man we see in the

¹ P. 145 of this work.

trunk of a tree becomes the predicate of the erroneous judgment "That is a man." And the perception of that man is of the form "That is a man." But when this illusion is negated, it is not the 'that' which is negated, but the man.¹ For the correction is of the form "That is not a man," but not "That is not a 'that' and a man."¹ This shows that even at the perceptive level a distinction is drawn between the 'that' and the 'what.' But the man we have shown is not an idea but a fact. If in wrong perception the predicate is a fact, even in the right one it must be so. *The ideality of the finite means that the finite is limited and limitation is due to thought*

The view of the Hegelian idealists that reality is a system of ideal contents is based upon the view that the predicate of every judgment is an ideal content. But we have shown that in the case of perception it is not. And it is in perception that we are in direct contact with empirical facts, though not with the Absolute. If the facts are therefore not ideal contents, coherence cannot be true of them or of the Absolute.

We have shown in a previous chapter that the coherence notion of truth interferes with the nature of finite truth and does not allow the finite individual even to err. The difficulty is due to the fact that truth is to be a coherent system of all judgments that can be made about reality. But this truth is an eternally accomplished fact. It contains all the phenomenal appearances. Therefore the finite individual has no new judgments to make, whether right or wrong. But on the view of non-contradiction this defect is overcome. An appearance is what is contradicted on its own basis as never existing. But the basis is discovered as already existing, but not manufactured by integrating these appearances. For if so manufactured it must have come into existence after the appearance is perceived, and must have been cognized as so coming into existence. But it is cognized as already existing before we perceive it, and even while the appearance lasted. Therefore the moment the appearance is negated it goes out of existence and its basis shows itself. So Reality

¹ Cp. footnote, p. 180 of this work

on which the play of the appearances is held does not interfere with them, and so with the human truth. Appearances may come and go through time, finite beings may make as many judgments as they like, right or wrong, good or bad, the Absolute allows them free scope. The Absolute is of course non-contradictory. The appearances do not constitute it. Therefore the Absolute can allow any number of them. So non-contradiction is a more adequate term to express the nature of both truth and reality than coherence.

It has also been pointed out that if coherence is the nature of truth, the passage from the phenomenal to the noumenal truth is blocked, because dualism which is an essential aspect of finite knowledge cannot be recognized by it. But non-contradiction can be the nature of both the phenomenal and the noumenal truths, and does not conflict with the dualistic aspect of the former. Coherence of the Absolute is the coherence of ideal contents. In it the distinction between the 'Other' and the ideal content is lost. But this distinction is necessary for finite knowledge. But non-contradiction shows a gradual development. The judgment, "That is a man," is contradicted by the judgment, "That is a tree trunk." Here the first predicate is contradicted by the second predicate. Therefore that judgment of which the predicate only is contradicted is the empirically false judgment. But the predicate, 'tree trunk,' is not contradicted by another predicate, therefore the judgment "That is a tree trunk," is empirically true. But the form of the judgment is itself contradicted at the noumenal level. At this level both the subject as subject and the predicate are contradicted. Thus the process of contradiction is gradual. And the passage from the phenomenal to the noumenal truth is continuous. Yet this continuity does not interfere with the dualistic nature of finite knowledge. For human knowledge is allowed to be of the form of judgment. But the coherent notion regards the Absolute truth as an eternal system of human judgments. But these judgments are not only made at a particular time and place, but are dualistic in nature. So the Absolute Truth comes into direct conflict with the human.

It may be said that even in our view the dualistic nature of human judgment is negated in the Absolute. True, we go on negating the lower truth and discovering the higher one. But the passage from the one to the other is by thus negating. But according to the coherence notion, the lower truth which exists at the phenomenal level in its dualistic aspect is said to exist even at the noumenal level and without the dualistic form. But how the lower is carried to the higher without carrying the dualistic aspect is not explained by the coherence notion. It is not binding on the non-contradiction notion to explain it. For it does not say that the lower exists in any form in the noumenal level.

It may be asked whether, on the view we are developing here, it is possible for us to be certain that we possess an empirical truth. We say that it is possible wherever the cognition gives us uncontradicted existence. Thus non-contradiction gives us that certainty which Professor Campbell calls intellectual incorrigibility. But in other cases we have to express doubt. But this does not mean that doubt always follows empirical truth. It may or may not.

One point we have to note here. We have admitted that correspondence is an aspect of empirical truth. But this correspondence does not hold in the case of perception, because the predicate in a perceptive judgment is not an idea. But there are cases in which we have ideas of things in our minds. Correspondence and also coherence hold true only in the case of such ideas. But utility and workability are applicable both in the case of ideas and of objects. And non-contradiction is applicable not only to the cases to which all these are applicable, but also to the Absolute Truth.

CHAPTER VIII

TRUTH AS ITS OWN CRITERION

TRUTH is regarded both by Bradley and Bosanquet as its own criterion. Bosanquet writes: "Truth then is its own criterion. That is to say, it can only be tested by the more of itself. Your complete system at the moment cannot be further tested. You can only test it further when you are in a position to make it more complete"¹ "Our doctrine of truth is wholly immanent. There is no external standard, and, of course, no possibility of applying it even if there were one"² And as according to Bradley, too, truth is all-inclusive and coherent, it is its own standard.

That truth is its own criterion means that to know truth as truth it is not possible to apply any standard that falls outside it, because truth is the whole. When we know that our knowledge is the whole, then no criterion is necessary to test it. If there is a criterion to test it that criterion must fall outside the whole. But in that case the whole cannot be a whole. Therefore truth cannot be tested by anything other than itself.

But all this comes to mean that truth is self-revealing, that is, that truth is known as truth only through itself.

But falsity cannot be known through itself. For any system of knowledge can be made false by a wider whole. It is the wider whole that enables us to know that the lower whole is not the true whole. So falsity is not self-revelatory, but is revealed through something not itself.

That truth is revealed through itself, whereas falsity is revealed through another is admitted even according to the principle of non-contradiction. A cognition that is not contradicted is a truth; but if contradicted, is falsity. One cognition is contradicted only by another cognition. It is the second cognition that reveals that the first cognition

¹ *Logic*, vol. II, p. 267.

² *Ibid.*, p. 265

is a falsity Therefore falsity is revealed by another, but truth is not so revealed

We have identified truth with reality. Therefore truth means the existence of the object of perception When we perceive an object, the existence of the object is perceived through the perception of the object itself For example, when I see a pen in front of me and say "It is a pen," the perception of the existence of the pen is the same as the perception of the pen. Therefore truth or reality is always self-revealing. But falsity is the non-existence of the object of perception This non-existence is revealed, taking the example of the perception of the man in the tree trunk, not through the perception, "This is a man," but through the perception, "This is a tree trunk." Therefore falsity is revealed through another

Now, these examples show that according to the view of non-contradiction, the self-revelatory character of truth and the other revelatory character of falsity are applicable even at the phenomenal level But according to the coherence notion, finite truth cannot be self-revealing For we can know that the judgment "It is a pen" is true only when we know that it coheres with the others Therefore it is its coherence with others that reveals its truth The Absolute Truth must of course be self-revelatory, because there can be nothing else which can reveal it. It may be said that that finite truth is not self-revealing is not a defect. Yet that the view blocks the continuity from the phenomenal to the noumenal is obvious.

It may perhaps be maintained that as coherence notion too identifies truth and reality, finite truth must somehow be self-revealing according to it. But we do not see how it can be self-revealing. And though the coherence notion identifies the Absolute Truth with Reality, at the phenomenal level it does not. For the finite things are only ideal contents. Though an 'Other' to thought is admitted at the empirical level, what we call facts or existences are explained away in terms of ideal contents and their coherence. For its existence means coherence of ideal contents. Because the truth of any judgment is revealed by other judgments with

which it is said to cohere, no finite existence can be self-revelatory. Therefore finite truth cannot be self-revelatory according to the coherence notion

Another advantage of the principle of non-contradiction is that it, and not coherence, can give a true place to mystic experiences. We do not understand how these experiences cohere with our ordinary experience. Coherence, as was said above, implies entailment. But we do not understand what entailment there could be between our ordinary and mystic experiences. But according to the notion of non-contradiction, if the mystic experiences are not contradicted, they must be regarded as true. It may be that I do not have them.¹ What is wanted is that any experience in order to be true must be the experience of some consciousness, and the object of that experience must not be contradicted by the same consciousness as never existing. It cannot be said that because we cannot contradict the statement that there are chimeras in the universe, as such a contradiction requires knowledge of the whole universe, they must be real. For the condition that they should be experienced by somebody is not fulfilled. Nor can it be objected that because there are some who say that they have seen ghosts, and we cannot contradict them, the ghosts must be real for us.

¹ Cp. Lester-Garland. *The Religious Philosophy of Baron Von Hügel*, p. 13. "He starts with the incontrovertible fact that both in the sphere of Metaphysics and that of Religion man is conscious of 'intimations' of Objective Reality of varying strength and depth. The presumption is that this belief is justified. If anyone says that it is illusory, the *onus probandi* lies with him. The method to be adopted by one who believes in it to be true is therefore not to attempt to establish it by argument, but rebut the arguments of those who say it is false." It is with this spirit that Sriharsha says *Eham brahmāstramādāya nānyam ganayatah kwachit, āste na dhīra-vīrasya bhangah sangarakeśhu*. To that brave soldier who takes only the weapon of *Brahman* and needs nothing else, there is no defeat in battle (argumentation). Sriharsha is a *vīrandāvādīn*. *Vīrandāvādīn* is one who has no position of his own, yet criticizes that of the others. The Advaitīn is forced to be a *vīrandāvādīn* because his Absolute cannot be brought to the logical level in order to argue about it. It is only intuited. However, both Hügel and Sriharsha are guided by the spirit of non-contradiction, for it is enough for them if their position is not contradicted.

also. For if those that do experience them cannot contradict them they must be real for them. But for us they need not be real. After all, the world of every individual is, at first, his own world. It is only later that those worlds are known to be identical. We cannot pronounce anything to be impossible unless we are omniscient. So long as we remain finite and cannot claim to have every possible experience, whatever we cannot contradict, if somebody claims to have experienced it, we should not pronounce it to be unreal.

CHAPTER IX

THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR

WE have said previously that the predicate of the judgment, "It is a trunk," is not an idea but a fact.¹ The tree trunk seen is actually the tree trunk which exists

If it were an idea, it could not have belonged to fact. Bradley says in his *Principles of Logic* that the predicate is an idea cut loose from existence. If it is really what once was mental, what process could have turned it into fact? When I perceive a red rose and make the judgment, "The rose is red," the red is an existent entity. It belongs to the rose. If it were merely an idea cut loose from my mental image, then the image must belong not only to my mind but to the object also before me. Otherwise, the red could not belong to the rose. If so, the object should be bodily in my mind—which is absurd. If the image of a horse as mental cannot be yoked to the cart between the shafts, even an idea cut loose from my mind cannot be so yoked.

Now, to avoid the difficulty, the fact itself may be regarded as a congeries of universals. This view is the above view of Bradley as later modified by him on Hegelian lines, and agrees with the view of judgment as expressing the identity of content between the subject and predicate. In fact, this is the view of Bosanquet and is strictly consistent with his theory of the Absolute. For him the only difference between the world of meanings or ideas and reality is that the latter is the former made coherent, and the former is the latter taken without coherence. That is, when the idea is taken in isolation it remains a mere idea.² Thus because a fact is

¹ If the 'trunk' is an idea or universal, it must be said not to be existing, but to be subsisting in something which exists. But the Advaitin does not make the distinction between subsistence and existence, for according to him even the 'trunk' exists. That is why he would say that the relation between the subject and the predicate is *tādātmya* or identity of being. Wherever in this work the existence of ideas or universals is spoken of the reader is requested to bear this point in mind.

² *Logic*, vol. 1, p. 5.

regarded as a system of ideal contents, it is made up of them. But this view cannot explain the integrality which the fact possesses. The rose cannot be regarded as merely made up of the ideas of colour, smell, taste, and so forth.

Moreover, if the predicate 'red' is an ideal content or universal referred to reality, as it has to be said that the red belongs to the rose, we must admit that somehow the universal is fixed in the rose. If so, how can we refer it to another thing, say the cloth, in the judgment "The cloth is red"? If the red belongs to the rose it cannot be taken out of it. If to avoid the difficulty it is said that the red has no existence, then we have to conclude that it does not belong to the rose, that is, it is not part and parcel of the rose. For the rose exists, whereas the red subsists. Then we have to think of the rose as without colour, smell, etc., which is absurd. Therefore, we have to regard the red also as existing and as identical in being with the rose.

It may be asked here. If we say that the red is a fact, when I make a judgment about a rose once seen but not existing now, namely, "That rose was red," can the red here be a fact? The answer is that it is not. It is only in the judgment of perception that the predicate is a fact. Here the subject is an actual reality, and as the predicate belongs to it it is taken to be fact. But in the judgment of remembrance the subject is an idea. Therefore the predicate too must be an idea, because as an idea only can it belong to the subject, which is an idea.

The question may be put: If you admit that in the judgment of remembrance the predicate is an idea, why not regard the predicate of the judgment of perception too as an idea? The reply is that there is difference between the two cases. In the judgment of remembrance both the subject and the predicate are remembered, whereas in the judgment of perception both are perceived. Because the predicate is identical in being with the subject it must be an idea when the subject is an idea, and an objective fact when the subject is an objective fact. Therefore, both have to be regarded as ideal. But in perception both are perceived, and perceived as existing in front. Therefore, both have to be regarded as

facts The subject and the predicate fall within the same kind of cognitive act Therefore, if one is an object of perception, the other also must be an object of perception; if one is an idea of remembrance, the other also must be an idea of remembrance.

What we say is supported by Bradley's conception of ideal experiment In it both the subject and the predicate must be ideas Otherwise, the experiment can never be performed For if the subject were the actual fact itself it must be regarded as undergoing change while we perform the experiment. But this conclusion even Bradley does not accept What we know in remembrance is ideal and therefore can be used in ideal experiment But what we perceive is not and cannot be made use of in it. For what we perceive is the fact or the thing itself.

Now, the oft-raised question, whether what we remember is the thing itself or the idea, may be put But this is not a difficulty peculiar to the view here developed What we know in remembrance is an idea, but this idea possesses a reference to, or stands for, a thing which may not exist now If it is asked, how can an idea refer to something not existing? the reply is that our experience is such We remember things which may not exist, but we perceive only those which exist Ideas refer to things, but this reference is not an organic relation Therefore, ideas do not imply the existence of things to which they refer at the time of reference.

Then another objection may be raised against our view. We perceive the red in the judgment, "The rose is red," as well as in the judgment, "The cloth is red " This sameness cannot be explained unless we postulate a universal red which is an ideal content But the words ideal content are ambiguous If they mean the actual red existing in the rose, it is not universal If they mean, on the other hand, the idea let loose from its existence, it is the same as the concept. And we have admitted such ideas or concepts. But we do not attach any metaphysical validity to them.

We should understand the matter thus. The red of the rose leaves in us an impression This impression is at first

a mental existence, and so a particular. But later we detach the particularity or the aspect of existence from the impression. And the impression then becomes a concept. It is this concept that serves as a symbol in ideal experiments. And because the same symbol can be used to refer to the rose as well as to the cloth we experience the sameness.

It may be asked. If the concept is formulated by cutting away the particularity from the impression, why not an ontological universal be posited by cutting off the particularity of the objective existence from the actual things? The answer is that the postulation of such universals is unnecessary. If we postulate such universals, we find it difficult to understand their relation to particular existences. If it is said that the universals subsist in the particulars, then where does the universal mammoth subsist now, as all the particular mammoths have gone out of existence?

But we cannot do without the universal concept. For in ideal experiments we cannot use the actual things themselves, and so require these concepts.

As a matter of fact, the predicate cannot be the true universal even according to Bradley and Bosanquet, for it cannot be the concrete universal. The universal red, for example, to be concrete, must be organically related to the other particular reds. This organic relation is the same as implication and would mean that the universal red implies all the reds. If it does, then when any particular red is destroyed that which it implies, viz. the universal red, must be destroyed. And because this universal red implies the other particular reds, these also must be destroyed. Thus we arrive at the absurd view that if any red is destroyed in the world all the other reds also must be destroyed.

Now, Bradley and Bosanquet regard the Absolute as the ultimate subject of every judgment. But the Absolute is the concrete universal. Therefore the concrete universal must be sought towards the subject of judgment. For example, in the judgment "The rose is red," the rose is more concrete than the red, and also is a universal. The rose is more concrete because it is in it that we perceive the colour,

the smell, etc., and it is universal because it transcends any of these predicates.

It may perhaps be said that the conception of the Absolute as a concrete universal and as an ultimate subject is arrived at by Bradley not by simply going from predicate to subject, but by going from one predicate to another, and by trying to include more and more predicates, while at the same time expanding the subject. In the example "The rose is red," the red refers not only to the rose but to many other things which are red, and the rose contains not only the red but many other predicates like sweet-smelling, soft, etc., each of these predicates again referring to many things besides the rose. Now in order to make both the subject and the predicate equal, we have to place all these predicates on one side and all the things to which these refer on the other side. But all these things combined contain predicates which are more in number than those contained by the rose. Then we shall have to place all the predicates that can be found in the universe on the side of the predicate and the whole universe on the side of the subject. Then certainly the subject and predicate become equal. It is only thus that the view that the Absolute is the ultimate subject is obtained by Bradley.

But this method of arriving at the conception is not tenable. We have pointed out that the predicate in a perceptive judgment is a particular. Therefore, it cannot transcend the subject.¹ If the predicate were an idea, however large be the number of such predicates, they cannot get existence. And the concrete universal or the Absolute would be ultimately devoid of existence. But the Absolute must exist. Rather it is the Absolute that lends existence to the finite.² Therefore, the Absolute must be sought towards the side of existence in the judgment. But existence falls on the side of the subject. Therefore, the concrete universal must be sought towards the side of the subject.

¹ And if the judgment of remembrance is to be based on the judgment of perception we have to say that even in the judgment of remembrance the predicate does not transcend the subject. Otherwise our theories will end in a myth having no basis in fact.

² See Chapter xi of this Part.

But the subject rose, as finite, is only an appearance, and therefore is not the ultimate existence. Hence we have to postulate the Absolute as ultimate existence and hence as the ultimate subject.

This chapter, if it has succeeded in proving what it wanted to prove, must have shown that conceptualism has a true place. We cannot accept with Plato that for every kind of object there is an idea of which the objects are copies, nor with Aristotle that the universals are real, though they subsist in the particulars. What we usually call a universal is only a concept, and what we use in the ideal experiment is the concept. There can be only one true universal, that is, the Absolute or *Brahman*, which pervades all particulars. It is this *Brahman* itself that appears as the various objects.¹ It may be said that we cannot understand how this *Brahman* appears as the various objects. But the difficulty is not overcome by postulating a large number of universals. For example, we cannot understand how the universal cow appears as the various individual cows. And in Aristotle's view, we cannot understand how the relation between the universal and the particular can be organic.² If the process is inexplicable, then by the same inexplicable process *Brahman* can appear as the various individuals. And we have proved that the relation between the individuals and *Brahman* cannot be organic.

It may be asked: What is the relation between the universal and the particular in our view? The reply is anticipated, that is, we cannot well define it. It is the same as the relation between the subject and the predicate. The Absolute is the universal and the things are its predicates. How do we understand the relation here? Only as that between reality and appearance. Similar is the relation

¹ *Ādvasatāśiddhi*, p. 316. *Satsāmānyāttiriklagotwādisāmānyānabhyupagamāi, gotwādyabhyupagamepi gotwādivyanyakatāvachchedahasa-mānyā nabhyupagamāi vyaktiviseseshānamevūnanugatānām sāsnadimatvādyupādhyānugatānām va tadanyakatwavat vyaktiviseseshavīśhīthatvena satsāmānyasyawatatiadvavahārajanakatwopapattih*. Cp. Bosanquet's statement that if the Absolute drops into water, it becomes a fish.

² See p. 174 of this work.

between the rose and the red. The red is the appearance of the rose for us, just as the rose is the appearance or the manifestation of the Absolute. That we know more of the rose than that it is red does not affect our view. In the judgment, "The rose is red," the rose appears to us as red. It may be much more. But what we determine the rose to be at present is red. So the red, so far as the judgment is concerned, is the manifestation or the appearance of the rose. Thus the predicate is the manifestation or the appearance of the subject, whether the subject is the proximate subject or the ultimate one. The same is the relation between the universal and the particular. We cannot further determine the relation.

We may sum up Sankara's view of the concrete universal. The concrete universal must be all-comprehensive. It must be *ghana* or rich, and *pūrṇa* or full. Yet it must possess a subjective intensity, which transcends thought. Only the Absolute or *Brahman* is such a concrete universal. Unlike Plato, Sankara does not regard the forms of the phenomenal world as eternal. These forms also are called in European philosophy by the name universals. For Sankara these forms can be nothing more than the ways in which finite things behave. This concrete universal is as much existence as the particular. In fact, the existence of the particular is the borrowed existence of the concrete universal. And the problem of the relation between the two is for him of a different kind from that which is found in European philosophy. In European philosophy the problem is about the relation between the forms of things and the things. This problem also exists for Sankara. He solves it by saying that the forms are simply the ways of things, or the ways of the phenomenal world. But the relation between the concrete universal and the particular is that of reality and its manifestation or appearance. This view of the concrete universal is not the same as that actually expressed by Bradley. But if the supra-rationalistic trend of his thought is carried to the end this view will result.

CHAPTER X

THE LOGICAL LEVELS OF TRUTH AND REALITY

WE have already anticipated what we want to say. Starting with the judgment, "The rose is red," we have to regard the rose as the appearance or manifestation of the Absolute. But we have said that appearance or manifestation is the nature of judgment. Therefore, that the Absolute appears as the rose means for us the judgment, "The Absolute is the rose." Thus the level of the judgment, "The Absolute is the rose," is higher than that of the judgment, "The rose is red." But there can be a level lower than that of the latter. For example, when the rose is perceived by a man suffering from jaundice, he makes the judgment, "The rose is yellow." But this is a judgment which is contradicted later by the same man after he is cured of the disease. And the contradiction is of the form, "The rose was never yellow." Therefore the level of the judgment, "The rose is yellow," is lower than that of the judgment, "The rose is red." So far we have three levels.

Yet above the judgment, "The Absolute is the rose," another level is to be postulated. That the Absolute is the rose means for us that the Absolute appears as the rose. But at the level of the Absolute there can be no appearance. It shines in its purity there. It is the supra-logical level and is the postulate of logic itself. That is, whatever judgment we take, this highest level is implied by it.

Lowest of all is the infra-logical level or that of the absolutely or admittedly non-existent, like the sky-flower and the circular square. The sky-flower cannot find any place in our logical discussions, for the question of its truth never arises, as we start with the admission that it is absolutely unreal.

Thus we have five levels which logic can recognize. The highest and the lowest are not strictly logical. Yet as they form the boundaries of our logical discussions we have to include them.

One acquainted with the Sāṅkara Vedānta can easily see that our levels are more in number. But the difference is due to the difference of standpoints. Sankara's standpoint is rather epistemological, while ours is logical. According to Sankara, there are altogether four levels of reality. The highest is called the *pāramārthica* or the level of the Absolute. Next comes the *vyāvahārica* or the empirical level. Below it is found the *prātibhāsika* or the level of illusion. Last of all is that of *tuchcha* or the level of the admittedly non-existent.

Now corresponding to the *tuchcha* we have the infra-logical level. Our supra-logical level corresponds to the *pāramārthica*, the level of the judgment, "The rose is red," to the *vyāvahārica*, and that of the judgment, "The rose is yellow," to the *prātibhāsika*. But in addition, we are obliged to postulate another level, viz. that of the judgment, "The Absolute is the rose." We may call it, if we like, the *speculative* level, in which everything is regarded as the appearance of the Absolute. The need of postulating this level would not have arisen if our standpoint were not logical. From the epistemological standpoint, when the yellow vanishes the red appears. But when the red goes the Absolute is to appear in its purity. Here the yellow and the red are taken merely as the objects of a conscious agent. But from the logical standpoint, though they are objects for us they are still predicates, and as such exist on a locus or a basis, which is the subject. So when the rose is said to be the appearance of the Absolute, the rose points towards the Absolute, and we are obliged to postulate the judgment, "The Absolute is the rose." It is, of course, not meant that we always make it. Nor can it be said that just as the rose points to the Absolute, the Absolute, too, must point to something higher. For the Absolute is postulated as one without a second, and therefore there can be nothing to which it can point.

These five levels hold true for each and every judgment.

We do not call these levels by the name of degrees of truth or reality, because the word degrees implies the idea of more and less. But we have shown in the previous chapters

that the appearances are not included in the real. Otherwise, we shall be committed to the absurd position—taking the classical example of the perception of the snake in the rope—that the snake is somehow included in the rope. It seems therefore that those who call Sankara's levels of reality by the name degrees of reality have failed to notice an important point. Those Hegelians who hold the view of degrees say in so many words that the lower is included in the higher. They perhaps do not mean that the judgment, "That is a rope," is at least more true than the judgment "That is a snake." If they do not, they should plainly acknowledge that they have no place for the distinction between empirical truth and falsity. On the other hand, if they do, they should admit that because the former judgment belongs to a higher level than that of the latter, somehow the snake is included in the rope. But the conclusion is absurd. So it is better not to call these levels by the name of degrees.

Now the process of negation from below proceeds as follows. First, the judgment, "The rose is yellow," is negated. But what is negated here is the predicate, not the judgment form itself.¹ What negates the judgment, "The rose is yellow," is another judgment, "The rose is red." But how is the latter negated? Certainly not by negating the red. For so long as our thought continues to exist, the rose appears to us only through a predicate. So this judgment is negated only when thought disappears. But when thought disappears we attain the supra-logical level of the Absolute. That is, when the judgment, "The rose is red," is negated the judgment, "The Absolute is the rose," is also negated, because the former judgment is negated when the judgment form itself is negated. If it is asked, "What then is the use of postulating it?" the reply is that it is an exigency of the logical standpoint. It is perhaps the nature of our logical intellect that it creates such demi-gods and worships them. The judgment in question is an implication of our empirically

¹ Cp. *Dharmyamśe sarvamabhrāntam prakāretu viparyayah*. Every cognition is valid as regards the subject. Error arises only in the predicate. Quoted from *Advantasiddhi*, p. 562.

true judgment, and as a matter of fact, of every judgment. So when the latter vanishes, the former too goes with it.

It is apparent that these five levels are abstract levels of logic. They are obtained through a consideration of the form of judgment in relation to the problem of truth and falsity. It is an unreasonable claim of Hegel to declare that by a study of the nature of pure thought we can know how many categories there are of physics, chemistry, and such empirical sciences. These sciences as empirical are contingent, and we cannot *a priori* determine how many and what categories they possess. *A priori* consideration of judgment can give us only these five levels.

CHAPTER XI

EXISTENCE AND REALITY

HEGEL in his *Logic* used the words Existence and Reality in different senses¹ Reality is for him not the same as the Absolute, nor is existence identical with either. But for us both Existence and Reality are identical with the Absolute

In Western philosophy, though most of the idealists identify Reality with the Absolute, yet they differentiate it from Existence While examining the Eleatic philosophy, Stace says "Clearly there is implied in this philosophy a distinction between reality and existence. Whatever exists, elephants, comets, multiplicity, motion, is mere appearance Only Being is real But Being does not exist. For it is nowhere and no-when And whatever exists must at least exist at some time, if not at some place And we may sum up the result in two propositions *Firstly, existence is not real Secondly, what is real does not exist*"²

But this distinction is not justifiable Examining the same Eleatic philosophy in his *Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, he writes "You may ask what is meant by the distinction between appearance and reality? Is not even appearance real? It appears It exists Even delusion exists and is therefore a real thing So is not the distinction between appearance and reality meaningless? Now, all this is perfectly true, but it does not comprehend quite what is meant by this distinction What is meant is that the objects around have existence, but not self-existence, not self-substantiality. That is to say, their being is not in themselves, their existence is not grounded in themselves, but is grounded in another and flows from that other. They exist, but are not independent existences *They are rather beings whose being*

¹ For him Reality is a category of the sphere of Being, and Existence of the sphere of Essence (Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, pp 171, 229). So the latter belongs to a higher level

² *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p 6

flows into them from another, which itself is self-existent and self-substantial. They are therefore mere appearances of that other which is the reality. Of course, the Eleatics did not speak of appearance and reality in these terms. But this is what they were groping for and dimly saw."¹

We have no cause to quarrel with Dr. Stace for what he says in this passage. But does this passage support the distinction between existence and reality? It does not. In it the phenomenal things are said to owe their existence to another. Does not this assertion mean that being or existence ultimately belongs to this another and not to things? If it does, how can we maintain that reality is not existence, or that reality does not exist? The judgments, "Appearances are not ultimately real" and "Appearances are not self-existent," mean quite the same. And the usage that calls an unreal thing non-existent, and a non-existent thing unreal is justified. We say that phenomenal things owe their reality to the Absolute, and also that the phenomenal things owe their existence to the Absolute. The usage proves that reality and existence are identical and ultimately belong to the Absolute. The term 'belong' does not imply here that reality or existence belongs to the Absolute, just as a coat belongs to me or the colour red belongs to the rose, because no such distinctions exist in the Absolute. The Absolute is the same as reality or existence.

In Indian philosophy the words connoting Truth or Reality and Existence are derived from the same root, with the addition of different suffixes and mean the same. Truth or Reality is called *satyam* and existence *satta*.²

If we examine Bradley's theory of judgment we come to the same conclusion. According to him, existence falls on the side of the subject or the 'that,' and ideality on the side of the 'what.' Thought finds that the 'what' is discrepant with the 'that.' The 'what' does not contain the immediacy and the wealth which the 'that' contains. Thought therefore tries to add to the present 'what' one more 'what' after another. It is the ideal of thought to attain the immediacy

¹ P. 61. Italics mine.

² The root of *As* = to be. *Yat* and *tap* are the suffixes.

and the fullness of the 'that' But the 'that' is the same as the existence Therefore thought's ideal is existence itself But thought's ideal is said to be the reality or the Absolute Though Bradley thinks that it would be better to distinguish between reality and existence,¹ it is not necessary, nor is it justifiable, to distinguish them

If being or existence and reality mean the same, Hegel's view that Being is the poorest category cannot be accepted. To prove that there is reality behind the appearances is, as Stace says, the same as to prove that there is Being beyond the finite things, and the being or existence of the latter is due to that of the former But this proof is not self-evident It implies that what we call being is not the real Being We have to prove that behind the apparent being there is a real Being If this Being is God, it would be no proof to say that we have an idea of God And Kant's criticism of the ontological argument is therefore justified This argument may be interpreted in the light of what Bosanquet calls the argument *a contingentia mundi*. Even then it would be a proof And Hegel should not have dismissed Kant's criticism in the light way he does with the remark that "Certainly it would be strange if the notion, the very inmost of mind, even if the 'Ego' or above all, the concrete totality we call God, were not rich enough to include so poor a category as Being, the very poorest and the abstract of all"² Certainly, God is not the totality of things we see If he is, he would be their mere aggregate He must include them all, pervade them all, yet must have an individuality or an integrality of his own We can believe that there is such a Being only by experiencing it or through some proof which demonstrates that it exists But the experience of such Being cannot be our ordinary experience. And most of us do not have the extraordinary experience of the mystics. Therefore, the proof of its existence is necessary

It may be objected: Illusion exists If existence therefore belongs to illusion, how can existence be said to be the same

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 110

² Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 109.

CHAPTER XII

IDEALISM AND REALISM—A RAPPROCHEMENT

THE theory we have developed in the previous chapters satisfies the demands of both realism and idealism. Realism requires that the objects which we cognize in perception should be the things themselves, not mere ideas or ideal contents. We grant what realism wants by treating the predicate of the perceptive judgment, not as an idea, but as an object. We have not accepted subjective idealism even as a propaedeutic. From the very start our position is realistic. Bosanquet starts with subjective idealism. But if we once start with it, and regard what we perceive as a subjective idea, we can never arrive at the objective world. For no amount of ideas can make up a real thing.

Idealism requires that all finite objects should be ideal and point beyond themselves to something which is real. We accept that the finite objects are ideal only in the sense that they are not self-explanatory and self-existent, but not in the sense that they are ideas or universals. The Hegelian idealists mean both by it, but we do not. Yet we agree that because finite things are not self-existent, they point beyond themselves to something which is self-existent, viz. the Absolute.

In this concession to idealism is implied the view that the finite is not ultimately real. No philosopher is called upon to defend the view that the finite is ultimately real. Philosophical enquiry arises only because the finite is not ultimately real. To maintain that the finite is ultimately real is to attempt the impossible. If by saying that the finite is ultimately real is meant that we perceive it, idealism does not question the view. At least Sankara's idealism defends it. What we perceive is an object existing before us, not our own idea.¹ If, on the other hand, the statement

¹ Cp. Commentary to the *Brahmasūtras*, I, 1, 4 (*Brahmavidyā*) *pratyakṣhādiprāmānyavishayaajñānavat vastutantrā*. Unless Sankara is interpreted thus, his criticism of the *Vijñānavādins* would be to no purpose. The very view of *māyā* is inconsistent with the theory that

means that the finite is eternal, no argument is required to contradict it. If the meaning is that there is nothing beyond what we see it has to be supported by systematic metaphysics. But the idealists hold that it cannot be so supported. Yet they can hold, and Sankara does hold, that what we see is a fact and not an idea. And Sankara's seems to be the only idealism that has done real justice to the realistic element in knowledge. When it speaks of the Absolute and the non-existence of the appearances in it, it is speaking of the implications of finite knowledge. It does not say that the objects of our knowledge are mere ideas.

Realists have objection to the absolute idealism of Hegel and his followers only because however hard these tried they could not prevent the interpretation of reality as a conflux of universals. But such a position we have successfully avoided by not accepting the coherence view of the ultimate truth. That the predicate is determinate when compared to the subject does not make it an idea. It is not necessary that the idea alone and not fact should be determinate. That the predicate is more determinate than the subject means that the former is more an appearance than reality. In the judgment, "The rose is red," so far as this judgment is concerned, the red is the appearance of the rose. We usually say, the rose is the substratum on

what we perceive is an idea. Cp. Chapter VI of this Part. There are some who interpret Sankara as a subjectivist. But the interpretation cannot be consistent with the theory of *anirvachnīyākhyāt*, which is fundamental to Sankara's system. The assertion that mind is the cause of the world can mean for Sankara that the mind is the occasion or *nimitta-kāraṇa* of the world, but not its efficient cause. The experience of the world as a mere idea belongs to a very high stage of religious experience or yogic practice, which few people claim to have. This point belongs to the mystical side of Advaita philosophy and religion. At this stage the agent is said to be midway between the Absolute and its appearances, in the state of *Iswara*, whose mind is identical with this world. But even this stage is to be transcended if we are to attain the Absolute. But for logic which holds good at the empirical level, what we perceive can never be an idea. One may try to interpret Sankara as a consistent subjectivist, but one must concede that this thesis represents at least one of the schools of Advaita.

which the red exists The red has no existence of its own Its existence is the existence of the rose.

There is another point which realism must concede, viz. that even perception is a judgment Any perception is of the form "This is so and so," but not of the form "so and so " Even in perception the distinction between the 'that' and the 'what' is drawn. The 'what' is always cognized as being on, or of, a 'that ' Because of this distinction, our perception is of the form of judgment

PART IV

THE SELF AND THE MIND

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

HEGEL's conceptual thinking, thinking raised to the level of self-consciousness, is not true thinking. For the categories cannot retain their significance if lifted to that level. Moreover, at that level there can be no incentive for thought to think.

Self-consciousness is the nature of reality. We take reality to be Self, because in it the 'Other' is transcended. And it is only the Self that can be the object of itself. The Self ought to be distinguished from mind, and it is the identification of the two that has made Bradley hesitate in calling the Absolute by the name of Self. The mind is only what Kant calls the empirical Self, not the noumenal Self. The Self must of course be an experience.

Thought is identity in difference and reality is non-difference.

Intuition is not a supernatural faculty, but the basis of intellect.

CHAPTER I

HEGEL'S CONCEPTUAL THINKING

It may be said that the thought identified by Hegel with being is not ordinary thought, but thought lifted to the level of Self-consciousness or Absolute Consciousness. The Absolute Consciousness is the result of the Phenomenology of Mind. "What mind prepares for itself in the course of its phenomenology is the element of true knowledge. In the element the moments of mind are now set out in the form of thought pure and simple, which knows its object to itself. They no longer involve the opposition between being and knowing: they remain within the undivided simplicity of the knowing function. They are the truth in the form of truth, and their diversity is merely the diversity of the content of truth. The process by which they are developed into an organically connected whole is Logic or Speculative Philosophy."¹ In his *Science of Logic* Hegel writes: "The concept of pure Science, and the Deduction of it, are assumed in the present treatise so far as this, that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is nothing other than the deduction of the concept. Absolute knowledge is the Truth of all modes of Consciousness, because according to the process of knowledge it is only when absolute knowledge has been reached that the separation of the *Object of Knowledge* from the *Subjective Certainty* is completely resolved, and Truth is equated to this Certainty and this Certainty equated to Truth."

"So pure Science presupposes deliverance from the opposition of Consciousness. Pure Science includes *Thought in so far as it is just as much the Thing in itself, in so far as it is just as much pure Thought as it is the Thing in itself*. Truth, as science, is pure Self-consciousness unfolding itself, and it has the form of Self in that what exists in and for itself is the known concept, while the concept is as such that which exists in and for itself."²

¹ Bailie. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 97

² Translation by Johnston and Struthers, vol. 1, p. 60.

According to these passages, for thought which has risen through various stages, finally to the level of Absolute Consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, the separation between the subject and the object does not exist. The concept is as much subjective as objective, and so is Self-consciousness. At this level, the nature of the object is not empirically known through search and discovery, but simply by the concept's analysis of itself. Because thought has not got to face an alien element, because thought does not stand in opposition to the object which, in that opposition, remains inscrutable, it becomes free, and the whole of Logic is the free movement of thought.

Our understanding, that is, thought which has not risen to the level of Self-consciousness, and is, therefore, not pure, is at first determined through its relation to something else. Its determinateness is imposed upon it externally. Thus necessity for understanding is external necessity. But when thought knows itself to be its object, this externality of necessity is overcome and necessity becomes internal. The process of the understanding for which the determinateness or necessity is internal is Rationality. And this is logical necessity. "This alone is what is rational, the rhythm of the organic whole: it is as much knowledge of content as that content is notion and essential nature. In other words, this alone is the sphere and element of speculative thought."¹

In order that thought may be self-moving, it must not only overcome the opposition to the object and turn the external into an internal necessity, but must also be freed from existence. And this liberation of thought, says Hegel, has already taken place.² Philosophy begins when thought leaves the sphere of existence and enters that of pure essence. Even existence must be grasped in a universal form, because essence or universal is the element of thought. Thought now comes to itself, that is, thinking about thought commences now. At this level of logical and internal necessity thought must have risen above the certainty of sense-perception. Such thought liberated from existence or nature,

¹ Bailhe: *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 115

² *Ibid.*, p. 91

Hegel asserts, is found for the first time in Greek Philosophy.¹

The concepts of mere understanding are fixed, whereas those of pure thought are fluent. The task of turning mere existence into a universal is certainly an important development in spiritual evolution. But it is not all "Nowadays the task before us consists not so much in getting the individual clear of the stage of immediacy, and making a substance that thinks and is grasped in terms of thought, but rather the very opposite—it consists in actualizing the universal, and giving it spiritual vitality by the process of breaking down and superseding determinate thoughts"² That is, the actuality of thought determinations is known only by transcending their fixity and grasping their inter-connections. No thought determination is true by itself but in virtue of its passing over into other determinations. The process whereby the fixity of these determinations is broken down is called by Hegel the negativity of the ego. "Thoughts become fluent and interfuse when thinking pure and simple, this inner immediacy, knows itself as a moment when pure certainty of self abstracts from itself. It does not 'abstract' in the sense of getting away from itself and setting itself on one side, but of surrendering the fixed quality of self-affirmation and giving up both the fixity of the purely concrete—which is the ego as contrasted with the variety of the content—and the fixity of these distinctions (the various thought functions, principles, etc.) which are present in the element of pure thought and share that absoluteness of the ego. In virtue of this process pure thoughts become notions, concepts, and are then what they are in truth, self-moving functions, circles, are what their substance consists in, spiritual entities"³

When the fixity of the concepts is overcome they move of themselves. The free movement of these entities constitutes scientific procedure in general. In this element each concept develops out of itself and expands into an organic whole. In virtue of this expansion knowledge becomes a

¹ Haldane and Simson *Hegel's History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 94-6

² Baillie *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 94

³ *Ibid*, p. 95

necessary and evolving process. At this stage philosophy does not consist in sporadic and miscellaneous treatment of topics which present themselves to mind by chance, but in a continuous development of knowledge covering "the entire objective world of conscious life in its rational necessity"¹

The negativity of the ego or the activity of the Self, by which thought determinations move of themselves by breaking down their barriers, is negation raised to the level of Self-consciousness. This negativity splits up what is simple and undifferentiated and sets up the factors in opposition. But it does not leave those factors in a state of opposition, but as well negates their opposition and diversity.² In this respect it differs from the negation of mere understanding which leaves the opposition unsolved. This latter negation turns away from the false as merely false and from the negative as merely negative, whereas the negativity of the ego turns the false into the true and the negative into the positive. For it, the barriers between these are not unbreakable.³

It is due to the free movement of this negation that we can proceed from the Absolute to the world and back again. It is this negation that enables us to 'deduce' the world. But Spinoza's negation is only a universal of the understanding, it does not belong to the ego. That is why his Absolute is like a lion's den into which all animals enter, but from which none returns. Hegel writes: "As Spinoza has set up the great proposition, all determination implies negation . . . and as of everything . . . it may be shown that it is determined and finite, what is essential in it rests upon negation. Therefore, God alone is the positive and the affirmative and consequently the one substance, all other things, on the contrary, are only modifications of this substance and are nothing in and for themselves. Simple determination or negation belongs to form; in this way of looking at it negation is the negation of negation and therefore true affirmation. This negative self-conscious movement, the movement of knowledge which pursues its way in the thought

¹ Loc cit

² Bailie: *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 80

³ Ibid, p. 93

which is present before us, is, however, certainly lacking to the content of Spinoza's philosophy, or at least it is externally associated with it since it falls within self-consciousness"¹ That is why Spinoza is not able to give a rational account of the plurality. Had he made his substance conscious, regarded it as an ego or subject, his negation would have assumed the form of negativity.² And from the conception of the Absolute as Subject one step would have carried him to the conception of it as Spirit. The ego or the subject is pure negativity, and is the eternal process of bursting into differences and negating them or finding itself compact in them. As such, its form would have been that of a system.³

This movement of thought raised to Absolute Consciousness or Self-consciousness is conceptual thinking. It is the process of the concept or the notion. This conceptual thinking is different from *raisonnement* or ordinary thinking. In the first place, *raisonnement* thinks of an object which is its 'other,' and thus "adopts a negative attitude to the content apprehended." But conceptual thinking absorbs the 'other' into itself, and so the opposition between itself and its 'other' becomes a moment of itself. Thus this moment becomes an inherent characteristic of conceptual thinking and forms its moving principle. That is, the concept expands in order to overcome this inherent opposition.⁴ Secondly, for *raisonnement* the object is a mere point to which the content is attached as a mere accident and predicate. The ego here is opposed to the object and is not the very self of the object. So the qualities, etc., which constitute the content of the object and are referred to the object as predicates are ego's own, and referred to the object externally. But "conceptual thinking goes on in a different way. Since the concept or notion is the very self of the object, manifesting as the development of the object, it is not a quiescent subject passively supporting accidents. it is a

¹ Haldane and Simson *Hegel's History of Philosophy*, vol. iii, p. 286.

² Baillie *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 80.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 117

self-determining active concept which takes its determinations and makes them its own.”¹ “Thus the solid basis which ratiocination found in its inert subject is shaken to its foundation, and the only object is this very movement of the subject”² It is this “reflection which constitutes truth the final result, and at the same time does away with the contrast between the result and the process of arriving at it.”³ For what we take to be the result is the beginning mediately expressed, and the beginning is the result immediately expressed.⁴

¹ Baillie *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, p 118

² Ibid , p 119

³ Ibid , p 83

⁴ Ibid , p 82

CHAPTER II

CRITICISM OF HEGEL'S CONCEPTUAL THINKING

IN the previous chapter we have given briefly Hegel's view of conceptual thinking. We shall examine it in this chapter. The first difficulty in accepting the view is whether thinking, if it is lifted to the level of Self-consciousness or Absolute Consciousness, can still remain In Self-consciousness notion is identical with being, subject with object And if there is no object to think of thought itself will disappear. This view, we have shown, is also supported by Dr. McTaggart The need for the application of the categories arises only when the subject faces the object Categories exist and have meaning only at this level If lifted to the level of Self-consciousness, they disappear and lose the significance they possess here

We should admit that the concept, if it can be retained in Self-consciousness when lifted to its level, will be both subjective and objective But the question is Does it remain and retain its peculiarity in Self-consciousness? In it certainly no distinction can be drawn between one category and another. It is of no avail to say that though there are no differences in it distinctions are not lost Of course Bradley, too, holds this view in his *Appearance and Reality* But as we have shown, and as Bradley himself admits in his *Terminal Essays*,¹ there could be no distinctions without differences.

It may be said that we are conscious of our self, and the categories exist and have meaning for us, therefore in Self-consciousness the categories can exist and can retain their significance. But our self cannot be the Self of which Hegel is speaking. For us objects exist as opposing us. They are not yet absorbed into Self-consciousness Our so-called self has meaning only with reference to the not-self. The categories as we know them are what Hegel calls mere universals, not lifted to the level of Self-consciousness. For us they are as such not running into one another The Self of which

¹ See footnote 2 on p 40 of this work

Hegel is speaking is not an object. It is what transcends our thought and eludes our grasp. Professor Wallace, too, agrees with our view. He writes expounding Fichte's philosophy "Even wiser heads forgot—if they ever knew—that Leibniz a century before had startled the world of his day by a view that 'the Ego or something like it' was, under the name of *monad*, the presupposition of each and every detail of existence in any organic total. It was useless for Fichte to repeat that his philosophical Ego was not the empirical or individual ego which he in this everyday world has to provide clothes and company for. It is hard to persuade the world that it does not know that 'I am I,' and what it means."¹ The Self or the Absolute Consciousness is a presupposition of the categories. And so long as it remains a presupposition the categories can be significant. If they are lifted to its level it ceases to be a presupposition, and there is no ground for us to assert that they will be significant.

Hence it is not a mistake of Spinoza that he has left thought as a mere universal without giving it the significance of self-consciousness. For the same reason he is right in not identifying his principle of negation or determination with the negativity of the ego. The Ego may be pure negativity and yet be fully positive, because in it the distinctions and difference are negated and yet it is the fullness of existence. But in such negativity negation as we experience it can have no place. Our negation exists because of the differences. But as differences are ruled out in Self-consciousness our negation cannot be found there. And we are not even justified in calling negation lifted to the level of the Absolute by the name of negation. For even granting that negation can persist even when lifted to its level, it must have undergone so much alteration that it would be hardly recognizable.

Kant has pointed out long ago that every concept treated as unconditioned leads us to antinomies. But he limited the number of these antinomies to four. Subsequently many philosophers have remarked that Kant is not justified in thus limiting them. And their criticism is true. For example,

¹ *Prolegomena to Hegel's Logic*, p. 98.

Bradley has proved that any category or conception treated as ultimately real leads to contradictions and dissipates itself in the Absolute. But Hegel wants to lift these conceptions to the level of the Absolute and keep them intact in it. Of course, he does not say that each and every category is the Absolute. But when lifted to the level of the Absolute Consciousness, we cannot understand how it can remain finite. Hegel says explicitly in the *Phenomenology of Mind* that Logic begins after Absolute Consciousness is reached. That is, the categories are the categories of the Absolute Consciousness. That is why they are both subjective and objective. But to this view we cannot subscribe. For the object of the Absolute Consciousness must be the Absolute itself. And the lower categories, if raised to its level, cannot retain their peculiarity. In finitude only they have meaning, not in infinitude.

Hegel might have advocated the lifting up of the categories to this level, thinking that they acquire fluidity only here. Here the object of Self-consciousness is the Self itself, and the movement from the subject to the object and back again is eternal and without hindrance. There is not the slightest chance for fixity here. Therefore all the categories can be fluid and run into each other. But we can have this advantage only if the categories can remain in the Absolute.

The fluidity of the categories means for Hegel, it seems, nothing more than the self-movement of the concept. At the level of the finite the concept moves only when impelled externally. But at the level of Self-consciousness it moves of itself. That is, at this level thought can be free.

It is true that thought lifted to the level of the Absolute Consciousness must be free, because it does not depend upon an 'Other.' But whether thought remains at all at that level is what we question. And we cannot think of any stimulus for its movement at this level. Therefore, we cannot understand how the philosophical method can be identified with the movement of thought at this level. For there could be no method at all here. Thought works only so long as the 'Other' challenges it. And so long as the 'Other' persists, what thought discovers in it is contingent for thought. That

is, the predicate must appear as contingent and empirically known. It is of course true that the predicate must be regarded as objective, as belonging to the subject itself. But yet we cannot know why, and how, the subject should possess the predicate. For example, we cannot say why the rose is red, or why there are matter, life, mind, etc., in the universe. Therefore, so long as the 'Other' exists, these are all contingent for us, and the moment the 'Other' disappears there is no guarantee that these will persist. Therefore, the high claim which Hegel makes for conceptual thinking as against *raisonnement* cannot be substantiated.

And because negation cannot be identified with the negativity of the ego and we cannot make use of the latter, as it does not belong to our level, we cannot proceed from the Absolute to the world of plurality and back again. Any deduction from the Absolute requires a detailed knowledge of it which we do not possess. And calling Spinoza's Substance a lion's den does not amount to a condemnation of it. It is true that Spinoza's mistake lies in not treating his Substance as Self. For the Absolute cannot be unconscious. But it is not a mistake that he does not give his concepts the significance of self.

Hegel's view that we must philosophize without regard to existence is not tenable. It is true that unless we are able to transcend existence we cannot philosophize. That is, we can philosophize only when we are able to deal with ideas by themselves. But this does not mean that philosophy can proceed without taking into consideration what there is in the world. But this is what Hegel wants that philosophy must do. He wants to bestow upon thought the freedom of movement, freedom from sensibility and existence.

Professor Wallace writes: "Logic, then, is not the Science of mere or pure thought, but of the Idea (which is coterminous with reality)—of the mind's synthetic unity of experience—looked at, however, abstractly in the medium of pure thought."¹ But how is this conception of Idea attained by Hegel? Certainly by a study of the pure concept of thought. Hegel wanted to detach thought from sensibility

¹ Wallace *Prolegomena to Hegel's Logic*, p. 284

and feeling, from what is called ordinary experience and give its movement freedom "Speculative logic contains all previous logic and metaphysics it preserves the same forms of thought, the same laws and objects, while at the same time remodelling and expanding them with wider categories"¹ These categories are Freedom, Spirit, and God The way in which speculative logic remodels the categories of ordinary logic and metaphysics is by giving them the form of Necessity,² i.e. the necessity of self-development This necessity is therefore really the freedom of thought from the givenness of ordinary experience³ Speculative logic shows how the categories develop by a thinking of the categories themselves In this thinking thought exhibits its own freedom. Hegel writes "The fact as experienced thus becomes an illustration and a copy of the original and completely self-supporting activity of thought."⁴ If this activity is really the self-supporting activity of thought, is it not the activity of pure thought? This freedom of thought must be either a mere show or real If a mere show, the whole system of Hegel, to which such freedom is fundamental, is also a mere show and is not worthy of serious study If real, it must be admitted that Hegel tried to prove that thought by thinking itself exhibits all the categories that belong to it and reality.

Dr McTaggart also wants to defend Hegel from the charge⁵ Long ago Trendelenberg brought it against Hegel by saying that, in spite of his claim to deduce all the categories *a priori*, Hegel makes surreptitious references to experience. But McTaggart says: "The fact seems to be that Trendelenberg's interpretation of Hegel's attempt to construct a dialectic of pure thought is inadequate in two

¹ Wallace *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 16

² *Ibid*, p. 15.

³ *Science of Logic*, vol. i, p. 46 "The categories function only instinctively and as impulses—they are at first introduced into consciousness piecemeal, and therefore are mutable and mutually confusing, and thus yield to mind only a piecemeal and insecure actuality To purify these categories and to raise the mind through them to Freedom and Truth, this it is which is the loftier task of Logic

⁴ Wallace. *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 22

⁵ McTaggart. *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 32.

ways. He supposes, first, that the incomplete thought from which we start is conceived to exist only in its incompleteness, and is *intended* to have as yet no actual relation to the concrete reality to which it is afterwards to attain." "And, secondly, Trendelenberg appears to think that thought, to be pure, must be perceived by itself, and not in concrete experience, which always contains, along with pure thought, the complementary moment of sensation"¹ But the difficulty is that, if Hegel wants to give freedom to the movement of thought, we cannot understand how McTaggart can meet Trendelenberg's objection. Thought can have freedom only when freed from existence and sensibility. If Hegel, by his method, is only putting in order the categories obtained empirically through history, then the freedom of thought's movement would be a mere show. If it is not a show, Hegel must deduce the categories *a priori* without any reference to existence, which, as Trendelenberg says, he is unable to do.

As regards McTaggart's first point of criticism, we may admit that complete thought does not exist by itself. But the idea of incomplete thought only implies complete thought or thought completed. But how the idea of incomplete thought can lead us to the discovery of all the categories in the universe cannot be conceived. Simply through *a priori* considerations all the categories cannot be discovered. The movement of thought from incompleteness to completeness is only the truth of the old ontological argument. The validity of this movement we can admit. But we cannot admit that all the categories can be discovered without reference to experience. In the passage from the lowest category to the highest thought may come across a number of categories. But the discovery of these is empirical, and they cannot be deduced *a priori*. But if we take Hegel's freedom of thought seriously, we have to interpret him as deducing the categories *a priori*.

It may be said that Hegel does not mean by Absolute Consciousness the consciousness of the Absolute, but only the life of contemplation. The last category in his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* is Philosophy which is

¹ McTaggart *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 34.

placed above Art and Religion. Similarly, in his *Phenomenology of Mind*, the last division, Absolute Knowledge, is only the concept of science or philosophical knowledge. And Bailie, in his *Idealistic Construction of Experience*, though he does not seem to place Philosophy above Religion, yet treats it as contemplation, one of the forms of experience in which the Absolute Spirit is realized.¹ In Aristotle, too, we find a similar conception, which recommends to man as his highest ideal the life of contemplation, the thought of thought. If we do not identify thought of thought with God, we can identify it with contemplative life.

But if Hegel means by Absolute Knowledge only the life of contemplation which any of us can possess, then certainly we cannot transcend our finitude in it. Simply on account of our dealing with pure ideas, we cannot be said to have left the level of finitude. Besides, in our dealing with them, our thought cannot be said to be free. None of those philosophers who have led a contemplative life, not even Plato, or Aristotle, or Spinoza or Hegel, have been able to explain why and how the world has been created. And the nature of any concept or idea they use is known by them only empirically. And Hegel's claim to have bestowed freedom upon thought has already been refuted. None of them has explained why and how life and mind appear.

So though we admit that the life of contemplation is a high ideal, we cannot accept that by leading that life our thoughts can be free from existence, and that we will be able to explain and deduce everything. If in contemplation we are really lifted to the level of Self-consciousness or ultimate reality, no thought and its movement would persist at that level. And the question of deducing the phenomenal world does not arise at all. What Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge is not really Absolute Knowledge. Unless thought is lifted to the real Absolute Knowledge, it cannot be free, but if it is lifted, thought itself will disappear and there will be no philosophy at all.

¹ P 343.

CHAPTER III

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

MANY great philosophers have pointed to the Self when the question 'What is the nature of reality?' has been put to them. But they differed from each other in their conception of the Self. Fichte thought that the Ego is the ultimate reality. Kant said that Self-consciousness is the condition and the possibility of all consciousness of objects whatsoever. Hegel posited the Absolute or Self-consciousness as the criterion of all truth. Sankara points to the *ātman* for understanding his Supreme *Brahman*, and holds that they are ultimately identical. Even Bergson points to the Self as the clue to understanding pure change. Yet all these do not agree as to the nature of the Self.

Bradley's criticism of the self is well-known. He argues that the Absolute is not Self. Yet he thinks that it is experience. But if the Absolute is experience, it must be an experience in which the 'Other' is transcended. It is the view of Bradley himself that the 'Other' is so transcended. In it the object and the subject are the same. Because of the absence of the 'Other,' we call that experience intuition.

Bradley writes "Why, it has been asked, have I not identified the Absolute with the Self? Now, as I have already remarked, my whole view may be taken as based on the self; nor again could I doubt that self, or a system of selves, is the highest thing that we have. But when it is proposed to term the Absolute 'self,' I am compelled to pause. In order to reach the idea of the Absolute our finite selves must suffer so much addition and so much subtraction that it becomes a grave question whether the result can be covered by the name of 'self.'"¹ It is true that the finite self, as it exists, does not adequately express the nature of the Absolute. It is always opposed by an 'Other,' the not-self. And it knows itself only with reference to the 'Other.'

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 558.

But the finite self is not the Self. It can be called Self only by courtesy. It is never its own object. Its object is always an 'Other,' either an idea or a thing. Hume said that whenever he looked within himself he could never perceive his self, but always came across a state of consciousness, an idea or image. Pure Self-consciousness in which the Self is its own object is not known by us. We have already referred to the view of Professor Wallace on the matter.¹ For us Self-consciousness always remains a presupposition of our knowledge. We may be able to look within our minds, but not within our Selves. However hard we try, the Self always recedes farther and farther and eludes our grasp. That is why Kant held that the noumenal Self cannot be made an object. Yet without postulating it we cannot explain the knowledge of the world.

In Indian philosophy mind is not the Self, but in Western philosophy the two are synonymous. Hence the hesitation of Bradley to call the Absolute by the name of Self. The Self is what transcends objectivity or 'Otherness.' And such is exactly the nature of the Absolute. But mind is not of such a nature. It is thought, and as such exists only in the presence of the 'Other.'

Professor Campbell objects not only to calling the Absolute by the name of Self, but also to treating it as experience; for, he says, both the Self and experience imply an 'Other.' We have already shown why we should regard the Absolute as Self. That there is no experience without the distinction of the experiencer and the experienced is an assumption which Professor Campbell has not proved. That there is such an experience is the presupposition of our ordinary experience. Otherwise, what can be the positive basis of our condemnation of the phenomenal world? Do we condemn it without any experience of the positive basis? How can our negative judgment, "The world of experience is not ultimately real," be significant? Every significant negation implies some experience of the positive basis. Professor Campbell meets the objection by pointing out that a negative implies a positive only when the negative is of a character

¹ See p. 198 of this work

which is "a particular instance of a more general character which is itself significantly positive."¹ As the character negated here is itself of ultimate generality, "the dictum that every negative implies a positive has on this interpretation of it, no significant application of the case in hand."²

But is this negative judgment significant or not? Professor Campbell cannot say that it is not, for then it has to be regarded as false, and he would not be able to maintain that the Absolute is the only real. If it is significant, what is the principle that is applicable to this significant negation? The answer seems to be contained in his reply to another form of the same objection. And no other answer seems to be given by him.

The other form of the objection that every significant negation implies the experience of a positive basis is based upon the demand for a ground for the connection of differences. To satisfy this demand the negative judgment "A is not B" assumes the form, "A (X) is not B," where X represents the ground of the negative judgment. Professor Campbell writes. "But does not this recognition of a ground for the connection imply the apprehension of some character in A? It is true, of course, that if we are asked why A is not B, we may be in a position to reply because A is not C, and not-C implies not-B. We should thus remain so far within the circle of mere negation. But evidently this is only to push the difficulty further back. We should now have to ask, What is it in A that warrants our exclusion of C? Sooner or later, it would seem, a positive character in A must come to light. But must it not be also so with 'reality' in the judgment 'reality is not relational'?"³ Professor Campbell answers by saying that in the consideration of the judgment at issue, though not-B is grounded upon not-C, we have to regard not-C as "ungrounded, intuitive, and immediate."⁴

Now is this not-C on which the negative predicate not-relational is to be grounded the same as reality or not?

¹ *Scepticism and Construction*, p. 77

² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 78

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

As not-C is to be regarded as ungrounded, Professor Campbell would give an affirmative answer. But then is reality a mere negative? I think that Mr. Campbell's view is that the Absolute is positive. But this not-C, he says, is known and known intuitively. But does this assertion not amount to the admission that we have an immediate and intuitive knowledge of reality? If so, why not acknowledge that in the case of every significant negation we experience the positive basis in some way or other? If acknowledged, will it not be so also with the judgment, "The world of experience is not ultimately real"? If it is so, then it is not necessary that a negative in order to be significant should be of a character which is a "particular instance of a more general character which is itself significantly positive." It is enough if there is a point or aim in making the negative judgment. The judgment, "The world of experience is not ultimately real," is significant because there is the intention of pointing to something else as ultimately real. What is wanted is a 'point' in making the negative judgment.

If, therefore, the Absolute is intuitively known, as intuition is a form of experience, the Absolute must be regarded as experience.

Moreover, Professor Campbell admits that reality is the self-completion of thought. If so, does nothing continue from thought to Reality? He writes: "But it is difficult to see that an asymptotic approach warrants the belief that the thing concerned exhibits 'in its real nature' the condition of the ideal limit. Rather it would seem to have passed into another nature. After all, though 0.9 asymptotically approaches 1 , we do not suppose that 0.9 is 'at its highest' or 'in its real nature' 1 ."¹ We have to admit that 0.9 is not equal to 1 , and also that thought is not the same as reality. There is no rational continuity between the phenomenal and the noumenal levels. Yet the absence of rational continuity does not mean the absence of every continuity. Even between 0.9 and 1 there is the continuity of numerical nature. Similarly the continuity of experience can be allowed between thought and reality. If reality is

¹ *Scepticism and Construction*, p. 63

thought self-completed, conscious continuity must be admitted between the two. It cannot be objected that consciousness always implies an 'Other.' For, as said above, the objection is based on an unsubstantiated assumption. That there is such an experience is a postulate necessitated by our philosophical system, and, as Bradley says, "what is *possible* and what a general principle compels us to say *must be*, that necessarily *is*."¹

The question whether there are many selves or there is only one self has already been answered in our previous discussions. As we accept a suprarational Absolute, there could be only one Self for us. Many selves mean many reals. And a plurality of reals is self-contradictory. For, as Bradley says, "the internal states of each give rise to hopeless difficulties, and, in the second place, the plurality of the reals cannot be reconciled with their independence."² Nor is the Absolute a system of selves. This conception has already been disposed of as unsatisfactory.

We have so far established that the ultimate reality is Self and is experience. But our conception of Self differs from that of many Western philosophers. For Hegel the Self or the Absolute is an identity in difference, and we have shown in Part I that the view cannot be defended. It ought not to be conceptual but supra-rational, because it always transcends our finite experience and thought. It can never be made an object. With Kant we hold that it is the condition of the possibility of every experience. We distinguish between mind and Self, and this distinction corresponds to some extent to Kant's distinction between the empirical and the noumenal self. But unlike Kant we hold that this noumenal Self is experienceable. For us intellect is not the only form of experience. It is a mistake of Kant to think that our experience is limited to the phenomenal world. The limit of our thought is not the limit of our experience. It is only the limit of one form of experience. Above thought we admit intuition. And what Kant calls intellectual intuition is possessed by us, though in an imperfect way. We have 'intimations' or glimpses of the Supreme Being.

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 196

² *Ibid*, p. 141

in certain forms of experience like the aesthetic and the religious. And it is only on the basis of such experience that we condemn the phenomenal world as ultimately unreal.

Fichte, too, draws a distinction between the Absolute and the finite ego. But like Hegel he professes to deduce the world from it. We hold that it is presumptuous to attempt to deduce the world from the Absolute. The deduction would be possible if the nature of the Absolute is identical with the nature of thought. But we admit that the Absolute is supra-rational and logic is transcended in it. Therefore deduction is not possible.

We cannot accept Bergson's view that our Self is pure change. Our first objection to Bergson's view is that he does not distinguish between Self and mind. We admit that in mind there is a continual flux. The *Bhagavadgita* says that the mind is not static¹. But there is always in that experience the feeling of continuity or identity which is an experience of stability. This aspect of our mind seems to have been overlooked by Bergson. He may say that in the idea of mind as enduring through change that aspect is included. But then it would be admitting that mind is not pure change. The experience of permanence as well as that of pure change are aspects of our mind. Bergson may object that this is only an intellectual description. True, but to call it pure change is also an intellectual description. Besides, in our experience of our minds there is always a transcendental aspect. That is, the experiencer is never experienced as an object. And it is this transcendental something that is the Self. And if our conscious life is to furnish us with a clue to the nature of reality we must do justice to its complexity.

¹ *Asamśayam mahābāho mano durnigraham chalam* (vi. 36). Oh Arjuna (of long arms), mind is certainly a flux and cannot be controlled.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THOUGHT

THE aim of this chapter is to find out the logical nature of thought. The question it answers is whether thought is pure identity or pure difference, or identity in difference, and whether Reality also is an identity in difference. The latter question has already been anticipated and a negative answer given. We shall say something more in this chapter.

Logically the form of thought is judgment. Reasoning also is thought. For it makes use of judgment. Judgment is the sundering of an original unity into subject and predicate. According to Bradley, this unity is given in feeling. Yet this original unity does not disappear in spite of division. Subject and predicate are the two parts of the original whole and are related to each other. And this relation can hold between the terms only because of the presence of the whole. Bradley writes "Every such relation is inconsistent with itself. . . For it exists within, and by virtue of an embracing unity, and apart from that totality both itself and its terms would be nothing"¹ That is, the plurality can exist only because of the unity. Professor Cunningham also interprets Bradley similarly. He writes: "It is important to note that immediate experience is present within the relational level as foundational. It functions as the background or the nucleus in which terms and relations germinate, so to say, and from which they grow. It is the felt unity that is the immediate centre of all mediate experience. It is not a 'stage' which may or may not at some time have been there and has now ceased to exist. It is not in any case removed by the presence of a not-self and of a relational consciousness. All that is thus removed is at most, we may say, the mere-ness of immediacy. . . . Thus in all experience we still have feeling which is not an object, and at all our moments the entirety that comes to us, however much distinguished and relational, is felt as com-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 228

prised within a unity which itself is not relational."¹ If judgment is present only within a wider unity we should say that thought must be an identity in difference.

Here the question arises whether mere plurality along with the relations that appear within the whole of feeling is thought or whether the whole with its divisions and its relations is thought. That is, whether feeling exists beside thought or whether feeling itself is transformed into thought. The problem raised is very complex. And the complexity is due to the nature of our consciousness. And the clue to the problem lies in recognizing that it is the same individual that is at the level of feeling and of thought. When we experience plurality, the unity does not cease to exist, but simply recedes to the background. It is only because of its presence even at the background that we are able to connect the differences. So thought is the plurality experienced within the unity and therefore is an identity in difference. That is why thought is sometimes said to be the unfolding of the differences contained in feeling, just as the bud, in which we do not see the petals distinctly, unfolds them when it becomes a flower. That is, thought is the whole along with the distinctions and their relations. Yet even at the level of thought we have some intimations or suggestions of a unity that transcends these distinctions. This peculiarity is simply experienced but cannot be further explained. Thought is not mere plurality experienced within the unity, but an identity in difference experienced within that unity. So no definite answer can be given to the question raised. Thought is the consciousness of difference with the feeling of unity as the background. Though feeling recedes to the background at the level of thought, both feeling and thought belong to the same experience. Hence the complexity.

If thought is identity in difference what are we to say of reality? We have already proved that it cannot be identity in difference. Reality is reached when thought is transcended, therefore the form of thought, viz. identity

¹ *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, p. 82

in difference must also be transcended in reality. It cannot be pure identity, because, as Bradley himself says, identity is a concept of thought and is therefore inadequate to express the nature of reality¹ Therefore we describe reality as non-difference

The conception that reality is non-difference agrees with the view that thought is inadequate to express its nature. No positive concept of thought is adequate to it Both identity and difference are positive concepts of thought. Therefore reality can only be described as only non-difference. We may also call it non-identity We generally call it unity because of the integrality it possesses. But unity can be understood only with reference to diversity Therefore, the usage cannot be logically defended. Yet as the usage is prevalent it is better to call it non-difference than to call it non-identity.

There is another peculiarity of thought which we have to notice. We have said that the form of thought is judgment. In judgment we draw the distinction between the subject and the predicate; and this distinction, it is said, falls within thought. That is, the whole with these distinctions constitutes thought But again thought cannot exist without an 'Other', and this distinction, too, between the 'Other' and thought falls within thought itself. Now, what is this 'Other'? When I make the judgment, "That is a pen," the 'Other' to me is the 'that' and the 'pen' is my interpretation or the appearance of the 'Other' to me. But the subject is, as Bradley says, existence Therefore the 'Other' is the subject or existence.

Yet the 'Other' is not merely the subject of the judgment as subject. It is the existence that opposes thought. The form of thought is judgment, and the judgment includes both the subject and the predicate. For example, when I say, "The rose is red," what I say expresses the form of thought. Yet the rose that is red is not the rose minus the red, but the whole rose including the red. So the distinction between the subject and the predicate is drawn within the thing rose itself. But the rose is what is 'Other'

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p 240

to thought because it is the existence. Hence we say that the 'Other' is the unity that sunders itself into the subject and the predicate. So it is the same 'Other' so sundered that is thought. We have said above that the relational form of judgment holds good within a unity which, in spite of breaking itself into judgment, still remains sustaining the relational form. And we feel that the distinction between the 'Other' and thought falls within thought, because the 'Other' appears as the subject of the judgment which is the form of thought. And we have quoted above from Professor Cunningham in support of our interpretation. Now, if this unity remains in spite the judgment, and if the judgment is the form of thought, and if thought requires an 'Other,' is not this 'Other' the same as the unity? Again, if, as we have pointed out in a previous chapter, for logic, the original unity that sunders itself into judgment is not feeling but the Absolute itself, will not the 'Other' to thought be ultimately the Absolute itself?¹ It is a mistake of Bradley to have called feeling the logical ground of thought. And the expression has prevented many from noticing that the 'Other' to thought is reality itself. Logically, thought is judgment, and the ground of judgment, and, therefore, of thought, is reality itself. That is why Bosanquet says that the logical ground of judgment is the whole of reality. Of course, for Bradley this reality is an integrality without differences and relations, and is not of the form of judgment. It is this reality that is the 'Other' and the ideal of thought.

It may be said that if we regard reality as the 'Other' to thought, as the distinction between thought and its 'Other' falls within thought itself, reality will have to be regarded as falling within thought. But the same objection can hold good against the view that reality is the ultimate subject. For the distinction between the subject and the predicate falls within thought, and as reality is the subject it must be taken as falling within thought.²

The solution lies in viewing the matter thus. We have

¹ Cp *Appearance and Reality*, p 182

² This difficulty is cognate to the view that reality is immanent in thought, and yet transcends it

said that it is the 'Other' in which the distinction between the subject and the predicate is drawn, and that it is the Absolute itself that sunders itself into the form of judgment. So it is thought that appears within the 'Other' or the Absolute, and not that the Absolute falls within thought. It is true that the form of thought is judgment and of the judgment the subject is a part. But the subject is not exhausted in the judgment, but transcends it. It is rather the appearance of the subject that is the judgment. Thought may know the subject, yet it knows it as its limit and as what transcends it. This knowledge implies that the thought has an inner nature transcending its discursive aspect. It is the inner nature that is the Self. And it is the Self that is identical with reality.

CHAPTER V

INTELLECT AND INTUITION

WE have already seen what the nature of the intellect is. It is that consciousness that makes distinctions within a whole and relates them. Intuition is that consciousness which experiences the whole as a whole without making distinctions and relating them.

The word intuition has been used in the history of philosophy in various senses. It served the purpose of the mystics, who called their experience of the one-ness with God by the name intuition. When Bergson is asked how we are to experience pure change, he says, through intuition. Kant used the term to denote sensibility as well as intellectual intuition. Hegel equated it to mere animal feeling, and criticized Schelling and others as if they were advocating it. And in Indian philosophy Sankara identified it with the experience of his Supreme Brahman or the Absolute. Because of this diversity of meanings it is easier to misunderstand and criticize a writer who advocates intuition than to appreciate him.

For us intuition is of the nature of the integration of the discursive intellect. Intuition is that consciousness in which distinctions are not found. That is why we call it integration. Yet the word integration suggests the process of integrating and producing the results. But it is the presupposition of consciousness that the thing known is discovered, not produced. Therefore the word integrality seems to serve our purpose better. So we should say that intuition is what reveals to us the integrality or individuality of a thing, whereas intellect presents us only a partial aspect or an appearance of the thing.

As the intellect presents the appearance of the thing to us, in the consciousness of the appearance of the thing is implied the consciousness of integrality. But at the intellectual level what is at the surface is the consciousness of the appearance. The consciousness of the thing in its

individuality exists in the background as the foundation. Therefore, we should say that intuition is the foundation of intellect.

The result agrees with Bradley's theory of immediate experience. According to him, as shown in the previous chapter, the original unity of feeling is not lost even when the relational form is developed in it, but remains as the foundation. The relational form can subsist only because of this unity. We have shown previously that logically the original unity is not feeling but the Absolute itself, and that the experience of the Absolute is intuition. If so, the logical foundation of thought or intellect is intuition. Of course, in the consciousness of an individual, we may admit, the integrality of the intuition at first appears as feeling or sensibility.

Intuition is not a supernatural faculty with which a few people alone are blessed. The recognition of intuition is regarded by some as a weakness and an admission of defeat or inability to reason, as if we can reason out and prove the existence of everything in heaven and on earth. Intuition is not a strange faculty. It is the presupposition of the intellect and is its foundation. It is not inexperienceable. It constitutes the limit of our intellect and yet is a form of experience. At the level of intellect we are not able to have pure intuition. Yet it is not a fictitious faculty invented by impostors and men of neurotic constitution.

That intuition is the foundation of the intellect does not mean that the former is like a corner-stone on which intellect, like the superstructure, is laid. Intellect is permeated by intuition. Both belong to our conscious life. And our conscious life is a unity. Therefore we cannot treat intellect and intuition as two layers in the literal sense.

Intuition is sometimes called imaginative sympathy that enables us to enter into the core of the object. Intellect appears only when we draw the distinction between the subject and the predicate. At the level of intuition the 'Other' is absorbed or overcome, whereas at the level of the intellect it stands opposing thought.

It is an untenable procedure to separate intellect and

intuition and pigeon-hole them as two faculties, relegating the one to our ordinary experience and the other to religion, for intuition pervades the intellect and is its foundation. It is true that in our ordinary experience we do not have pure intuition, and that the medium of our religious experience cannot be intellect. Yet they are not faculties unconnected with each other. Intellect cannot exist without intuition. Nor is intuition irrational. Intellect is mediation and mediation cannot be found without immediacy. But intuition is complete mediation, or what is called 'mediated immediacy.'

The intuition of the mystic, that form of experience in which he feels his oneness with the Supreme Being, is not the only form of intuition. It is, of course, the highest form. Yet at our level there are forms of intuition, though imperfect. Whenever we experience an integrality, however short-lived the experience may be, we still have some intuition. For example, the rose may be known through its colour, smell, weight, etc. This is the intellectual way of knowing it. Yet the rose has an individuality of its own and is not merely a group of these qualities. When known in its individuality it is intuited. Of course at our level we never have pure intuition of the rose. When we perceive it we say 'that is a rose' or 'that rose is red.' And the perception is here certainly intellectual. But this is due to the finitude of the rose. The rose is not self-existent and depends upon, and points to, something else for its existence. That is why, when we take the rose even as a whole, we have to say "That is a rose," and treat the rose as a predicate that depends upon a subject. For even according to Bradley the subject is the existence. That is, the predicate borrows its existence from the subject and depends upon it.

It may be asked whether the red, the predicate of a judgment, does not have an individuality of its own. It does possess an individuality, and so far the knowledge of it is an intuition. But as finite the red, too, depends upon something else for its existence. Hence the necessity of referring it to a subject. Because everything finite has to

be referred to something else its knowledge cannot be perfect intuition, but is relational.

Self-consciousness or the experience of the Absolute is the highest form of intuition, because it is the highest and deepest integrality. But matter, life, mind, etc., are also intuitions, because each is an integrality with a peculiarity of its own. That level of consciousness which sees matter cannot see life. Similarly, that level which sees life cannot see matter or mind. It is for this reason that Mr. Joad postulates jumps or levels of consciousness.¹ He writes "There also seems to be good evidence for the *abruptness* of the transition from one level of apprehension to another. Between the worlds of becoming and being there was fixed for Plato a definite gulf, a gulf which the mind must leap to obtain its vision of Beauty. There is a leap, too, from any level of the leading-up process to the next, from the apprehension of a thing as an object useful or useless, rare or worthless, to the apprehension of it as what Chve Bell calls significant form, that is, as a combination of lines and colours . . . that moves us aesthetically."² "Now these jumps are in the nature of integrations."³ At every jump the lower must be transcended and therefore we experience an abruptness of the transition. Bradley would have said that the lower commits suicide in its attempt to become the higher. For him at the level of the Absolute the phenomenal world must disappear. We may add following the idea that for that level of consciousness which perceives mind, life and matter do not exist, and similarly for that level of consciousness which perceives life, matter and mind do not exist. So also at all levels.

The intuition which we are advocating is not identical with that advocated by Bergson. Bergson's intuition is a sort of will, the object of which is pure change. But our intuition is much wider in significance. It, of course, denotes, as in the case of Bergson, that kind of consciousness which enters into the actual nature of things. But Bergson's reality is pure change, and his intuition is identical with it. But

¹ *Return to Philosophy*, p. 96.

² *Ibid.*, p. 97

³ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

for us, the Absolute which is the ultimate reality is not mere change but transcends it

Though intuition presents the truth, the thing in its real nature, at our level it is easy to mistake each and every phantasm for an object of intuition. Hence the need of reasoning as a corrective function. Reasoning does not give us the truth, but it can point out what truth is not. We have previously identified truth with existence and reality. And this existence is not obtained through inference or any other form of reasoning. Existence is known only through intuition. But when intuition because of our finitude goes astray, its untruth is revealed by reasoning. Reasoning can only point towards the thing, but the thing as existing is revealed only through intuition. It should not, of course, be forgotten that at our level intuition is not perfect. The first appearance of intellect, we may say, is at the level of perception. In perception both intellect and intuition are present. In it the existence of the thing is given through intuition, but the subject-predicate form belongs to the intellect. Of course this intuition is the lowest form of the real intuition.

PART V

THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE method that is the method of philosophy and at the same time represents the process of life is the transcendental method. The moving principle of this method is the principle of non-contradiction, not that of coherence. Even in inference the same principle is operative. So long as this principle is conformed to, any reasoning will be valid.

The argument *a contingentia mundi* is based upon this method. In Kant we find two forms of this method. The first resembles *arthāpatti* of Indian philosophy. The second is closer to Hegel's dialectic, but both it and Hegel's dialectic have their own defects. The mistake of Kant is that he regards the Ideal of Reason obtained by this method as only regulative, and that of Hegel is that he thinks that this method helps us in deducing the categories intervening between the lowest and the highest. But the method is in truth a method of discovery, not a method of deduction.

CHAPTER I

REASONING ¹

IT is said in the previous Part that categories cannot subsist if thought is lifted to the level of Self-consciousness. There is no reasoning or thinking at that level. That is, there is no thinking which is thinking by Self-consciousness. Therefore the conceptual thinking which Hegel advocates is no true thinking. Thinking belongs, if at all, to the finite level. Hence our method of thinking cannot overcome the defects of finitude. And the principle to which it tries to conform in order to be correct is the principle of non-contradiction. But as has already been said, if at any time we are asked whether the result obtained will not be contradicted, we have to confess ignorance. And our ignorance is due to our finitude. Only at the level of the Absolute can we be certain of non-contradiction, but this certainty is not due to reasoning.

Reasoning in Western philosophy was for a long time identified with syllogistic reasoning. In Socrates and Plato we find rudiments of the dialectical method, but it was not explicitly formulated. In Indian philosophy *arthāpatti* or postulation was recognized as a form of reasoning centuries before Hegel by the Mīmāṃsakas and many Advaitins. It resembles to some extent the transcendental method of Kant and the dialectical method of Hegel. The utterance of a reliable person that the man Devadatta is living makes us know that Devadatta is living. But when we look for him in his house and find that he is absent, our knowledge of his non-existence in the house conflicts with our knowledge of his existence. And this conflict is removed by postulating the existence of Devadatta outside his house ²

¹ The word is used in the very general sense of thinking.

² *Jīvaḥ Devadatta ityāptavūkyam Devadattasatwam sāmānyena pramāpayati. Gryhe anupalabhisādasatwam pramāṇayorvirodho anupapattiḥ sā cha bahissatwam prakalpya śāmyati* (Commentary *Vidyā-sāgarī* on *Khandanakhandakhāḍya*, p. 764)

Thus when a general proposition is contradicted by a particular proposition, the contradiction is resolved by postulating another particular proposition. For example, the general proposition "Devadatta is living," is contradicted by the particular proposition "Devadatta is not living in his house." And this contradiction is removed by postulating the proposition, "Devadatta is living outside his house." Because of the general proposition the proposition "Devadatta is not living in the house," is made to imply the proposition, "Devadatta is living outside his house." The transcendental method too proceeds by similarly postulating.

But some Vedantins do not accept that *arthāpatti* is a different kind of reasoning from inference. For there really cannot be any conflict between a general proposition and a particular proposition, to solve which we have to postulate another proposition. Moreover, do we know that Devadatta does not exist in the house before we know that he exists outside it, or after we know that he exists outside it? In the latter case there is no need of this reasoning at all, for we are already in possession of the result. And if we argue his existence outside from his non-existence inside his house, basing our knowledge of the latter on our knowledge of the former, we would be committing the fallacy of *petitio principii*. If, on the other hand, we know his non-existence in the house previously to our knowing his existence outside, then our reasoning would be the ordinary inference based on the general proposition that a man living, if he does not exist in one place, must exist at another.¹

Though *arthāpatti* is reduced to inference, inference is not regarded as an unfailing method of proof. In Western philosophy various objections have been brought against its syllogistic form by logicians like Bradley, Bosanquet, Lotze, and Schiller. Some have pointed out that it is not a method of discovery, all must have been discovered by the time we make the major premise itself, and the conclusion gives us no new knowledge. Even accepting that it is not a method of discovery, but only a process of

systematizing or connecting our experiences, it has been pointed out that it is not necessary that we should have only three terms or only three propositions in it, and that the major premise is a superstition. The major premise, "All men are mortal," does not imply that we have counted all men. If taken literally, therefore, it would imply omniscience on the part of the reasoner. And if the reasoner already knows that all men, each individual taken separately, are mortal, then the conclusion, "Socrates is mortal," as the author of *Khandana Khandakhādyā*¹ points out, would be only a judgment of recognition. And many Advaita logicians like him do not lag behind the Western logicians in pointing out the defects of the syllogistic form of reasoning.

But syllogism as interpreted even by Bradley and Bosanquet cannot be ultimately valid, because it possesses defects similar to those that vitiate the formal syllogism. We may accept that the major premise "All men are mortal," denotes only a necessary connection of the attributes human and mortal. But how are we to know that this connection is a necessary connection? We can be certain of it only if we know the underlying system in detail. But in order fully to understand the nature of this system we have to know the whole of reality. But, as Bradley says, if we know the whole of reality, neither inference nor judgment remains. The older interpretation requires omniscience on our part because we have to know each and every man in the universe, not only those that lived in the past and are living in the present, but also those that will live in the future. The modern interpretation requires omniscience on our part by asking us to understand the whole of reality. Both interpretations are defective ultimately for the same reason.

Yet we may accept the major premise as an assumption or working hypothesis that is uncontradicted by our experience so far. And granting its truth, the principle that connects the premise "Socrates is a man" with the conclusion, "Socrates is mortal," is the principle of non-contradiction. When it is accepted that man is mortal, if Socrates is a man, it would be contradictory to assert that

¹ P. 673.

Socrates is not a mortal. Yet the result cannot be taken to be ultimately certain because the major premise, "All men are mortal," cannot be proved to be ultimately true.

In *arthāpatti* also it is the same principle of non-contradiction that gives us the result. For, if the proposition, "Devadatta is existing outside the house," is not postulated or is taken to be false, then he must be regarded as existing in the house, for he exists somewhere. But we see that he does not exist in his house. Therefore we shall have a contradiction. And to avoid this we postulate that Devadatta is existing outside his house. Thus the movement of thought in both *arthāpatti* and inference is the same and is guided by the same principle of non-contradiction.¹ So there is really no fundamental difference between *arthāpatti* and inference. Of course, it is not necessary that there should be only three terms or only three propositions in inference. What is wanted is that it should conform to the principle of non-contradiction.

It is often questioned: How could we accept the verdict of thought that the phenomenal world is ultimately unreal, if it cannot express truth? Thought is inadequate to express the nature of reality. Its results are therefore false. That the phenomenal world is not ultimately real is a conclusion arrived at by thought. Therefore it must be false. And if false the phenomenal world must be real.

This objection has already been met by Madhusūdana in his *Advantasiddhi*.² It is true that the unreality of the phenomenal world is proved by our reasoning. But what is proved by our reasoning is unreality, not reality. Therefore thought need not be real. Nor can it be said that the conception of reality is simpler than that of unreality, therefore thought proves reality, and out of that conception we form the conception of unreality. For the objector may assert, usually we have simpler ideas first and then out of

¹ So much is noticed by Chitsukhāchārya when he says that even smoke proves the existence of fire only because it would be contradictory if fire is absent where smoke exists. *Dhūmopi dhūmadhvajasyāsau virodhādeva tadgamakah* (*Tatwadīpikā*, p. 274.)

² P. 440

them construct complex ideas. But the conception of reality or existence is not simple. As Professor Campbell says, the contradictory is the simple and positive idea for us, and on it we base our conception of the non-contradictory. Reality is for us a negative idea. It means what is uncontradicted in the past and in the present, and will not be contradicted in the future.¹

As regards the point that if the unreality of the phenomenal world is unreal, the phenomenal world would be real, and that if, on the other hand, that unreality is real, then too there is something which is not the Absolute that is real, the answer is that even if the unreality of the phenomenal world is unreal, the phenomenal world cannot be real.² For the unreal and the real are not contradictories. The unreality of the unreality of the phenomenal world results in the reality of phenomenal world only if reality and unreality are contradictories. But we have proved previously that they are not so.³ Therefore both the unreal and its unreality are unreal. For example, there is the prior absence of Cæsar before he was born, and there is also his absence due to his death. The prior absence of Cæsar and Cæsar living are opposites, and where the former is the latter cannot be. But from the unreality of the one we cannot infer the reality of the other, for both may be unreal due to the reality of his absence caused by his murder. Similarly, the judgment that the phenomenal world is unreal as well as the judgment that this judgment is unreal can both be rendered false by the ultimate Truth.

Even supposing that they are contradictory, they are contradictory only at the same logical level. That is, both are false for the same reason, that they belong to the phenomenal. Therefore the falsity of the one need not prove the reality of the other. The falsity of the one can prove the reality of the other only if they belong to two different

¹ *Advantasiddhi*, p. 443. Reality is *trikālābādhyatvam*, i.e. uncontradictedness in the past, present, and future. This definition implies that *bādha* or contradiction is a positive idea for us, and *abādhyatvam* or uncontradictedness a negative idea.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 207 sqq.

³ P. 155 of this work.

logical levels. Taking the classical example of the perception of the snake in the rope, the falsity of the judgment, "It is a snake," can prove the truth of the judgment, "It is a rope," for the first judgment belongs to the *prātibhāsika* level and the second to the *empirical*. But the falsity of the judgment, "It is a snake," cannot prove the truth of the judgment, "It is different from a rope,"¹ for both judgments belong to the *prātibhāsika* level. That is, both the judgments are equally false because the object before is a rope.

Moreover, we see many instances where falsity results in truth. Two false premises may give a true conclusion. For example, we may argue "All trees are famous, Socrates is a tree, therefore Socrates is famous." Many of us have come across the phenomenon of faith cure. There are also cases where the pricking of a thorn mistaken for the biting of a snake resulted in death. So it is not necessary that thought which proves the unreality of the phenomenal world must be real.

Hence it must be accepted that our reasoning is guided by the principle of non-contradiction. But as our reasoning is always finite it cannot be sure that its conclusions will never be contradicted. It is also not necessary that thought, in order that its verdict that the phenomenal world is not ultimately real may be true, should be ultimately real. It can be certain of non-contradiction only within a limited and relative sphere. And its sphere is always limited and relative. Hence finality should not be attached to its conclusions.

¹ Cp. *Advantasiddhi*, p. 222.

CHAPTER II

THE ARGUMENT *A CONTINGENTIA MUNDI*

WE have accepted the supra-rational Absolute and regarded it as the basis of our condemnation of the phenomenal world. And the argument used by us is the argument *a contingentia mundi*, which is the argument of many Hegelian idealists

But recently Professor G. W. Cunningham has examined the argument in his *Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, and tried to establish that the argument in no way proves the existence of the Absolute. We are therefore bound to reply at least to defend our position. It has never been the fortune of philosophy that any of its problems has been solved once for all, or that any of its solutions has not been called in question. Such will not be the fortune of philosophy even in future. Yet our examination of Professor Cunningham's criticism may serve the purpose of at least clarifying the issues and defining the standpoints. We shall examine his criticism only so far as it concerns our view. For we do not accept all that Bradley and Bosanquet say about the argument.

We accept with Professor Cunningham that "the cognitive situation is self-transcendent and that 'reality' is the concept within which such transcendence finds its logical ground."¹ But what is it that is self-transcendent? Is it the object or the subject? If it is the subject, then this view of Professor Cunningham is the same as the idealistic view that mind transcends the opposition between itself and the object. And this view, we have proved, leads us to postulate the Self or the Self-consciousness which is the Absolute. We have said that the experience of this transcendence is due to our being more than thought or mind. As mind we are opposed by the object and as Self we transcend the opposition.

What transcends the situation may be said to be the

¹ *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, p. 1x

object. When I see a rose and say, "The rose is red," the rose certainly transcends the predicate red, for the rose has not only a colour but also smell, weight, and a number of other qualities. The transcendence of the object we understand in this way. The object transcends only the particular appearance on which the subject's attention is fixed. The transcendence of the appearance is the same as the transcendence of the predicate.

But where does this distinction between the subject and predicate occur? As Bradley says, within the unity of feeling. It is the unity of feeling that breaks itself into the differences of subject and predicate. But again, from the point of view of the object, the distinction between the subject and the predicate is drawn within the object itself. The object is the integrality within which this distinction is drawn. If so, is not the integrality of the object identical with the unity of feeling? It seems that the answer must be affirmative.

Therefore the unity of feeling has to be taken to be the same as the unity of the subject and the object, and that of the subject and the predicate. It is within this unity that the distinction between the subject and the object, and the distinction between the subject and the predicate arise. But at the level of feeling these distinctions do not exist. And as we have said it is the mistake of Bradley that he sometimes says that these distinctions belong to feeling. The 'uneasiness' of immediate experience is due to the appearance of thought on the scene. Uneasiness can be experienced only when a problem is raised. And there can be a problem only when the distinction between the subject and the object is already drawn; and the uneasiness is to some extent removed when the judgment is made. But at the level of feeling this distinction could not have been made, and therefore the uneasiness could not have been experienced.

And because the distinction between the subject and the object is not yet drawn at the level of feeling, the charge of solipsism cannot be brought against Bradley. Professor Cunningham writes, "When he (Bradley) wishes to emphasize its non-relational character he appeals to the fact that in the experience 'there is no difference between state and

content'; but when the avoidance of the identification of reality with the 'state' and the consequent solipsism is uppermost in his mind, he turns to the 'content' of immediate experience for deliverance. If the first character of immediate experience is granted, then it is merely non-relational, but then the second character can hardly be entertained, and the road away from solipsism is by no means clear. If, on the other hand, appeal is to be made to the 'content,' then solipsism may indeed be escaped, but the non-relational character of immediate experience is thereby in principle surrendered, or at least seriously compromised."¹

As the distinction between the subject and object cannot be drawn at the level of feeling, the distinction between the content of experience and the state of experience too cannot be drawn there. And Bradley seems to have overlooked the fact in thus vacillating between two positions. The second position is inconsistent not only with his Absolutism but also with actual fact. And the charge of solipsism cannot hold against him at all. If he means that the object is only a state of the subject's consciousness, he would be a solipsist. On the contrary, the distinction between the subject and the object holds only within this feeling. Both are absolutely identical here at first. The feeling is not the feeling of the subject who knows himself as such by distinguishing himself from the object, but the matrix of the subject itself.

Because of the identity of the subject and the object at the level of feeling, the assertion that, though immediate experience is non-relational, what is given in it need not be non-relational cannot be defended. For here the distinction is not drawn between the content and the state of experience. Professor Cunningham writes: "Is it mere psychological feeling taken without reference to anything beyond the 'state,' or is it such feeling contemplated as involving a reference to some sort of a situation which is other than the 'state'?" If it is the former, then any question

¹ *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, p. 397.

about it which assumes (as the one we are seeking does assume) that it 'gives' something other than its mere self is unwarranted. If it is the latter about which we are talking, however, the question is not amiss, for, then, an 'object' in some important sense is logically involved and one may well ask concerning its character. And, of course, it is the latter meaning which alone leaves our attachment between the immediate apprehension and reality, and which Bradley, I take it, always intends"¹ But in this immediate experience there is no difference between the given and that to which it is given. The experience is not mere psychological feeling taken without reference to the object. For psychological feeling is the feeling of a subject, but as yet there is no subject. The moment the object is even vaguely experienced we have begun to transcend the stage of pure feeling. Of course, whenever our perceptions are indefinite, we say "I feel something." But this feeling is not pure feeling. Thought must have appeared already at this level, because we have distinguished between the subject and object. But the feeling of which Bradley is speaking is one in which the distinction could not have been drawn. We have already said that the original unity which has divided itself into subject and object should not be called feeling, because feeling has no definite meaning and is therefore misleading. But its logical nature, the absence of distinctions and differences, is what we are concerned with. And we preferred calling it by the name of intuition to calling it by the name of feeling. We have also said that this intuition may appear in the consciousness of an individual at first in the form of feeling, which means that we have a vague sense of unity somewhat like an intimation or suggestion.

Hence that what is given in immediate experience is non-relational is not an unproved assumption of Bradley. We experience terms and relations only at the level of thought. It is, of course, the presupposition of knowledge that it discovers these terms and relations, but does not produce them. Yet if these exist at the level of feeling they

¹ *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, p. 391

should have been experienced. But they are not experienced. Nor can it be said that it is only our feeling that does not experience them, though they are there. For at the level the state of experience and the experiencer are not distinguished from the content of experience. That is, the object and the experience of it are identical.

The philosophy of Bradley as well as that advocated in these pages is a philosophy of experience. And this theory does not at all conflict with the theories of natural sciences which proceed on the assumption that the objects they deal with are independent of mind and are not mere ideas. For we have already proved that even the predicate of the false perception is not an idea or an ideal content or universal, but as hard a fact as the stone at which Johnson kicked. Just as the scientist does not curse the discovery that water is a compound of two gases, thinking that in future it will not quench his thirst, so also we need not be afraid that by calling reality experience the concrete objects which we handle in our everyday life will cease to be concrete. Nor does pure or Absolute Experience postulate an experiencer and the experienced, for at that level no distinctions can be drawn. That is why we called the Absolute by the name of Self-consciousness.

Similarly, that the relational form is internally inconsistent is not an assumption of Bradley.¹ Taking the judgment, "The rose is red," how does thought understand the rose? Only as a combination of the colour, smell, etc. But is the rose merely a group of these qualities? We certainly regard the rose as having an integrality or individuality of its own into which these qualities are absorbed. But how can we know this integrality? Can we know it conceptually, i.e. through thought? To know it conceptually we have to distinguish between the rose and its appearance to us, that is, between it as the subject and the predicate. But it is this conceptual form of knowledge that is relational. That is why Bradley says that the relational form is inherently inconsistent. Bergson advocates intuition or imaginative

¹ *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, p. 389.

sympathy as 'giving' us the individuality of things and Bradley non-relational experience.

Bradley gives other reasons to show why the relational form of experience is contradictory. For example, he says that the predicate is not adequate to the subject, that thought can never exhaust the nature of the 'that,' and that it cannot bestow the immediacy of the subject on the predicate. But all this criticism amounts to the charge that conceptual thinking, which is relational, cannot grasp the individuality of anything. Its self-contradictory nature consists in this defect.

Professor Cunningham accepts the principle that every negative implies a positive. And the argument *a contingencia mundi* is based upon it. If one is accepted, the other cannot be rejected. But according to this principle what is relative presupposes the absolute, and what is false the true. And the Absolute is the ultimate presupposition of the relative and the false. If we accept this principle we should carry on its application to the logical extreme, and be thorough Absolutists, or be satisfied with rank realism by holding that the principle is applicable only at the level in which we live.

Our view of the Absolute therefore is a form of mysticism. The Absolute cannot be dragged down and made use of at the logical level. In the language of Bosanquet, it is the high "watermark of fluctuations experienced." It is the higher limit of our logic. It is for this reason that it is said to belong to the supra-logical level.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

A PHILOSOPHICAL system that postulates the supra-rational Absolute as the presupposition of finite experience has to admit the validity of the transcendental method. This method has been made use of both by Kant and Hegel, though in slightly different ways. As N. K. Smith says, "it is really identical in general character with the hypothetical method of the natural sciences. It proceeds by enquiring what conditions must be postulated in order that the admittedly given may be explained and accounted for."¹ He further writes "Thus Kant is a rationalist of new and unique type. He believes in, and emphasizes the importance of, the *a priori*. With it alone, he contends, is the *Critique* competent to deal. But it is an *a priori* which cannot be shown to be more than relative, and to entertain in thought the possibility of the Absolute, but this it cannot do without possessing independent validity. For though proof of the *a priori* is not empirical in the sense of being inductive, neither is it logical in the sense of being deduced from necessities of thought. Its 'transcendental' proof can be executed only so long as the fundamental characteristics of this experience are kept in view."²

The movement of thought present in this method is that present in the ontological argument as interpreted by Hegel and many modern idealists. It proves that the finite points to the infinite as its basis. The idea of the finite makes us think of the infinite. We certainly do not proceed to argue from the mere idea of the infinite to its existence. We regard the finite as not self-existent, but as depending for its existence on something which is self-existent. Therefore given the finite—and we admit that we experience the finite—the infinite must exist. Because the infinite is not directly experienced but is only a presupposition of the

¹ *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. xxxviii

² *Ibid*, p. xxxvi

experience of the finite, the older theologians thought that we argue from the idea of the infinite to its existence, and formulated the proof accordingly

For the same reason the argument *a contingentia mundi* is also transcendental. It is based on the principle that every significant negative implies a positive, that our condemnation of the world as relative and finite implies some experience by us of the Absolute. We could not have condemned the world unless we had had some experience of the Absolute

There is, of course, some difference between the method as advocated by Kant and that as advocated by Hegel. In both the argument proceeds by bringing to light the implication of a given fact. But Kant regards the result of the argument sometimes as constitutive,¹ and sometimes as only regulative.² But for Hegel the result is always constitutive

But, as we have pointed out already, the defect of Hegel's method is that he regards the movement itself as discovering the intermediate categories between the lowest and the highest, without depending upon actual experience. We can only say that, given any category that is limited, we have to postulate a category that is unlimited. But what categories intervene between the former and the latter can be determined only empirically, not by *a priori* considerations. But Kant is not open to this charge. For example, the proof of the category of causality would be as follows. We have experience of causality. But taking any two events A and B, no *a posteriori* consideration can make A the cause and B the effect necessarily. So the element of causal necessity must be *a priori*. This argument can have cogency only so long as we admit that we do have the experience of causality. Causality can never be proved simply from the existence of two events A and B. But Hegel tries to deduce all the categories merely from the category of Being. Even accepting for the sake of argument that Being is the poorest and the lowest category, we could not have deduced the category

¹ That is, in the case of the categories of the understanding

² That is, in the case of the Ideas of Reason.

of Becoming from the fact of the opposition between Being and Nothing. We overcome this opposition by postulating Becoming only because we have had already the experience of Becoming Simply by a consideration of Being and Nothing, Becoming cannot be deduced. If Becoming is postulated-only to solve the opposition between Being and Nothing, we could as well have postulated the Absolute Idea itself as solving that opposition. And if Becoming were not already experienced, we can only think of the Absolute Idea. For the method is based on the principle that a self-contradictory category is based on a self-consistent one. But what is self-consistent is the Absolute Idea. Hence Trendelenberg's criticism that Hegel makes surreptitious references to experience is justified. His criticism is supported by the objection that we have brought forward, viz. unless we have had the experience of Becoming, we would not have postulated it as being implied by Being and Nothing. It is only in the case of the Absolute Idea that logical considerations by themselves can guide us.

Arthāpatti is nearer to Kant's transcendental method than to Hegel's dialectical method. For in the first two something is accepted in general, and as one particular case of it is false, another is postulated as true. In *Arthāpatti*, Devadatta's existence in general is accepted. His existence in a particular place is denied. Therefore his existence in another place is postulated. If *arthāpatti* is reduced to inference we shall have an argument of the form: Any living man, if he does not exist in one place, must exist in another. Devadatta is a living man who does not exist in this place. Therefore he must exist in another. Similarly, Kant's transcendental argument accepts the experience, say of causality, in general. Its experience *a posteriori* is denied. Therefore its experience *a priori* is postulated. Even this argument can be transformed into the form of inference thus: Any experience, if it is not *a posteriori*, must be *a priori*. Causality is such an experience. Therefore it is *a priori*.

But the same method when used to deduce the Ideal of Reason is slightly altered. The method of Reason by which it arrives at the Idea of the unconditioned Kant compares

to that of syllogism. He writes. "Reason, in its logical employment, seeks to discover the universal condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and the syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment made by means of the subsumption of its condition under a universal rule (the major premise). Now since this rule is itself subject to the same requirement of reason, and the condition of the condition must therefore be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) whenever practicable, obviously the principle peculiar to reason in general, in its logical employment, is to find for the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion"¹ Thus Reason in trying to unite the subject and the predicate in a judgment has to posit the unconditioned background. The same is the view of Bradley about judgment. Every judgment depends for its truth ultimately upon the whole of reality. And the ontological argument, when rightly interpreted, says nothing else. All this shows nothing more than that our finite experience is self-transcendent, and points to the unconditioned Absolute as the background.

Here the movement of thought is different from that of *arthāpatti* and the first form of Kant's transcendental argument. Here we do not start from something general, and, opposing a particular to it, postulate another particular. We rather start from a finite and limited something and proceed to something wider and general, or in Hegel's language more concrete and inclusive. This upward movement of thought is the same as in Hegel's dialectic. But the difference is that Hegel regards the higher categories as more determinate, whereas in Kant they would be less determinate, because the movement higher is towards the unconditioned. For Kant the Supreme Ideal cannot be dragged down to the conceptual level, that is, it is not conceptual. Instead of saying so, Kant asserts that it is only regulative, but not constitutive. It is constitutive, but not in the sense that it can be brought down to the logical level and made to explain everything. It does not do so, because it is not conceptual or determinate. Hence the

¹ N. K. Smith *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 306.

higher the category, we have to say, the less determinate must it be

It may be said that the method actually followed by Hegel enables us to deduce the categories. He proceeds from thesis to antithesis, and, to resolve their opposition, postulates their synthesis. Croce pointed out that in Hegel's dialectic there is confusion between distincts and contradictories. And Bradley, too, contends that thesis and the antithesis are not really contradictories. We may say that they are not even contraries, but differentials. Contraries, too, oppose each other, but differentials do not. It is therefore that the thesis and the antithesis can subsist in the synthesis. The category of Nothing is certainly not the opposite of Being, as Hegel interprets it. It is only the words understood in the non-Hegelian sense that lead us to think that they are opposites. Being for Hegel is absence of determinateness. Similarly Nothing. And this Nothing is certainly not the *Sūnya* or the Void of the Buddhist Nihilists, though Hegel maintains that it is. We may take any triad, and take into consideration Hegel's meaning of the terms, we shall always find that the thesis and the antithesis are not opposites, though one is not the other.

Besides, the antithesis seems to be an advance upon the thesis from the very beginning. Nothing is the antithesis of Being. Being is mere indeterminacy. But when do we call it Nothing? Pointing to something, we say that it is nothing, because it is not an object in which we are interested or that answers our purpose. Similarly, we call mere indeterminacy Nothing only because we are interested in determinate things. If so, is not the category of Nothing richer in content, as it is obtained after as much reflection? It is certainly not the contradictory of Being. A mere contradictory cannot have positive significance for us. But the antitheses in Hegel's dialectic are positive categories. They are deduced from a consideration of the theses. So they carry in themselves the theses as moments. Hence the movement of thought is always from the lower to the higher. And though the higher category is pointed to by the lower, what the higher is is known only empirically, not by a

mere consideration of the lower. As has been said, it is only in the deduction of the Absolute Idea that *a priori* considerations by themselves help us.

It is a mistake of Hegel to think that by means of the transcendental method we can deduce the lower categories from the higher. It is only on this assumption that he compared the Absolutes of Spinoza and Schelling to the lion's den and so forth. From the Absolute we cannot deduce the lower categories. The Absolute is the presupposition of our finite experience and transcends our logic. Therefore it cannot be made use of in our logical deductions. Deduction of the lower from the higher is possible only in cases like *arthāpatti* and Kant's first kind of transcendental argument. Devadatta is living. And we empirically know that he is not living in his house. So, we say, he must be living outside. But starting from the Absolute we can find nothing to oppose it. Or even starting from Becoming we cannot say that Being opposes it, to resolve which opposition we have to postulate Nothing, for both Being and Nothing are elements of Becoming itself.

That is why Sankara says that we cannot explain how the world comes into existence. He therefore postulates the principle of *māyā*, which means that inexplicability. We find ourselves in this world of finitude, and the experience of finitude is a fact for us. We cannot understand why and how we are here. Our chief concern is to know the higher and rise to that life. It is the aim of philosophy to act as a guide for us in our endeavours. Hence the method of philosophy must also be the method that leads us from the lower life to the higher. And this method is the transcendental method. It is not only the way of our thinking but also the process of our life. In our march from the lower to the higher, what we chance upon is only empirically discovered but not *a priori* deduced. We are certain at the beginning only of the truth of the goal, viz. the Absolute. Yet we admit that the consideration of the lower points to something higher, though what that something is cannot be determined at the lower level itself. This consideration is reasoning. And reasoning, we have said, does not 'give'

the truth or existence itself but simply guides or points to it. It is intuition that 'gives' us existence. But as we are finite our intuitions are unreliable, and so the necessity of reasoning as a check. Hence the corrective or negative function of reasoning. It can point out what is not true, but cannot 'give' the truth.

That is why coherence for us has only a negative significance. What is incoherent is false. But what is true need not be coherence. The Absolute, or even a finite individual, is not a system of content but an integrality, and therefore is not coherence. Yet it cannot be incoherent. Any experience, if it is found to be incoherent with what is accepted as fact, will be made false by it or will make it false. Yet when it is not known to be incoherent it cannot be declared to be false. Nor can it be said to be coherent with the rest. For if all are facts they simply coexist, and the relation of entailment or implication need not be found between them.

We can appreciate Bradley's view that truth as coherence is an ideal which if reached is destroyed and is changed into reality, and Kant's view that the Ideal of knowledge is only regulative. We have to organize our experience as if the whole universe is a coherent whole, each element implying the rest, yet in actuality such entailment is not found. We may modify Kant's view and say that the Ideal of Reason as a coherent whole is regulative and yet as an integrality is constitutive. It is regulative only because it is constitutive, but not constitutive in the sense in which it is regulative. Because we start from the finite standpoint, reality seems to be a coherent whole. But in fact reality is an integrality and is supra-rational.

To view the matter from a different side. Coherence is an ideal of thought. Thought is an appearance. Therefore coherence, too, is an appearance. That is why truth is turned into reality when attained.

Even here the moving principle of thought is the principle of non-contradiction. To think that the appearance is not the appearance of something real, to say that what is not self-existent does not depend upon what is self-existent, is

self-contradictory And to avoid this contradiction we postulate the Absolute. Also, when we accept coherence as a regulative idea, we are guided by the same principle For what is not coherent, and is therefore contradictory, cannot be true.

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CONCLUSION

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I

MASSON-OURSSEL says that every intellectual culture possesses its own logic¹ An intellectual culture is expressed in the philosophy of the nation to which it belongs Philosophy is the expression of systematized outlook It is connected and consistent formulation of a people's beliefs, their achievements and aspirations. It is the best clue to the mind of the nation It contains its soul, the guiding principle of the nation's reaction to the environment In it can be found the pattern of thought and behaviour of the individual belonging to the nation. The pattern is the way in which the guiding principle leads and which it is And it is the business of logic to study this pattern. In this study logic extricates the principle from the material in which it is entangled Of course, the principle owes its form to the material Yet logic studies the form and so far is admittedly an abstraction That logic which studies the principle as it is exhibited in the various forms of thought is philosophical logic And if every nation possesses its own outlook and therefore its own philosophy, then it must have its own logic, which is the study of the principle of the structure of its philosophy as a whole

Bosanquet understands logic as the morphology of knowledge This expression is used, before Bosanquet, by Wallace, who says that logic is the morphology of thought² And the conception is obviously Hegelian in origin. Hegel studies the nature of the forms of thought exhibited in the course of history and shows that the operative principle which is responsible for the progress of thought and civilization is the same. And this principle for him is the principle of the dialectical method, the spirit of the whole. The same principle has been made the foundation of his logic by Bosanquet.

So logic is the soul of philosophy, for it is its special

¹ *Comparative Philosophy*, p. 118

² *Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel*, p. 283

privilege to study the working of the operative principle of philosophy. It studies the method by which the mind of the individual works. For this reason it also represents the soul of the nation. It shows how the nation reacts to the environment, how it understands its relation to the cosmos and adjusts its behaviour accordingly. But logic must be in possession of this principle before it can understand the forms of thinking in its light. That is, this operative principle must be clearly understood before we can study how it works in the various forms of judgment and reasoning. The preceding pages attempt to make clear the nature of the guiding principle of the Indian mind. So this work is not really logic as it is usually understood, but is its metaphysical basis. It attempts only to determine the nature of the principle by comparing Advaita with Hegelianism in which the principle has been the most clearly formulated.

It is no doubt accepted that Advaita represents the Indian mind better than any other system of Indian philosophy. Speaking of Sāṅkara Vedānta, Max Muller says "And while to us such higher abstractions may seem useless for the many, it is all the more surprising that, with the Hindus, the fundamental ideas of the Vedānta have pervaded the whole of their literature and forms to the present day the common philosophy of the people at large."¹ Similarly, Dr. Barnett writes "And as a purely intellectual force it (Sankara's Vedānta) has had an incalculable influence upon the minds and character of millions of Hindus in nearly every station of civilized life."² So also Paul Deussen says: "On the tree of wisdom there is no fairer flower than the Upanishads and no finer fruit than the Vedānta philosophy. This system grew out of the teachings of the Upanishads and was brought to its consummate form by the great Sankara. . . . Even to this day, Sankara's system represents the common beliefs of nearly all thoughtful Hindus and deserves to be widely studied in the Occident"³ No one who reads Dr. Thibaut's "Introduction" to his translation

¹ *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 183

² *Brahma-knowledge*, p. 10

³ *Outline of the Vedānta*, "Prefatory Note."

of the *Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Sankarākārya* can say that he is prejudiced in favour of Sankara. Yet he writes: "It has been said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that Sankara's system is most probably the best which can be devised"¹ "It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of other Vedantic systems"² Again, "the later growth of the *Māyā* doctrine on the basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite intelligible, and I fully agree with Mr Gough when he says regarding it that there has been no addition to the system from without but only a development from within, no graft but only growth"³ Hence, if the Upanishads are representative of the Indian mind, and if Sankara's system is the best systematic exposition possible of the Upanishads, then it is also the best expression of the Indian mind.

So we may conclude that in general the pattern of thinking in the Advaita is the pattern of thinking of the Indian mind. The motive force of Advaita is the principle of non-contradiction which spurs it on to reach higher levels. The principle does not possess the same significance as that given to it by Hegel and many Hegelians. It is not coherence, yet is not incoherence. It has a negative significance for us, which means that reality is non-conceptual. Max Muller writes "It is surely astounding that such a system as the Vedānta should have been elaborated by the indefatigable and intrepid thinkers of India thousands of years ago, a system that even now makes us feel giddy, as in mounting the last steps of the swaying spire of an ancient Gothic cathedral"⁴ Advaita advocates adventure, it is a philosophy of adventure. One who is afraid of losing the ground on which he stands and yet wants to soar high, cannot appreciate it. Advaita regards the attempt of such a man as

¹ P. cxxii.² P. cxxiv.³ P. cxxv.⁴ *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 182.

absurd. It assures us of the goal, it says that the ultimate end is secure. But it asks us to leave the lower level in order to reach the higher. The lower cannot be carried up. And what we come across in the way is empirical, a discovery. This method, according to Advaita, is the method of life. Yet it is also the method of thought. Even here the Absolute is guaranteed by the transcendental method. Yet all that intervenes between the lowest and the highest cannot be 'deduced,' but is only to be discovered.

Even the dialectical method of Hegel is claimed to be the method of life. Bosanquet writes "The positive and constructive principle of non-contradiction—in other words the spirit of the whole—is the operative principle of life as well as of metaphysical thought."¹ Royce says "What in the logical philosophy appears as a conflict of categories, of points of view, of theses and antitheses, will appear in human life as a conflict of moral and social tendencies, of opinions for which men make sacrifices, upon which they still stake their fortunes. The conflict of philosophical ideas will thus appear as a kind of shadowy repetition, or representation, of the struggles of humanity for life and for light."² But Hegel's dialectic method does not adequately represent the process of life. It is true that life is full of conflicts and contradictions. Yet the process of life is not always a swing from one extreme to its opposite. A bit of thought and some experience make us realize that such a swing, in order to reach truth, is an unnecessary waste. Especially if logic begins after Absolute knowledge, i.e. Contemplative Life is reached, the mistake would never be committed. Moreover, in life we have discoveries and surprises. Dissatisfied with something we go in search of a better. But the better is not already in our possession. What it is is discovered, not deduced. Hegel's method implies that we are in possession of it. The higher category is deduced from the lower. That is why we have said that Hegel's point of view is that of the spectator. Royce says that the "*Phenomenologie* . . . appears . . . as a sort of biography

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 267.

² *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, p. 144.

of the world spirit"¹ But Hegel does not identify himself with the hero of the biography, and loses the surprise which an adventurer feels when he comes upon a discovery True, detachment helps us in giving a better account. But the account possesses an aspect of externality and misses the element of internality When the higher level is actually reached, we can say that it is there. But from a consideration of the lower itself we cannot say what the higher is For the man who proceeds from the lower in search of the higher, the higher is a discovery. If he is already in possession of it he would not have started in search of it. It is only to the observer of the toils of the adventurer and his fortunes that the higher can be a deduction So the dialectic as a process of life is defective The method which is a method both of philosophy and life is a transcendental method, which is not constructive like Hegel's method And it is based on the principle of non-contradiction. We leave the lower for the higher because of the lower's contradictions

We have thus made clear the way in which the Indian mind works and the principle that guides it The Indian mind has a theory of reality, a *Weltanschauung*, but the method by which it arrives at the theory has not so far been clearly formulated. And it is the aim of this work to make it explicit. It is not maintained that this method is peculiar to the Indian mind It might have been adumbrated or advocated with slight differences by some Western philosophers And in fact we have shown how far this method agrees with, and how far it differs from, that of Kant or Hegel It may also be the case that this method is acceptable to many As a matter of fact, it is believed in India that Vedānta is the only philosophy that can cure the ills of the present-day world. And there may be people in the West who support the belief. There have been demands for new philosophies which can guide our times. Sāṅkara Vedānta is a philosophy the full significance of which does not seem to have been understood More works have been written on him than on any other Vedantin. Yet he still seems to

¹ *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, p. 149

tantalize us. Full use has not been made of his philosophy. A logic, as usually understood, that shows the structure of Advaita thought is still a desideratum. And this work is a modest attempt to furnish not only a metaphysical basis for such logic, but also a principle which will guide new constructions of sciences incident to social life.

II

A brief explanation has to be given of my treatment of Bradley. His thought underwent different stages of development. During the period when he wrote his *Presuppositions of Critical History* and *Ethical Studies*, he was to all appearances a Hegelian. But Professor Murrhead writes "Yet for us, looking back with his later work before us, it is possible to see the beginning of a cleavage. We can see his own thought beginning to work into clearness both as to the nature and as to the implications of what he conceived as the fundamental principle of a true idealism."¹ In the period when Bradley wrote his *Principles of Logic*, his departure from the Hegelian position is clear. As before he was guided by the principle of a perfected wholeness. But he did not accept the concrete nature of thought which supplements what is given in perception until the whole which is the ideal and the moving principle is reached. On the contrary, we find him maintaining that concrete reality falls on the side of immediate perception, and thought turns this concrete reality into abstractions and artificial constructions. There also seems to be an element of dualism between mind and its objects, and an acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth. Bradley himself was aware of this.² In his *Appearance and Reality* this dualism and correspondence theory of truth are given up for the coherence theory, which is a theory of both truth and reality. But Bradley maintains as before that reality is given in feeling or sensibility, or rather that it is materially feeling or sensibility, though it is not feeling or sensibility which is below relations. He

¹ *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, p. 244.

² *The Principles of Logic*, p. 591, "Additional Notes."

instances Religion, Beauty, and Goodness, as clues to the understanding of the nature of reality.¹ He still holds that thought cannot be concrete, though it tries to be concrete. It is inherently defective and cannot help making divisions within an undifferentiated reality. In his *Terminal Essays* he seems to make a further approach to orthodox Hegelianism. In his *Appearance and Reality* he allows only distinctions, but not differences in the Absolute.² But here he allows differences also.³ But by the way in which he refers in his "Additional Notes" to *Appearance and Reality*, *Terminal Essays*, and *Essays on Truth and Reality*, it seems that he is not fully conscious of this change in his thought. He accepts most of Bosanquet's views and thus adheres more to the Hegelian position. But still he appears to feel that he is in his *Terminal Essays* what he was in his *Appearance and Reality*. In spite of these changes, he remains, as Professor Muirhead says, critical and sceptical, unlike Bosanquet, as regards the relation of thought to reality.⁴

If it is asked at what stage of development of his thought I have taken Bradley into consideration, the answer is at the stage of *Appearance and Reality*, and also at the stage of the *Terminal Essays*. If it is asked, What is the truth of Bradley's philosophy, there can be no one answer. A convinced Hegelian may say that the truth of Bradley's teaching is the rationality of the universe, and that whatever else there is in him is an aberration due to his dialectic over-reaching itself. Another may say that the special contribution of Bradley lies in his *Principles of Logic*, whereas all the rest is the old Hegelian prejudice.⁵ But we, especially in India, feel that the real Bradley is found in *Appearance and Reality*. As I have said, Bradley is not fully conscious, or at least not always conscious, that his views have undergone change in his *Terminal Essays*. This unconsciousness may be due to the fact that there was no fundamental

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 159-60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 146.

³ *The Principles of Logic*, p. 664.

⁴ *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, p. 297.

⁵ According to Dr. Rudolph Kaegy, the real trend of Bradley's thought does not seem to be towards absolutism.

change in his views of the Absolute. This statement may be supported by the fact that in his "Additional Notes" he refers to *Appearance and Reality* and *Terminal Essays* together, and that many of these notes are about change or modification of expression—which means that Bradley is feeling that, from the *Principles of Logic* to the *Terminal Essays*, there is some continuity in his thought. In the *Terminal Essays* he still thinks that thought is unable to grasp reality and that reality is supra-rational. This point is quite evident in the essays on "Inference" and "Judgment." Now, Bradley has to be taken either as a forthright supra-rationalist or as a thoroughgoing Hegelian rationalist, between which positions he seems to waver. If he allows differences in the Absolute,¹ there is no reason why he should not treat it as rational and relational, and therefore conceptual. He will have to admit that thought is concrete and can 'give' us reality. If, on the other hand, he wants to be a consistent supra-rationalist, and if, as he says and as we have shown,² distinctions cannot exist without differences, he must banish even distinctions from the Absolute and say that it is completely above thought. If the two alternatives are offered us to choose between, we choose the latter, as we have already shown why a rational and relational view of the Absolute cannot be accepted.

If the truth of Bradley's position is supra-rationalism, some of his views have to be interpreted in a slightly different way from that in which he himself expressed them. For example, feeling, he says, is at the basis of thought. But if this is taken as the feeling of an epistemological subject, which is prior to that feeling, then the objection³ which Professor Cunningham brings forward against this view cannot be met. Hence, in the manner of Professor Whitehead, this feeling has to be treated as impersonal, as the material of the universe. I have so treated it in Chapter II, Part v. But we have to add that this feeling is the Absolute for it is an integral experience, not a mere plurality. It is the basis of thought as well as its ideal. We may notice a

¹ *The Principles of Logic*, p. 664.

² See p. 40 of this work.

³ See p. 231 of this work.

stage of personal feeling in which the epistemological subject is said to feel its opposition to the object. But this is an elusive stage, for the moment we try to fix it we transcend it. Besides, this feeling is not pure feeling, but mixed with thought. But the feeling which is the Absolute must be the basis of the distinction between the subject and the predicate as well as between the subject and the object. If the distinction between the subject and the predicate is vague, the distinction between the subject and the object also is vague, if the former is definite the latter also is definite. Hence, if Bradley is taken to be a consistent supra-rationalist, the present view of feeling must be a necessary implication of his theory.

Another word about my use of Bradley's terminology. His expressions, "divorce of the predicate from the subject," the logical idea as "cut loose" from mental existence, are as misleading as his definition of judgment as the reference of an ideal content to reality. This definition we find in Bosanquet also. Bradley, at least in the last stages of his thought, did not believe in floating ideas, or in externally attaching the predicate to the subject. Yet I have used these expressions in discussing Bradley's views. For, if I am to avoid them, and choose expressions which would be consistent with the true teaching of Bradley, I feel that Bradley's theory of judgment has to be re-written—which means undertaking to write on a very controversial topic. But with the aim before me of bringing Sankara's philosophy into a line with Western idealism, I could not have avoided a criticism of Bradley's view of judgment and a development of the Advaitin view of it. But this in its turn would lead me to a presentation of logic from the side of Sankara's supra-rational Absolutism. Thereby matters would have been complicated, whereas my aim in writing this book is more limited. It is the clarification of Sankara's philosophy in the light of Western systems, so that it may be made the basis of a system of logic. Moreover, I have considered different alternatives which may be taken as different interpretations of Bradley's views, or as representing different stages of his thought. Therefore, my use of Bradley's expressions—

sions as they are does not affect my criticisms. Bradley's fundamental view that thought is inadequate to reality stands, and I have made full use of it. I have therefore adopted much even from his *Principles of Logic*, which goes to support it.

III

Of all the great Hegelians or Neo-Kantians Bradley comes nearest to Sankara. Between Green, Bradley, and Sankara, the common point is that thought is not identical with reality. But neither Bradley nor Sankara accepts with Green that reality is a network of relations. At this point interpreters of Green may differ¹. But the general tendency of Green is to view the Absolute as relational and not as transcending relations. Caird is a more thoroughgoing Hegelian than Green, and consequently is more distantly removed from Sankara than Green and Bradley. Of Caird Professor Muirhead writes: "Equally little did he mean by the unity of subject and object in self-consciousness an absolute experience in which the duality has disappeared. It was here that he found himself, with all his great admiration for Mr F. H. Bradley's metaphysical genius, at issue with his central contention. Starting from the conception of complete harmony of content as the ideal of knowledge and the test of truth and reality, Bradley finds in the antithesis of a subject or self that seeks to be one with its object and an object which maintains itself in independence of it, a fatal bar to any such harmony on the plane of self-conscious intelligence. It is only at a higher level at which the antithesis has disappeared by some unknown and to us unintelligible process of transformation that the final or absolute unity is attained"². At another place he writes: "The ideal of judgment is never the abstract identity of subject and predicate, thought with thing. Its ideal is to hold reality in the form of the unity of thought and thing

¹ H. Halder *Neo-Hegelianism*, pp. 247-8

² Sir Henry Jones and J. H. Muirhead *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, p. 285.

The idea moves forward *with* reality into distinction and difference *within a whole and a unity* of which it never loses hold."¹ The Advaitin would certainly concede that if the above were the ideal of thought, thought, without transcending itself, realizes it. But he would add that thought cannot rest satisfied with merely remaining with the thing. For what we actually know about the subject is the predicate. We are more at home with the predicate than with the subject. Apart from the predicate the whole of the subject remains inscrutable to thought, a sort of a thing in itself. So long as this inscrutable element remains, so long as this 'Other' to thought is not overcome, thought cannot cease to be curious. Thought now tries to idealize the subject completely. Then only can it grasp the full nature of the subject. This attempt of thought is not an attempt to petrify itself and become one with the unconscious object. It rather tries to idealize the subject fully without losing anything in the process. In order to succeed in the attempt it must exhaust the subject's infinite detail, and infuse into the detail the original integrality or immediacy. But it fails to do either. One may say that thought does not hold this ideal before itself. But Sankara would say with Bradley that this is the ideal of thought. Otherwise, thought has to be satisfied with simply standing by the side of reality. It will not be much of an objection to say that reality includes the actual and the ideal. For then the same difficulty appears in a different form. Thought here has to be content with staying by the side of the actual, which remains an inscrutable thing in itself or a mere point of reference, which is an admission that thought cannot grasp reality. It certainly does tell us *something* about reality. But what it tells us is vitiated by its innate defects. Reality is presented not in its purity, but as coloured by the shortcomings of thought.

The orthodox Hegelians hold that in the ideal of thought the subject and object are transparent to each other. Bradley's ideal, too is the same. But the ideal is attained by thought, not as thought but by transcending itself, or, as Bradley puts it, by 'committing suicide.' Bradley's criti-

¹ *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, p. 300.

cisms are useful, therefore, in understanding that this ideal cannot be conceptual. He can admit that thought represents reality partially. But the word 'partial' is here misleading. For the statement appears to mean that reality consists of a number of such partial representations grouped together. But reality is not a group, it possesses an immediacy in which the partial representations are transcended. If they are not transcended the immediacy characteristic of self-consciousness cannot be attained, but if transcended the parts cannot remain as such. So if we are to avoid understanding the expression, 'partial representation,' in the quantitative sense we must accept that thought gives us only a distorted view of reality. The only alternative to this conclusion is the view that there is no reality beyond thought, that reality consists of the actual and the ideal, and is of the form of judgment. But the difficulty then would be to check the curiosity of thought to peep into and try to idealize the actual which challenges it. Thought cannot but accept the challenge. Thereby it destroys itself, but it destroys the 'Other' also. And in destroying itself it becomes a new form of experience which we have called by the name 'intuition.'

IV

It may perhaps be objected that because the Absolute of Sankara is beyond identity in difference it can have no room for the dynamic aspect of things. Now, if we are to regard the Absolute as identity in difference, what can this difference mean? If this difference means continual change, and if this change is said to happen in the Absolute, then Sankara can have no objection to accept this view. For, if the Absolute is the all-comprehensive and the only reality, whatever happens must somehow be in its bosom. But to view the Absolute as a whole within which change happens can be justified, and is possible only from a spectator point of view, that is, we have to regard ourselves as watching the Absolute from outside. But to understand it from within is not possible unless we become one with it. But if we

become one with it the finite appearance disappears. Besides, in order to preserve change in the Absolute we have to regard it as an identity in difference only if change is the same as difference. But pure change or pure process need not be difference. Bergson claims that his Change is indivisible and therefore cannot be difference. Apart from this consideration, even if change means difference we should accept that not only individuals, but also types of individuals or universals appear and disappear in the Absolute. Hence the theory of ideas as forming the eternal system of the Absolute cannot be accepted. For where can the universal of the extinct species exist now? And without the particulars to exist in where can the universals exist? In spite of the change of the ideas the Absolute must remain the ideal of thought, the same as ever. The 'friends of ideas' have to face here an insurmountable difficulty. But Sankara's is not an idealism of the ideas.¹ It is an idealism of the ideal. Sankara is an idealist, because he says that the Ideal is the Real, it is Existence, it is Actuality. Yet he does not say that the temporal existence is non-existence. He is quite explicit on the point. The existence of the temporal is the existence of the ideal. The former is existence borrowed from the latter. This borrowing we should not understand in terms of quantity. The ideal does not lend out some of its existence and retain the rest. The phenomenal is rooted in the existence of the ideal. It is ephemeral, yet when it disappears its existence is not lost, because its existence is the same as the existence of the ideal. That is why Sankara says that the finite is a name and a form, and all forms and names are bound to disappear. That is, there are no eternal universals or ideas.² Dean Inge writes: "The riddle

¹ Cp. Masson-Oursel *Comparative Philosophy*, p. 147. We can understand Hegel's assertion that philosophy cannot begin unless the idea is free from existence only in the sense that thinking cannot begin unless we are able to hold ideas apart from reality. We cannot accept that ideas by themselves can constitute reality.

² *Asi bhāti priyam rūpam nāmachetyamśaṅkṣaṇakam*
Ādyam trayam brahmarūpam jagadrūpam tatodvayam.

There are five factors—existence, consciousness, bliss, name, and form. The first three belong to the *Brahman*, the other two belong to the world.

of the Sphinx for the twentieth century is how to preserve what is true and noble in the idea of evolutionary progress without secularizing our religion and losing our hold on the unchanging perfection of God. Plotinus will teach us that there can be no evolution except in relation to a timeless background which does not itself evolve.¹ Sankara would fully agree with Plotinus. He would say that only by treating the Absolute as supra-rational can we give a true place to change even in the phenomenal world. That is, the ideas or forms appear and disappear. And unless the Absolute is treated as unaffected by the appearance and disappearance of these ideas, it cannot remain the eternal ideal of thought. The ideas should not be organic to the Absolute. But identity in difference is the logical aspect of organism. Hence the Absolute must transcend identity in difference. If, on the other hand, the ideas are organic to the Absolute, and the Absolute is to remain the eternal ideal of thought, the objection that the idealist presents a block universe cannot be met.

The word 'change' for the ordinary man means change of form, because change is perceived as change of form. But we find a different meaning also of the term. It has come to mean pure process.² From this process is differentiated form as an eternal idea.³ If we accept the ordinary man's meaning of the word, change must be change of form. The Absolute, as shown above, cannot comprise a system of these ideas, and the ideas should not be treated as eternal, but as the ways of the behaviour of things. If, on the other hand, the universals form an eternal system, then pure process must be detached from them, and it must flow through them like water flowing through a system of pipes.⁴

¹ *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, vol i, p xi. But unlike Plotinus, Sankara asserts that the Absolute is existence.

² Cp. Whitehead.

³ Whitehead calls it an eternal object.

⁴ We find both these lines of thought mixed up in Whitehead's philosophy. I have not discussed his views explicitly in the text, because it is very doubtful whether he can be a Hegelian, though we may call him an idealist, and this thesis is confined to Hegelianism. Moreover, if Whitehead's theory is not discussed separately, it is difficult to do justice to the remarkable way in which vari-

But then we cannot avoid a block universe. The universe in which we are interested is the universe of forms, and this remains eternally fixed and unchanging. The process that flows through this system in order to give it existence becomes negligible.

V

Empirical methods can find a true place only in an idealistic system like the Advaita. By them we discover things. The Advaitin would add that we discover forms also. The Recollection of Plato is interpreted as implying the eternity of universals. Here Sankara differs from Plato. The form of a thing is transient like the thing itself. Pure non-sensuous forms like Nothing, Something, Judgment, and Inference, may be said to be just as eternal as thought. But in the experience in which thought transcends itself these forms also are transcended. Yet we may call them eternal when compared to the sensuous forms. But Plato regards even sensuous forms like Man, Horse, and Chair, as eternal and as forming a system. Josiah Royce writes "Definitions get at the essence, at the 'Idea,' at the type which special instances exemplify, and depend upon taking the universal as such, upon bringing it to our knowledge with clearness. But a definition once thus formulated upon the basis of the instances first chosen needs to be further tested. One tests it, according to the methodical doctrine, by applying it to new instances and by a deliberate search for possible inconsistencies. For a truly universal account of a concept must provide for all the cases that rightfully fall under the concept which is to be defined, and must exclude all instances which do not belong to the type in question. In case incon-

ous trends of thought met in his system, and to determine how far the significance of each is preserved in it. For example, what Whitehead calls the Primordial Nature of God is the eternal system of ideas borrowed from Plato through Hegel and Hegelians. This conception conflicts with Whitehead's Ontological Principle, according to which the form or eternal object is more or less an abstraction from an actual fact, and so must perish with it. Whitehead does not seem to have reconciled these two conceptions.

sistencies are discovered by finding that the definition includes too much or too little, the definition first attempted must be amended. But in such consideration of right definitions, one is greatly aided by remembering that no universal types exist in isolation. And here a very important feature of Plato's methodology appears. *The universals; the 'Ideas' form a system*"¹ We have shown already that neither the sensuous nor the non-sensuous forms constitute a system. Both are forms of phenomenal existence, and as such are phenomenal. Now, in the above passage, there is another point which requires consideration. It is that definition can get at the essence of things. This view has its origin in mathematics. Perfect as a science, as an interconnected system of definitions and deductions, mathematics has often been the ideal of philosophers who want to rescue philosophy from prejudice and superstition and turn it into a science. Locke, for instance, wanted to turn even ethics into as rigorous a system as mathematics. But philosophy can be turned into such a system only if definition can always get at the essence of things. In mathematics definition gets at the essence of things because the thing is what it is through the definition, that is, the thing is constituted by the definition. But in dealing with concrete things like life and mind the definition cannot get at the essence. The thing here is unique and its nature is not exhausted by the definition. Definition can give at the most a kind of 'sufficient description,' which is a sufficient description *for us*. But sufficient description does not enable us to deduce one thing from another as we do in mathematics.

The same idea that definition expresses the essence of things obsessed the mind of Spinoza, who was one of the master minds of Europe. He developed his system from that of Descartes. He overcame the dualism of mind and matter as found in Descartes by postulating his Substance or God, and treating mind and matter as its or his attributes. But he seems to have overlooked the fact that this Substance is not first given to us, but is only presupposed by our finite

¹ Arnold Ruge *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, vol. 1, "Logic," p. 70

experience Descartes did not deduce the finite things from the existence of God, but deduces the existence of God as a presupposition of the existence of the finite things. Here he uses the same argument as that we find in Coleridge's philosophy, namely, "whatever is necessary for the possibility of a given reality must itself be real."¹ The same idea is expressed by Bradley when he says, "what is *possible*, and what a general principle compels us to say *must be*, that certainly *is*."² This argument is the same as the argument *a contingentia mundi*, which is based on the principle that every significant negative implies a positive.³

Coupled with this oversight, the idea that the definition of a thing is its essence has made Spinoza think that he can deduce from the definition of Substance everything else in the universe. But if the Substance is the all-comprehensive being, as it is in Spinoza, it does not require much argument to show that his definition of Substance cannot give its essence. To have knowledge of this essence, as John Veitch says, we must grasp through definition the totality of being, as we grasp the figure in mathematics.⁴ But it is beyond the power of thought to frame such a definition as would comprehend the totality of being, for, as Spinoza himself says, the Substance possesses an infinite number of attributes all of which our thought cannot know. And if it is not possible for us to know the totality of being, we are not justified in deducing the world of finite things from the Substance.

Fichte is in a similar position when he tries to deduce the world from the Ego. In the deduction he makes use of the principle of contradiction, but it is introduced from without, and the world therefore appears to be externally attached to the Ego. Hegel is not slow in perceiving this difficulty,⁵ and instead of beginning with the highest cate-

¹ J. H. Muirhead. *Coleridge as a Philosopher*, p. 106.

² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 196.

³ See p. 234 of this work. Professor Collingwood also makes use of the same method in the transition from one form of experience to another in his *Speculum Mentis*.

⁴ *Discourse on Method*, p. xci.

⁵ J. H. Bailie. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, pp. 273-7; also Haldane and Simson: *Hegel's History of Philosophy*, vol. III, p. 483.

gory he begins with the lowest and advances to higher and higher categories until the highest is reached. By negating each lower he reaches the higher, and he says that thereby negation as well as the categories negated are carried into the highest. Because negation also is carried into the highest, he claims that it is possible to descend down from the highest to the lowest, that is, perform more satisfactorily the deduction which Spinoza and Fichte tried to do in their own ways. But the Advaitin, as we have already said, cannot agree with this view of Hegel. We proceed from the lower to the higher by applying the principle that every significant negative implies a positive, that imperfection implies perfection. But in this application, negation itself is not carried to the higher. For, as we have shown, though every significant negative implies a positive, the positive does not imply a significant negative. Hegel may say that he proceeds from a category to its contradictory and then to the higher, and that this contradiction is somehow preserved in the higher. But about this point we have shown that if the contradictory is not a bare contradictory but something positive—and in Hegel's dialectic the so-called antitheses have a positive meaning—then the antithesis cannot be a mere opposite of the thesis, but an advance upon it. If negation, therefore, cannot be carried into the highest category, it is not possible to descend from it to the lowest. And any attempt at such a descent, any attempt to deduce the world of finite things from the Absolute would result in externally attaching the former to the latter.

The so-called representative English philosophers like Locke and Hume have this merit, that they always begin from the finite point of view, and are conscious of the limits of our powers of understanding the universe. Their defect is that they generally ignore the fact that our cognition has certain presuppositions, which must be true if the object given in our cognition is true. This defect is made good in the speculative systems of the continent. But most of these systems treat the presuppositions in the same way as they treat the objects which make those presuppositions, that is, they treat their presuppositions as the starting-points

In Kant we find a proper blending of these two attitudes. He also starts, like Descartes and many English philosophers of the time, with the dualism of subject and object. His problem was, How can the subject which is different from the object perceive it, how can ideas which are different from things correspond to them? The same problem took different forms throughout the *Critique*. For example, one form of it is, How can causality, which Hume reduces into subjective expectation, be objective? Kant solves this problem by pointing out that every bit of finite experience like the perception of an object before me has a number of presuppositions, the ultimate presupposition being the Intuitive Understanding or the Ideal of Reason. The method which Kant adopts here is in principle the same as the method by which Descartes proves the existence of God. Kant starts with finite experience and brings out its presuppositions. And we have to recognize the reasonableness of this method, whether we accept all of Kant's solutions or not. The mistake of Kant lies in holding that this Ideal of Reason cannot be experienced. Hegel corrected the mistake. But that we can experience the Ideal cannot justify our making a rational deduction of the categories, as Hegel thinks we can do, from it. We have given reasons why we cannot do so.

It is right that the categories should be referred to Self-consciousness, when Self-consciousness is treated as the intuitive understanding. But this reference is not the same as the deduction of categories from Self-consciousness. For Self-consciousness as intuitive understanding is beyond thought, and it is not possible to deduce anything from what lies beyond thought. All that we can do is to trace, as Kant does, the presuppositions of our finite experience. It may be said that Self-consciousness is a presupposition of these presuppositions, and by bringing together these presuppositions we can arrange them in systematic connection. This arrangement, it may be said, is the philosophical criticism of the categories. This we may do. But to do this is one thing and to deduce the categories from Self-consciousness is another. Besides its being impossible to regard

this concatenation of categories as a deduction from Self-consciousness, it is in principle impossible to complete their number. For the more the intellect works, the more it splits up integral experience and the greater will be the number of categories. All that the intellect can do is to analyse a given concept, and show, by pointing out its shortcomings, how a whole or integrality that passes beyond the category in question is involved in it.

The Sankarite cannot but notice some ambiguity in Hegel's use of the term Self-consciousness or Absolute Consciousness. In one sense it means that ultimate reality or Ideal of Reason which, according to Kant, is beyond experience, and which we take to be beyond conceptual thought, though not beyond every form of experience. If philosophy is to view all experience from its standpoint, the only statement that the philosopher can make is that reality is indescribable. But Hegel uses the word in a second sense. After criticizing Kant's view that the Ideal of Reason is beyond experience, he identifies it with contemplative life, or the thinking of thought. In this thinking of thought, thought thinks of the categories or the universals. Because the substance of these universals is thought itself, Hegel says that in this thinking of thought the 'Other' is overcome. For the same reason he holds that Philosophy is the highest category, higher than even Religion.

Sankara accepts the first interpretation of Self-consciousness. As regards the second, he would say that it is not the true meaning of Self-consciousness. Whether the Absolute has a contemplative life or not is beyond our powers to ascertain. But the contemplative life which we have is not the truth of Self-consciousness. In our contemplative life the 'Other' is not overcome. Our very existence as finite beings disproves any assertion to the contrary. The categories we think of in our contemplative life have been obtained sporadically and by chance in the course of history. We have shown that even the Hegelian dialectic is faulty in its attempt to deduce everything without depending on empirical methods. Now, as the categories are obtained at random, and not deduced from Self-consciousness or the

category of contemplative life, they do remain an 'Other' to thought. For the sake of argument even if we accept that Self-consciousness is a system of these categories, we should admit that before they are systematized they must form an 'Other' to thought. And as thought in principle can never complete this systematization, they must always remain an 'Other' to it. So in our contemplative life the 'Other' is never overcome. But it should be overcome in the ideal form of experience. Hence, it is never possible for us to deduce the world of finite experience from the Ideal of Reason and the Ideal of Reason cannot be our contemplative life. Similar considerations have led some critics of Hegel to place Religion above Philosophy.¹

When Lord Buddha was questioned as to how the finite self came into existence, he is reported to have said that it should be our duty to attain the ideal life, but not to worry about the problem of the creation of the finite self. Sankara agrees with the spirit of Lord Buddha's answer. He would say that the problem of creation is insoluble; we cannot deduce the finite from the infinite, yet we can attain that ideal life, for it is the very presupposition of our imperfection.

¹ Cp. J. S. Moore "A Reconsideration of Hegelian Forms" *The Monist*, January 1934.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, which depicts various forms of experience, must remain a phenomenology, because thought as a phenomenon cannot get at the noumenon, which is a different form of experience. On the other hand the Sankarite does not accept Professor Loewenberg's view that the *Phenomenology* is a "comedy of errors" culminating in the conviction that the absolute consciousness is a "sublimation of human madness" (See his review of Bailie's *Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind in Mind*, April 1932, and Bailie's "Note" on it in *Mind*, July 1932. See also Loewenberg's article, "The Exoteric Approach to Hegel's *Phenomenology*," *Mind*, October 1934 and January 1935.) For the finite forms of experience are not due to human madness, nor is the absolute knowledge sublimated madness or human sanity. Human beings cannot help being finite, and their experience is certainly sane so far as it goes. Also, the absolute knowledge is not finite, and as such it transcends finite experience. The *Phenomenology* can depict only forms of finite experience.

VI

It is a common criticism brought against Advaita that it ends in a metaphysical blank, that its Absolute is bare lifeless existence. This criticism is due to the Western modes of understanding Eastern thought. Existence for the Western philosophers in general is the phenomenal existence. If the Existence of the Absolute is the phenomenal existence without its forms it would be certainly as lifeless as death, because it is bare objectivity without subjective intensity. For Kant also existence is due to time, that is, it is temporal existence¹. Hence, some philosophers want to distinguish between existence and reality. But pure Existence for the Advaitin is not this lifeless temporal existence without its forms. On the contrary, what some of the Western philosophers call the ultimately Real is Existence for him. The temporal existence is the same existence viewed through the world of forms or the phenomenal world. So the existence of the phenomenal world as such is not the true existence. Again, there is also a tendency in European philosophy to regard existence as a quality of things, as a predicate of the subject. They treat the 'is' in the judgment, "The tree is," the existence in the judgment, "The tree exists," as a predicate of the tree. But to the Advaitin existence is identical with the subject. If the subject is admitted to be non-existent, the Advaitin would say that any proposition made about it can have no interest for logic. It is not necessary that the subject should be existent in order to be logically significant, but *it should be taken to be existent at least when the judgment is made*. Later it may be proved to be non-existent. Thus existence is identical with the subject. Therefore it includes all the infinite detail of the subject, but in an intensity in which distinctions cannot be drawn. Further, the Absolute as Existence is not the most common feature of things. That is, the Absolute is not obtained by abstraction from the things of the phenomenal world. Just as it is to many Western idealists, to Sankara also the finite thing is a selected abstraction from

¹ Cp his "Schematism of the Categories,"

the Absolute The determinateness which the things possess is due to this abstraction Concreteness is integrality; it has, as Whitehead would say, a subjective intensity or immediacy, as such it is not determinacy.

I have not referred so far to the view that the Absolute is *satchidānanda*, or Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss, all three in one, only because the thesis is a discussion from the side of logic It is shown that the ideal of thought is an experience in which subject and object, and subject and predicate, are completely transparent and equal to one another We have therefore called it Self-consciousness and its form intuition As regards its being Bliss, we have to say that it is Bliss because it is positive and beyond discord and pain It is not mere absence of discord, because, according to the Advaitin, the negative implies the positive, and the absence of discord must therefore imply something positive and is not discord and is therefore Bliss Disharmony, as Professor Campbell says, is quite positive at the level of finite experience Disharmony has an immediacy and an intensity for us. Evil therefore is not a negative entity for Sankara, as it is for some Western philosophers We have objected to calling the Absolute a harmonious whole because harmony is usually understood as holding between plurality, but this view conflicts with Sankara's view that the Absolute is non-difference The word 'Bliss' can be accepted by the Advaitin, because the experience of bliss has an intensity and is therefore beyond relations.¹

VII

It may be next asked whether Advaita has any theoretical value It does not give a definite description of its conception of the Absolute, but examines other conceptions. Because its Absolute is indescribable and beyond thought, it is not of theoretical importance Now, if by theoretical value is meant the value of the theory for the natural sciences,

¹ A solution of the problem of the Good and the Evil from the side of Advaita requires an elaborate discussion, which is beyond the scope of the present work.

the objection holds quite as much against other systems of philosophy as against Advaita. If the objection means simply that the Absolute should be capable of being thought out, described, and defined, then it can be no objection to Advaita. For the Absolute, according to Advaita, is beyond thought, though experienceable. It is no use to define what is not determinate. Holding that the Absolute is beyond determinations, the Advaitin examines all those views according to which the real is determinate, and exhibits the difficulties and contradictions in them.

It is because the Absolute of the Advaitin is indescribable that he adopts the method of *vitandā*¹ in his discussions. All the determinate conceptions which he uses are those of other schools. He examines each and shows that it is not ultimately real. *Vitandā* is that kind of discussion in which the party concerned has no definite position of his own to establish. And certainly the Advaitin, his Absolute being indeterminate, has no definite position to establish. And he successfully establishes what he has to establish, namely, that the Absolute is beyond determinations and thought is not adequate to it. If, for this reason, he is not to be called a *vitandika* or one who adopts *vitandā* as

¹ *Vitandā* is defined by Gautama as that kind of *jalpa* in which there is no attempt by the rival to establish his own theory (*Nyāyadarśana*, I ii 3). *Jalpa* is defined by him as a debate which possesses the five parts of inference, namely, *pratīyā* or proposition, *hetu* or reason, *udāharana* or explanatory example, *parāmarśa* or application, and *nyamana* or the statement of the conclusion (for an explanation of these terms see Radhakrishnan *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 75), and which uses *chchala*, *jāh*, *nigrahasthāna* as the means of attack (*Nyāyadarśana*, I ii 2). *Chchala* is attack by equivocation (*ibid*, I ii 10). *Jāh* is attack with superficial similarity and dissimilarity (*ibid*, I ii 18). *Nigrahasthāna* is also fallacious reasoning in which the proposition is not proved or its contradictory is proved (*ibid*, I ii 19). There are many kinds of *nigrahasthāna*, for which see *Nyāyadarśana*, v ii. Though the *vitandika* is regarded by Gautama as one who uses fallacious arguments, the Advaitin hardly uses them. The only reason for calling him a *vitandika* is that he has no determinate conception of his own to defend and makes use of the concepts of other systems in discussions. In this work he is taken to be a *vitandika* only for this reason.

his method, he may not be called by that name. But that he has no determinate idea to establish he does not conceal.

It cannot be said that *vitandā* has no theoretical value. One cannot refuse to consider the arguments even of a philosopher who does not profess to have a position of his own, but examines the theories of others to find out whether they are consistent and acceptable. On the contrary, his arguments may be the more valuable than those of many others in that he is not prejudiced in favour of any theory, and consequently his arguments are not advanced in its interest and so do not beg the question. Similar objection is anticipated by Śrīharsha and answered in his own way.¹ One who is not a superficial critic cannot but notice much that is valuable in the answer. When the objector asks Śrīharsha whether the latter accepts the truth of the method² which the disputants follow he is answered in the negative. For to accept the method is tantamount to accepting the theory, and hence there would be no need of discussion. The method of discussion depends on the position discussed. Do we not here find anticipated what Whitehead says, namely, "so far as concerns methodology, the general issue of the discussion will be that theory dictates method, and that any particular method is only applicable to theories of one correlate species."³ In the course of the development of thought we find method dictated by theory. It is, of course, to be admitted that when one theory and method find themselves confronted by a different theory and its method, the first theory and its method become modified. But it is not always the case that the first theory and its method confront another definite theory and its method. The first theory and method may modify themselves through self-criticism, by trying to become more consistent, or by the appearance of a new fact that does not fit into them. The method of this self-

¹ *Khandanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, pp. 129-37.

² *Ibid*, p. 135. The word here used is *vichāra*, which, literally translated, means discussion.

³ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 283.

criticism is in essence the method of *vitandā*, which cannot therefore be said to possess no theoretical value.

Again, the Socratic method of argument is truly a form of *vitandā*. In discussion, Socrates does not give his own opinions, but elicits the truth by continuous questioning until a consistent and satisfactory answer is obtained. For example, he does not give his own definition of justice as against that of his opponents, but continues objecting to their definition and its reformulation until he is satisfied.

It is of course true that a bad use can be made of this method. It can be used simply to destroy the opponent's theory, because the opponent is not liked for other reasons. But an abuse can be made of every method. It is therefore laid down that the truth-seeker should be unbiased. Varadarāja is in the right spirit when he defines *vāda* as *vītarāgakathā*, and says that its result is *tatvanirnaya*. *Vāda* is the discussion of those who are devoid of passions and its result is the discovery of truth. We are here reminded of Descartes who advises us to weed away all passions from our mind before we begin to think. So long as we are in the right spirit it is not necessary to start discussion with some traditionally accepted theory of our own.

On the contrary, the search for truth is hampered by preconceived notions. Bradley defines metaphysics as the "finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct," and adds that "to find these reasons is no less an instinct." The traditional view may be a superstition that is no longer worth holding. If the discussion is started in order to support it, unless it were in the debating society of schoolboys, no useful purpose can be served. Even if the disputants are guided by the spirit of truth-seeking, it would require on their part additional effort to abandon their own wrong views after criticizing the wrong views of their opponents. The true scientific spirit requires that one should not start upon an enquiry with preconceptions, but with an open mind.

Vitandā, when rightly used, is the criticism of a theory from within. This is what Hegel claims to do when he examines other theories. The method is particularly useful

in examining philosophical systems. Therefore the Advaitin adopts this method. For the sake of argument he accepts both the method and the theory of the opponent and enquires whether they are not self-contradictory. Finally, he shows that truth can only be directly experienced and that it cannot be determinate. He does not end in nihilism like the Mādhyamika, because, unlike the latter, he accepts the principle that the negative presupposes the positive, the false the true, and the self-contradictory that which is not self-contradictory.

Not only is *vitandā* not inconsistent with the spirit of truth-seeking, but also it is the only method to defend oneself when some direct experiences like those of the mystic, perceptions like those of colours, pains, and emotions, are questioned. For example, I see a blotting-paper before me. It is easy to question the fact that it is red. When thus questioned, it is of no avail for me to attempt to prove that it is red by measuring the wave-length of the light rays that proceed from the paper. For before we correlated red colour with that wave-length, we must have started from the concrete sensuous fact red and then measured the wave-length. So to prove that it is red by pointing to the wave-length is to move in a circle. So if it is denied that a particular fact before me is red, the only reply possible for me is to disprove that it cannot be red. This disproof has to be carried out by attacking the opponents' arguments¹ on their own ground. The Advaitin is quite in a similar position. For him truth cannot be defined because it is self-revealing, though the falsity of a cognition is revealed by another cognition. We are here reminded of the criterion of truth given by Descartes, which is intuition regulated by non-contradiction.² The existence of a thing is known only by immediate experience. Every philosophy that stresses upon this point and accepts this criterion of truth cannot avoid the use of the method of *vitandā*. The insistence on the importance of *śruti*pramāṇā, on *śruti* or *veda* as the

¹ Cp. H. H. Price *Perception*, pp. 7 sqq. Price makes a good use of the method to prove the existence of the sense datum.

² John Veitch *Discourse on Method*, p. cxv.

source of valid knowledge, is necessitated for the Advaitin by their view of the indescribability of reality. In this century the emphasis on *śruti* has to be interpreted as the emphasis on the intuition of people who are *vītarāgas*, not affected by passions. Reference has already been made to the opinion of Descartes that before we begin to think our minds should be freed from all preconceptions and passions. If purity of mind is required in order even to reason, much more is the need of this purity in case of intuition. It is a matter of common experience that one who is violently disturbed by some emotion does not perceive some things which are perceived ordinarily and perceives certain things which are not perceived ordinarily. And imperfect beings that we are, there is much chance of our taking hallucinations and fancies to be objects of right intuition. But the seers of the *śruti* are men who long disciplined their minds and removed all passions from them. Therefore they are the least liable to be misled. *Śrutipramāṇā*, therefore, can have this significance for us, namely, that truth is always intuited. As already said, the Advaitin accepts that thought or reasoning acts as a check to false intuition, and says that the falsity of a cognition is revealed by another cognition.

VIII

It may be next asked. What is the place of logic in Sankara's system? The supra-rationalists both in the East and the West have finally come to the conclusion that logic cannot carry us to the end in our quest for reality. Then, how far it can carry us, is the proper question to them. To answer this question satisfactorily, we have to write a treatise on logic from the standpoint of supra-rational Absolutism. But the aim of the present work, as already mentioned, is more limited. Yet we can say a few words about the place of logic in Sankara's philosophy. He would say that logic has to be fitted into the five levels of reality given in Part III, Chapter X. Thought is not limited to formal logic. It also tries to know its implications, though it cannot grasp all.

Thought performing this second function is speculative thought, and the logic depicting this function may be called speculative logic, or, after Kant, transcendental logic. These two functions of thought we may, if we like, metaphorically call the horizontal and the vertical functions. For thought tries to dive down the depths of phenomenal existence in the transcendental logic, whereas it merely skims the surface in the formal logic. These two aspects of thought cross and recross each other, and can be separately treated only by abstraction. Logic can work only so long as the distinction between the subject and the object, and between the subject and the predicate, lasts, and only so long as the subject is taken to be true and existent.

IX

In the end the question may be put: What is the ideal meaning of the universe according to Sankara? It is its spirituality. It is the supremacy of spirit and its freedom. Professor Bakewell writes: "Into a world bound by fate you cannot squeeze freedom any more than you can translate motion into rest. But if you start with freedom, we can perhaps account for fate. So the idealist starts with freedom, with spontaneity, creativity, that is, with soul or spirit."¹ Sankara accepts this motive of idealism wholeheartedly. But he is more serious with the supremacy and the freedom of the spirit than most others. These have allowed the determinism of the natural sciences to make its way into the realm of the spirit and turn it into an identity in difference, with the result that the spirit is no longer regarded as free. Professor Campbell has rightly shown that if the Absolute is a system of content there can be scope for freedom.² The content is constituted by universals or eternal ideas. Thus the spirit is determined by the eternal ideas and has no choice to make between alternatives. It is of no use to say that the whole transcends the parts if the parts are organic to the whole. But according to Sankara

¹ C. Barrett: *Contemporary Idealism in America*, p. 35.

² *Scepticism and Construction*, pp. 115-27.

the spirit is non-difference and there are no eternal ideas. Hence the spirit can find itself intact in any change of content, choosing some and rejecting the others

This freedom in the practical sphere has its counterpart in integrality in the theoretical sphere. This integrality shows the same indifference to detail or content. It is here that the element of possibility finds its place. For example, we find no reason why the rose is red and the marigold yellow. It is on account of this indifference that the lower, as we have said, cannot be deduced from the higher category, though the higher can be deduced from the lower.

The same idea of freedom is expressed when it is said that creation is due to the spirit overflowing itself. It means that the phenomenal world is what has overflowed, while the spirit does not spend itself in creation. It remains a whole, free and intact, and is not affected by the phenomenal world. Similarly, when it is said in the Upanishads that the world is the *līlā* or play of God, the statement signifies the freedom of the spirit. Because of this freedom, there is inexplicability in the world, and the world is called *māyā*. Again, because of this freedom, the spirit transcends our thought, which is deterministic in outlook.

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